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KENTUCKY PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT
Bruce K. Dudley
WYATT, TARRANT & COMBS, LLP
500 West Jefferson Street, Suite 2800
Louisville, Kentucky 40202-2898
(502) 562-7550
I. INTRODUCTION
Following passage by the General Assembly, the Kentucky Principal and Income Act
(the "Kentucky Act") became effective on January 1, 2005. It is set out in KRS 386.450 through
.504. The Kentucky Act contains most (but not all) of the provisions of the 1997 Revised
Unifonn Principal and Income Act (the "Uniform Act"), and many of these are a substantial
departure from prior law concerning principal and income detenninations.

Included in the

Kentucky Act are three provisions of significant note:
(1)

KRS 386.454, which grants the trustee the authority to adjust between principal

and income, (a) is applicable only where the trustee is investing as a prudent investor (more
discussion later), (b) includes payment of a unitrust amount as a method of adjustment, and (c)
requires beneficiary consents and District Court approval;
(2)

Subsection (6) of KRS 386.454 authorizes a fiduciary, with District Court

approval, to divide a trust into two or more

~eparate

trusts on a fractional basis, if there is no

change in any beneficial interests; and
(3)

KRS 386.464 pennits the settlor of a trust to change the charitable beneficiary by

Will or by written notice to trustee or decline to make a change in like manner.
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As noted, many other changes wrought in the Kentucky Act are a substantial departure
from prior law. Much of this is due to the fact that prior law was based upon the Revised
Unifonn Principal and Income Act that was promulgated in 1962. Of course, entities such as S
corporations and limited liability companies did not exist then. Nor did retirement vehicles such
as 401 (k}benefit plans and IRAs. The Kentucky Act deals with all of these.
One provision of prior law doesn't appear in the Unifonn Act or the Kentucky Act
because it should no longer be necessary. Prior KRS 386.295 dealt with payment of delayed
income upon the sale of underproductive property (property that didn't produce annual income
of 1% of its inventory value). Under the Kentucky Act, KRS 386.488(2), proceeds received
upon the sale of an asset are principal regardless of how much income the property produced.
However, with the trustee's authority to allocate between principal and income (with District
Court approval), old KRS 386.295 should not have any relevance in the administration of a trust.

II. TRUSTEE'S POWER TO ALLOCATE

"

The Unifonn Act empowers the trustee (and the personal representative of an .estate) to
adjust between principal and income so as to enable the trustee to implement modem portfolio
theory under the prudent investor rule 1, which looks at trust investing on a total return basis with
less emphasis on traditional notions of income and principal. As note in the Comments to the
Unifonn Act:

1 The

Unifonn Prudent Investor Act has not been enacted in Kentucky. However, there is a brief
statement of the ·prudent investor rule inKRS 287.277 (Appendix A) that is applicable to
corporate trustees, and non-corporate (individual) trustees may elect to have the prudent investor
rule apply under KRS 386.454(1).
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Section 104 does not empower a trustee to increase or decrease the
degree of beneficial enjoyment to which a beneficiary is entitled
under the terms of a trust; rather, it authorizes the trustee to make
adjustments between principal ~d income that may be necessary if
the income component of a portfolio's total return is too small or
too big because of investment decisions made by the trustee under
the prudent investor rule.
The Kentucky Act in KRS 386.454(2) provides that a trustee may adjust between
principal and income if
(1)

KRS 287.277 applies by law or by election (which may be made under Section

(1) with District Court approval);
(2)

the trust describes the amount that mayor shall be distributed to a beneficiary

with reference to the trust's income; and
(3)

the -trustee is unable to administer the trust impartially with respect to all

beneficiaries.
The Kentucky Act limits the trustee's power to adjust by requiring the approval of the
District Court. In the definitional section of the Kentucky Act, this is defined to mean the
consent of all current beneficiaries, all remainder beneficiaries ·in the oldest generation, and the
district court. KRS 386.450(3). In contrast to the Unifonn Act, which grants full discretion to
the fiduciary, the Kentucky Act subjects the exercise of discretion to the consensus of a group.
This is a substantial departure from the Uniform Act, and it came about because the General
Assembly was uncomfortable with granting too much discretion to fiduciaries.
The power to adjust includes conversion to an annual unitrust payout of 3% - 5% of the
annual value of the trust's assets.

The range of 3% - 5% was derived from regulations
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promulgated under section 643(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the
"Code,,).2 The regulations specifically state that a unitrust amount of 3% - 5% is a reasonable
apportionment of the total return ofa trust. Treas. Reg. 1.643(b)-I.
Several questions have arisen concerning the district court proceeding:
1)

Who are the remainder beneficiaries in the oldest generation?

For

example, if the spouse is the current beneficiary and two children (both over age
18) are the equal remainder beneficiaries if they survive this spouse (but if not, to
their descendants), it is clear that the two children are the remainder beneficiaries
in the oldest generation.
Change the facts slightly so that one child is deceased but has surviving minor
children. Is the surviving child the remainder beneficiary in the oldest generation
or must the minor children of the deceased child be included in the proceeding?
The answer should be that only the surviving child must consent, but it could be
argued that there are two separate remainder interests.
2)

The statute states that a unitrust percentage is to be applied to the annual

value of the trust assets. Does this authorize an average of three preceding year
ends or 12 preceding calendar quarters?

2 These regulations were drafted to authorize a fiduciary to include capital gains in distributable
net income for fiduciary income tax purposes, where the fiduciary is exercising a power to
adjust. These will be discussed later in detail.
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3)

With a dynasty trust lasting for the full period of the Rule Against

Perpetuities, who are the remainder beneficiaries? A guardian ad litem will be
necessary in this situation.
4)

What is the impact of the new statute, if any, for a traditional trust that was

converted to a total return trust prior to January 1, 2005, and is paying greater
than a 5% unitrust amount?
III.

CODE SECTION 643<Bl - THE NEW REGULATIONS

Capital gains are generally excluded from distributable net income for fiduciary income
tax purposes, and this rule has been in place for many years under Section 643 of the Code and
its regulations. The new regulations are effective for tax years of trusts and estates ending after
January 2, 2004. The changes in the regulations were generated as a result of changes in state
laws concerning the prudent investor rule and the Unifonn Act. Under certain circumstances,
fiduciaries may allocate capital gains to "distributable net income", and the gains then will pass
to the beneficiary as part of the distribution deduction calculated on the income tax return for the
trust. 3 Treas. Reg. 1.643(a)-3(b)(1) states:
Gains from the sale or exchange of capital assets are included in
distributable net income to the extent they are, pursuant to the
tenns of the governing instrument and local law, or pursuant to a
reasonable and impartial exercise of discretion by the fiduciary (in
accordance with a power granted' to the fiduciary by applicable
local law or by the governing instrument if not prohibited by local
law-(1)
Allocated to income (but if income under the state statute is
defined aS,or consists of, a unitrust amount, a discretionary power
to allocate gains to income must also be exercised consistently and
3

Capital losses are first netted at the trust level against gains. Treas. Reg. 1.643(a)-3(d).
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the amount so allocated may not be greater than the amount of
distributable net income determined without regard to this
subparagraph §1.643(a)-3(b» (emphasis added.);
Two of the examples in the regulations deal with payments of a unitrust amount where
there is no state law concerning the ordering of the character of the payment (i.e., no rule stating
that the unitrust amount is considered to be paid from various types of income in a certain order,
as under the Kentucky Act), one with the trustee determining to include capital gains in
distributable net income and the other not. Both are all right, but the trustee must be consistent
in its treatment of capital gains from year to year. The Kentucky Act does not specifically grant
discretion to the trustee concerning allocation of capital gains to distributable net income, so the
trustee likely will want to address this matter in any petition to reform a trust.
Other tax issues are addressed in the new regulations and in amendments to regulations
under other Code sections. These are:
1)

A switch between methods of determining income that is authorized by state law

will not constitute a recognition event for purposes of Code Section 1001. Treas. Reg. 1.643(b)1.
2)

A switch between methods will not result in a taxable gift from the trust's grantor

or any of the trust's beneficiaries. Treas. Reg. 1.643(b)-1.
(3)

A trustee will be treated as having sold property that is distributed in kind to a

beneficiary entitled to receive all income. The amount realized is the fair market value of the
property on the date of distribution. Treas. Reg. 1.651 (a)-2.
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4)

Gain or loss is similarly realized by a trust where the trustee distributes property

in kind if the distribution is in satisfaction of a right to receive·a distribution of a specific dollar
amount, of property other than that distributed, or of income (if the income is required to be
distributed). Treas. Reg. 1.661(a)-2.
5)

The regulations under both Code sections 2056(b)(5) (general power of

appointment trust for spouse) and (b)(7) (QTIP trust for spouse) are amended to the effect that
qualification for the marital deduction is not adversely affected where the trustee distributes
income that meets the requirements ofTreas. Reg. 1.643(b)-I.
(6)

A trust that is grandfathered for generation-skipping tax purposes will not lose its

exempt status by converting an income interest to a unitrust interest that is authorized under state
law. Treas. Reg. 26.2601-1(b)(2).
IV. DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND TERMINATING INCOME INTERESTS:
DETERMINATION OF AND ENTITLEMENT TO NET INCOME
A.

Detennination and distribution of net income in the case of an estate and after an
income interest in a trust ends.

KRS 386.456(1) provides that a beneficiary who receives specific property will receive
the net income and net principal attributable to such property as detennined under nonnal
income/principal rules.
Section (2) states that remaining net income will be detennined under nonnal
income/principal rules and by - --Including in net income all income from property used to discharge liabilities;
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--Paying from income or principal in the fiduciary's discretion, fees of attorneys,
accountants, and fiduciaries; court costs and other administration expenses (but expenses may be
paid from income only if such payment will not reduce the marital or charitable deduction); and
--Paying from principal all other disbursements made in connection with settlement of an
estate or winding up a terminating income interest.
According to the Comments, the fiduciary is granted discretion in connection with certain
expenses above so that the need to make compensating adjustments will not be necessary. For
example, if the fiduciary pays an expense out of income which the fiduciary. has determined to
deduct on the income tax returns of the estate or trust, then no adjustment between beneficiaries
would be necessary (i.e., the income beneficiary bore the expense and received the benefit of its
payment).
Section (3) puts on the same footing beneficiaries of specific dollar amounts from estates
and trusts by providing that the beneficiary under the trust agreement will receive the same
payment of interest that the beneficiary under a Will would receive. Under KRS 394.520, the
beneficiary of a pecuniary bequest under a Will is entitled to interest if payment is made more
than one year after the Will is probated.
B.

Distributions to Residuary and Remainder Beneficiaries.

KRS 386.458(4) states than an income interest ends on the day before an income
beneficiary dies. This new section also includes a specific provision for calculating a fractional
interest upon distribution. Prior law specified the use of "inventory value" in making such
calculation. The new law appears to be more in line with accepted practice to the effect that,
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absent contrary instruction in the governing document,. the value of the fractional interest is
detennined using date of distribution values.

c.

KRS 386.462 - Apportionment of Receipts and Disbursements When Decedent
Dies or Income· Interest Begins.

-'-An income receipt or disbursement will be allocated to principal if the due date occurs
before the decedent's death (in the case of an estate) or before an income interest begins (in the
case of a trust).
--An income receipt or disbursement is allocated to income if, its due date occurs after
the decedent's death or an income interest begins and it is a periodic due date. If there is no
, periodic due date or the payment has no due date, then the income receipt or disbursement is
treated as accruing from day to day. Amounts accrued to the decedent's death or before the
income interest begins are allocated to principal and the balance of a payment is allocated to
income.
--What is the due date of a payment? Normally, it is the date on which the payer is
required to make payment. Distributions to shareholders or other owners from an entity to which
KRS 386.466 applies are deemed to be due on the "record date" or, if there is none, on the
declaration date. Due dates for lease rentals and interest on obligations are considered to be
periodic.
D.

KRS 386.464 Apportionment When Income Interest Ends And Definition of
Undistributed Income.

--"Undistributed income" means net income received before the date on which an income
interest ends. It does not include income or expense that is due or accrued or net income that is
required to be added to principal.
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v. ALLOCATION OF RECEIPTS DURING
ADMINISTRATION OF A TRUST
A.

KRS 386.466 deals with receipts from entities.

"Entities" are defined as corporations, partnerships, limited liability companies, regulated
investment companies, real estate investment trusts, common trust funds or any other
organization in which the trustee has an interest (other than an estate or trust).
Generally, money received from an entity is income.
A trustee is required to allocate the following receipts to principal:
--Property other than money received from the entity.
--Money received in one or several related distributions in exchange for part or all of the
trustee's interest in the entity.
--Money received in total or partial liquidation of the entity.
--Money received from a RIC or a REIT if the money is a capital gain dividend for
federal income tax purposes. As the Comments note, net short-term capital gain is not included
as a "capital gain dividend" under the Code and, therefore, is allocated to income.
--Per the Comments, reinvested dividends are treated as principal if the trustee elects to
reinvest dividends under KRS 386.454 (with District Court approval).
--Money is received in partial liquidation if such is indicated by the entity or if the
distribution(s) exceed 20% of the entity's gross assets.
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--Money is not received in partial liquidation to the extent it does not exceed the amount
of income that a trustee or beneficiary will pay on the taxable income of the entity.
--The trustee may rely on a statement from the entity's board of directors (or similar
person or group of persons) as to the source or character of the distribution.
B.

KRS 386.470 deals with principal receipts.

--Amounts received from a transferor during life are allocated to principal.

--The same is true for amounts received from a decedent's estate and amounts received
on life insurance and annuity contracts.
--Money received from the sale, exchange, or liquidation of a principal asset, including
stock splits and realized profit.
--Proceeds of property taken by eminent domain. But, if there is a separate award for loss
of income during a period where a current beneficiary had a mandatory income interest, such
award will be income.
--Amounts received for options granted or paid for options acquired are allocated to
principal. The same is true for gain or loss realized upon the exercise of options.

c.

KRS 386.472 concerns receipts from rental properties.

--Rent is income. Amounts received for renewal or cancellation of a lease are as well.
--Refundable deposits are added to principal.
--Some amounts paid under a lease may be reflective of capital improvements and,
according to the Comments, the trustee may want to make a transfer from income to principal
under KRS 386.496
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D.

Receipt from obligations to pay money are dealt with in KRS 386.474.

--Interest is allocated to income.

This includes receipt of a prepayment penalty.

Premiums paid on obligations are not to be amortized.
--Amounts received from the sale or redemi'tion of an obligation that matures more than
one year after purchase are allocated to principal, even if the original purchase price was less
than the obligation's maturity value. If the maturity date is less than one year after purchase, an
amount received in excess of the purchase price is allocated to income.
--This section is not applicable to an obligation to which KRS 386.472 (receipts from
rental property), .480 (receipts from deferred compensation, annuities, or similar payments), .482
(receipts from a liquidating asset), 484 (receipts from mineral, water, or other natural resources),
or .486 (receipts from timber) applies.
E.

KRS 386.476- insurance policies and similar contracts.

--Where the trustee is named as a beneficiary of a life insurance policy or other contract,
including property and casualty policies and title insurance policies, proceeds are allocated to
principal.
F.

KRS 386.480 deals with receipts from deferred compensation, annuities, and
similar payments.

--Included in this section are private or commercial annuities, individual retirement
accounts, and pension, profit-sharing, stock bonus, or stock-ownership plans.
--The term "payment" means a payment over a fixed number of years or during the life of
one or more individuals because of services rendered or property transferred in exchange for
future payments.
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--If a payment is designated as interest or dividends (or as made in lieu of interest or
dividends), the trustee will allocate such payment to income.

The balance is allocated to

principal.
--If no designation is made and all or part of the payment is required to be made, the
trustee will allocate to income 10% of the portion of the payment that is required to be made and
the balance will be allocated to principal.
--If no part of the payment is required to be made or the payment is the entire amount to
which the trustee is entitled, the entire payment is allocated to principal.
--If a larger portion of a payment is required to be allocated to income in order for the
trustee to obtain the marital deduction, the trustee will make such allocation.
G.

KRS 386.482 concerns principal/income treatment of receipts from liquidating
assets.

--"Liquidating assets" are leaseholds, patents, copyrights, royalty rights, and the right to
receive payments for a period greater than one year under an arrangement that does not provide
for the payment of interest. Ten percent of amounts received are allocated to income.
H.

386.484 - Receipts from natural resources.

--Most receipts are allocated 90% to principal and 10% to income.
--If an interest in water is renewable, the receipt is allocated to income.
.--Proceeds from disposition of an interest are allocated in the same manner as receipts.
--If the interest is held in trust on 1-1-05, the trustee is granted discretion to allocate the
receipts in the manner utilized by the trustee prior to that date.
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--In detennining the allocation o'freceipts under the new Kentucky law, it does not matter
whether the minerals or other natural resources were being extracted before or after being placed
in trust.
I.

The rules concerning receipts from timber are set forth in KRS 386.486.

--Receipts are allocated to income to the extent that the timber removed does not exceed
the growth rate during a beneficiary's mandatory income interest. Receipts in excess of the rate
of growth are principal, as are proceeds from the sale of standing timber. The trustee is required
to allocate to principal a reasonable depletion allowance. As with natural resources, it does not
matter whether the timber was being harvested prior to being placed in trust. Also, the trustee
has the option of using the prior method on existing timber interests, but must apply the new law
on timber interests acquired in the trust after 1-1-05.
J.

Pursuant to KRS 386.478, amounts received to which .480, .482, .484 or .486 is
applicable may be insubstantial, and the trustee may determine to allocate the
entire amount to principal.'

--An amount is presumed to be insubstantial if (1) the amount of the allocation would

increase or decrease net income (as determined before the allocation) during the accounting
period by less than 10%, or (2) the value of the asset producing the receipt is less than 10% (at
the beginning of the accounting period) of the value of the trust's assets.
VI. ALLOCATION OF DISBURSEMENTS DURING
ADMINISTRATION OF TRUST
A.

Disbursements from income are governed by KRS 386.490, and the rules for
disbursements from principal are contained in KRS 386.492.

--1/2 of the trustee's regular compensation is paid each from·principal and income. This
includes costs of investment advisory or custodial services provided to the trustee.
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--1/2 of all expenses for accountings, judicial

proc~edings,

or other matters that involve

both the income and remainder interests is paid each from income and principal.
--Trustee's compensation calculated on principal as a fee for acceptance, termination, or
distribution is charged to principal.
--Disbursements to prepare property for sale are charged to principal.
--Payments on the principal of trust debt are paid from principal.
--Expenses of a proceeding that primarily concerns principal, such as a proceeding to
construe a trust or to protect the trust or its property, are paid from principal.
--Premiums on insurance to cover the loss of a principal asset or loss of income from the
use of the asset are charged to income and·other insurance premiums are paid from principal (per
the Comments, such as title and life insurance premiums).
--Death taxes (including penalties apportioned) to a trust are charged to principal. Per the
Comments, GST taxes are included.
--Disbursements concerning environmental matters are charged to principal.
--All other ordinary expenses concerning administration, management or preservation of
trust property and the distribution of income are charged to income. These include interest,
ordinary repairs, regularly recurring taxes assessed against principal, and expenses of a
proceeding that primarily relates to the income interest.
B.

KRS 386.494 deals with transfers from income to principal to cover depreciation.

--The trustee is authorized to make such transfers, but need not create a separate fund.
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No transfer may be made for a residence or personal property that is used by the
beneficiary or during the administration of a decedent's estate.
C.

KRS 386.496 concerns transfers from income to principal in order to regularize
.
income disbursements over a period of years.

--An example would be a large planned expenditure from principal for which the trustee

would expect to create a depreciation reserve. Rather than make abnonnally large transfers from
income to principal following the expenditure, this provision authorizes the trustee to make
transfers from income to principal with the expected expenditure in mind.
D.

KRS 396.498 - Payment of income taxes.

--If a receipt is allocated to income, the tax on that receipt is paid from income.
--Similarly, the tax on receipts allocated to principal are paid from principal.
--Tax on income from an entity depends upon whether the receipts from the entity are
allocated to income or principal.
E.

Adjustments between principal and income due to taxes are dealt with in KRS
386.500.

--A typical example, per the Comments, involves deducting a principal expense (that
could have been deducted on the federal estate tax return) on an income tax return.
--With a QSST, where all of the income of the S corporation is taxable to the income
beneficiary, the trustee may transfer principal to income (for ultimate distribution to the income
beneficiary) if the cash distribution from the S corporation is not sufficient to cover the
beneficiary's income tax liability.
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--Under the Kentucky Act, the above adjustments require District Court approval.
--Subsection (2) requires a mandatory adjustment from income to principal if the marital
or charitable deduction is reduced because the fiduciary deducts an amount paid from principal
on an income tax return and the estate tax is increased and the income tax is decreased.
VII.

APPLICABILITY TO EXISTING TRUSTS

A.

Unless provided othetwise in the instrument creating the trust, the Kentucky Act
applies to all trusts administered under Kentucky law no matter when created.

B.

KRS 386.502 reiterates that the trustee's authority to adopt the prudent investor
rule and to make allocations to income (KRS 386.454) is strictly subject to
District Court approval.
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APPENDIX A
287.277 Standards for bank or trust company acting as fiduciary.

(1)

Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, a bank empowered to act as a fiduciary
or trust company, when investing, reinvesting, purchasing, acquiring, exchanging, selling,
and managing property held in a fiduciary capacity, shall act as a prudent investor would,
in light of the purposes, terms, distribution requirements and other circumstances of the
fiduciary account.

(2)

The standard described in subsection (1) of this section requires the exercise of
reasonable care, skill, and caution, and is to be applied to investments not in isolation but
in the context of the account portfolio and as part of an overall investment strategy, which
should incorporate risk and return objectives reasonably suitable to the account.

(3)

In making and implementing investment decisions, the bank or trust company has a duty
to diversify the investments of the account unless, under the circumstances, it is prudent
not to do so.

(4)

In addition, the bank or trust company shall:
(a) Conform to fundamental fiduciary duties of loyalty and impartiality;
(b) Act with prudence in deciding whether and how to delegate authority and in the
selection and supervision of agents; and
(c) Incur only costs that are reasonable in amount and appropriate to the investment
responsibilities of the account.

(5)

The duties of the bank or trust company under this section are subject to the rule that in
investing the funds of the account, the bank or trust company:
(a) Has a duty to the beneficiaries of the account to conform to any applicable statutory
provisions governing investment by fiduciaries; and
(b) Has the power expressly or impliedly granted by the terms of the account or
applicable instrument and has a duty to the beneficiaries of the account to conform to
the terms of the account directing or restricting investments by the bank or trust
company.
Effective: July 15 1996
History: Created 1996 Ky. Acts ch. 338, sec. 6, effective July 15 , 1996.
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I. The Underlying Issue: Wealth And How To Use It Wisely. Our society has
created vast amounts of wealth. This wealth has incredible powers for bringing
out the best and worse in human beings. Those powers are difficult to fathom and
equally as difficult to direct and control. Some of these issues are humorously
depicted in the movie, "A New Leaf'.!
A. Ignorance, Fear, Hopes and Desires - A nationwide survey study
conducted by PNC Advisors and released in early 2005 questioned 792
affluent people including nearly 500 with more than $1 million in
investable assets. 2 Among the surprising results were:
1. More than 37% of respondents lack a will or healthcare proxy and
do not have a trust. The excuse cited by 56% of all respondents
who do not have a will was procrastination. Twelve percent said
they did not want to confront their own mortality and 5 % said they
did not feel they had enough money to justify a will.
2. Almost half (49%) of survey respondents with children at home
worry that their kids will grow up feeling "entitled" and nearly as
many (44%) believe their children are spoiled. Nine out often
respondents with children agree that it is important for children to
learn the value of money through hard work and half (50%) said
they do not believe kids today know the true value of a dollar.
Of this same group only one third (29%) encourage their children
to take after school jobs. The survey showed that 76% of
respondents with children said it was important to be open with
children on financial matters. Of that group only 58% have set up
basic bank accounts for their children to use, only 29% have set up
basic brokerage accounts for children to learn about investing and
only 8% have set up a relationship with a financial advisor.
3. When asked how much they needed to feel financially secure in
the future, respondents consistently cited a need to approximately
double their current level of assets. Those with $10 million or more
felt they needed a median of $18.1 million; those with $5 million
or more needed $10.4 million; and those with a half million to $1
million said they needed $2.4 million.
4. Many of America's richest individuals are not communicating their
plans, even with those closest to them. More than half (58%) of
survey respondents have never discussed the transfer of wealth
with family members, and one in five (23%) who have plans feel
1

2

May, Elaine. (Director). (1971). A New Leaf. Paramount Studios 5555 Melrose Avenue, Hollywood, CA.
PNC Advisors, Wealth and Values Survey, 2005.
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no need to discuss them. More than one in 10 (14%) said they
never even thought to have the discussion.
B. These polling results show the ignorance, fear, hopes and desires of many
wealthy individuals. They want their children/heirs to grow up and live
healthy, happy and productive lives. They recognize that wealth, if
handled properly, can be a component in achieving these goals. Their fear
centers on wealth's ability to corrupt and stifle initiative and block true
happiness. Many wealthy individuals are uncomfortable with their
money, don't plan properly, find it difficult to communicate with those
who will inherit their wealth and worry about whether they themselves
have enough to sustain their lifestyles.
C. The emotions surrounding wealth and the responsibility of finding the best
way to pass it along to the next generation makes estate planning a
daunting task. As in most things in life, there are no tried and true
methods. Wealthy individuals often look to a trust as a vehicle by which
they can attempt to protect or control their heirs "from the grave". "They
fear that the beneficiaries of their trust will be unable to handle the
responsibilities and temptations of wealth. The grantors try to protect the
beneficiaries from themselves.
D. This dark side of wealth, the source of worries and fears for those who
hold it, looms large. Our society recognizes these worries and fears and
has, in typical American entrepreneurial fashion, spawned an industry that
attempts to -aid the wealthy in addressing their concerns and helping the
next generation live happy lives. The offerings range from books,
websites, and periodicals to television shows and documentaries.
1. "Affluenza" is a term coined to describe the often dysfunctional
relationship that people have with money and material things. 3
2. The Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) has aired a program titled
"Affluenza" de~cribing this phenomenon. According to its web
site "(t)hrough revealing personal stories, expert commentary,
hilarious old film clips, dramatized vignettes, and "anticommercial" breaks, "Affluenza" examines the high cost of
achieving the most extravagant lifestyle the world has ever seen.,,4

3. More Than Money - an organization based in Cambridge,
Massachusetts, that offers conferences, coaching, online discussion
and a magazine geared to " ... start participants on the path of

The Affluenza Project. affluenza.com. 2005. Retrieved June 18, 2005 from http://www.affluenza.com.
KCTS/Seattle and Oregon Public Broadcasting. Affluenza. Retrieved June 18, 2005 from
www.pbs.org/kcts/affluenza/home.html.

3

4
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becoming more efficient and clear decision-makers about their
money and their values in order to create a more meaningfullife."s
4. The Inheritance Project - an organization that " ... explores the
emotional and social impact of inherited wealth. The project's
mission is fourfold: (1) To enhance our culture's understanding of
the unique challenges and opportunities that inherited wealth
brings (2) To help heirs break the isolation and overcome the
taboos surrounding wealth (3) To show heirs how other inheritors
have claimed their personal power and used it to benefit others (4)
To provide networking and educational resources to heirs and
professional advisors who work with them.,,6
5. "Born Rich"? a 2003 Sundance Film Festival Selection and Emmynominated documentary produced and directed by Jamie Johnson,
an heir to the Johnson & Johnson fortune. The documentary
examines wealth and its affect on children.
E. It is too easy to dismiss these and other organizations as crackpots or fly
by night operations representing a passing fashion. Credentialed,
established companies and individuals are recognizing that their clients
take the heavy responsibilities of wealth seriously.
1. Resonate, Inc. is a financial and estate-planning firm based in
Cincinnati, OR, which describes itself as having" ... created an
interactive planning process which first shifts the focus from your
economic value to emphasizing your human value."s.
2. Merrill Lynch's website contains an "Advice and Planning" article
titled "Raising Wealthy Kids Right" which discusses "affluenza".9
3. Jon Gallo, J.D., senior partner in the estate-planning department of
Greenberg, Glusker, Fields, Claman, Machtinger & Kinsella LLP
in Los Angeles, CA and his wife psychotherapist Eileen Gallo,
together founded the Gallo Institute. Their institute recognizes
" ...that people have complex relationships with family wealth and
that affluence, handled properly, is a positive factor in one's life."

More Than Money. (2005). Retrieved June 18,2005 from www.morethanmoney.org/.
The Inheritance Project. (2003). Inheritance-project.com. Retrieved June 18, 2005 from
www.inheritance-project.com/.
7 Johnson, Jamie. (Producer & Director). (2003). Born Rich. Home Box Office, Inc., a division of Time
Warner Entertainment Company, 1100 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY.
8 Resonate, Inc.. Resonatecompanies.com. Retrieved June 18, 2005 from www.resonatecompanies.com/.
9 C.J. Price. (Spring 2005). Raising Wealthy Kids Right. Reprinted from the Spring 2005 Issue of Merrill
Lynch Advisor. Retrieved June 18, 2005 from Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith website:
http://askmerrill.m1.com/publish/marketing_centerslarticleslaap_article_aO 18/.
5
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Eileen Gallo is also author of the book "Silver Spoon Kids: How
Successful Parents Raise Responsible Kids" 10
4. PNC Advisors and its "Wealth and Values Survey",ll as noted in
Item I (a), above.
II. New ideas in dealing with wealth planning use a number of approaches to combat
the negative issues associated with wealth. Among them are communication,
education and building self-esteem.
A. Education - How can wealth be used to positively influence the lives of
heirs?
1. Start the learning process when the heir is young and can be taught
to handle money in a responsible way. For example, give children
an allowance. Eileen Gallo, author of "Silver Spoon Kids: How
Successful Parents Raise Responsible Kids" suggests that all
children should get an allowance with no strings attached. The
allowance should be a sharing of family resources, not as a form of
compensation or as punishment. It is an excellent opportunity for
teaching values and the uses of money. 12
B. Communication - "Wealth is a subject everyone has traditionally been
told not to talk about; it is a taboo" says Jamie Johnson, an heir to the
Johnson & Johnson fortune. He goes on to say that "(i)fpeople are not
willing to talk about the wealth they have created, and about how their
children can be part of preserving the family business or the family
wealth, you have confusion, and you run into a lot of problems. That is
when you end up seeing the family company fail, or people losing their
family fortune." 13
C. Self-Esteem - This is a vital quality in any person. High self-esteem
allows a person to function successfully in society. Low self-esteem can
cripple an individual making them unable to navigate life successfully. 14
Those with low self-esteem have more financial problems than those with
high self-esteem.
III. Discretionary Trusts
The Gallo Institute. (2005), Galloinstitute.com. Retrieved June 18, 2005 from www.galloinstitute.org/.
Wealth and Values Survey. 2005. PNC Advisors.com. Retrieved June 18,2005 from
www.pncadvisors.com/pncadvisors/1.1264.522.00.html.
12 Lowengard, Mary. Making Allowances for Youth. Worth. April 1, 2004. Retrieved June 18, 2005 from
www.worth.com/WealthlFamily-Issues/Parenting-Making-Allowances-for-Youth.asp.
13 Johnson, Jamie. Teach Your Children Well. Worth. July 1, 2004. Retrieved June 18, 2005 from
www.worth.com/Wealth/Family-Issues/First-Person-Teach-Your-Children-Well.asp.
14 See Hausner, Lee, (PhD). The Good Financial Parent. Worth, January 1, 2004, Retrieved June 18,2005
from www.worth.com/WealthlFamily-Issues/Family-Matters-The-Good-Financial-Parent.asp.
10
11
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A. Discretion - Black's Law Dictionary defines discretion as the "Wise
conduct and management: cautious discernment; prudence,,15.
B. Discretionary Trust - A discretionary trust grants a trustee the power to
distribute income and/or principal to or for a current or future
beneficiary's benefit. The trust outlines the class or classes of
beneficiaries who can receive these distributions, grants authority to the
trustee to make distributions to some or all of them and provides
guidelines to assist the trustee in determining the purposes for which the
funds may be distributed and in what amounts. 16
IV. Grantors need guidance in communicating their values and intentions and
structuring discretionary language in such a way that furthers those values and
intentions.
A. Educating grantors gives them a clear understanding of the impact of their
decisions. It also allows them an opportunity to guide and instruct the
beneficiaries. Grantors can be unaware of their ability to help or hurt the
named beneficiaries. They may assume that the law dictates how a trust
should read and that they are stuck with the "boilerplate".
B. Communication with family and financial advisors/trustee helps in dealing
with the issues that will inevitably arise that the document's terms do not
address.
1. A grantor engaging in an open discussion with beneficiaries about
the terms of a trust can go a long way in easing tensions and
helping everyone come to a mutual understanding of the wealth
held by the trust and how the trust will make that wealth useful to
its beneficiaries.
2. Ethical Wills - According to the Ethical Wills website, "Ethical
wills are a way to share your values, blessings, life's lessons, hopes
and dreams for the future, love, and forgiveness with your family,
friends, and community. Ethical wills are not new. The Hebrew
Bible first described ethical wills 3000 years ago (Genesis Ch. 49).
References to this tradition are also found in the Christian Bible
(John Ch. 15-18) and in other cultures ....'Ethical wills' are not
considered legal documents as compared to 'living wills' and your
'last will and testament' ...". 17

Gamer, Bryan A. (Ed). (2004). Black's Law Dictionary. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co.
See Rounds, Charles E, Jr. (2005). Loring: A Trustee's Handbook. § 3.5.3.2(a). New York, NY: Aspen
Publishers.
17 Josaba Ltd. (1998) Ethicalwill.com. Retrieved June 18, 2005 from www.ethicalwill.com/.
15

16
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3. Family Mission Statement - A statement best crafted by the whole
family that outlines its philosophical basis and direction. This type
of document can assist the grantor as well as the trustee and
beneficiaries in understanding their common goals and beliefs. It
can help clarify everyone's financial needs and aspirations. I8
V. The Discretionary Trust - Drafting and Terms
A. See the outline prepared by Kelly Henry, co-presenter, which deals with
this topic in detail.
B. Ideally, the drafting of discretionary language and standards should
include input from the trustee. Discussion between the trustee, grantor
and the drafter can result in language and standards that express the
grantor's wishes in a clearer and more effective way. This collaborative
process can also result in a trust that contains language which the
beneficiaries can understand and use as a source of guidance.
1. For example, a trust permits payments to a beneficiary for
"maintenance and support". This broad standard falls somewhere
between the payment of a utility bill and a payment for a world
cruise. 19 What is the grantor's intent? How would a trustee
interpret this standard? How would the grantor feel about that
interpretation? Does it foster good or negative behavior in the
trust's beneficiaries?
VI. Working with Discretionary Distributions in Trusts
A. KY Law - Guidance for Trustees
1. The Kentucky Revised Statutes do not offer much in the way of
guidance for a trustee in its handling of discretionary distributions
of income or principal.
a. Under its "Definitions for Kentucky Principal and Income
Act", the Kentucky Revised Statutes define "Terms ofa
trust" as " ... the manifestation of the intent of a settlor or
decedent with respect to the trust, expressed in a manner
that admits of its proof in a judicial proceeding, whether by
written or spoken words or by conduct... ,,20. Under this
definition, the obvious first place to look for guidance is the
18 Family Business Institute, Inc. (2004). Family-business-experts.com. Retrieved June 18, 2005 from
www.family-business-experts.com/family-mission-statement.html.
19 See Rounds, Charles E, Jr. (2005). Loring: A Trustee's Handbook. § 3.5.3.2(a). New York, NY: Aspen
Publishers.
20 Kentucky Revised Statues §386.450 (12) (2005).
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text of the trust. Other written materials (ethical will,
mission statement, etc. noted above) may also have a place
under this definition. Spoken words and conduct also have
their place, but are open to interpretation· and problems of
proof.
b. The Kentucky Revised Statutes §386.452(2) titled
"Fiduciary duties" directs a fiduciary to " ... administer a
trust or estate impartially, based on what is fair and
reasonable to all of the beneficiaries, except to the extent
that the terms of the trust or the will clearly manifest a
contrary intention. 21 This is a reminder of the trustee's
fiduciary duty to deal impartially with beneficiaries.
B. Fiduciary Duties -.- Trustees must adhere to numerous duties in
administering a trust. Listed below for reference are all of the duties with
notes accompanying those that have particular relevance in discretionary
distributions.
1. Duty to administer the trust.
a. When a trustee receives a request for a discretionary
distribution it must be certain to review the document, be
certain the request falls under the trust's terms and
determine what standards apply.
2. Duty of loyalty.
3. Duty not to delegate.
4. Duty to keep and render accounts.
a. The trustee must keep accurate records of discretionary
distributions.
5. Duty to furnish information.
a. Trustees have a duty" ...to keep the qualified beneficiaries
of the trust reasonably informed about the administration of
the trust and of the material facts necessary for them to
protect their interests. Unless unreasonable under the
circumstances, a trustee shall promptly respond to a
beneficiary's request for information related to the
administration of the trust. ,,22
21
22

Kentucky Revised Statues §386.452 (2) (2005).
Uniform Trust Code (2005) §813 (a).
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6. Duty to exercise reasonable care and skill.
7. Duty to take and keep control.
8. Duty to preserve trust property.

9. Duty to enforce claims.
10. Duty to defend actions.
11. Duty to keep trust property separate.
12. Duty with respect to bank deposits.
13. Duty to make the trust property productive.
14. Duty to pay income to beneficiary.
15. Duty to deal impartially with beneficiaries.
a. The Uniform Trust Code (UTe) "If a trust has two or more
beneficiaries, the trustee shall act impartially in investing,
managing, and distributing the trust property, giving due
regard to the beneficiaries' respective interests.,,23 In
comments to this section, the UTC notes that "The duty to
act impartially does not mean that the trustee must treat the
beneficiaries equally. Rather, the trustee must treat the
beneficiaries equitably in light of the purposes and terms of
the trust. A settlor who prefers that the trustee, when
making decisions, generally favor the interests of one
beneficiary over those of others should provide appropriate
guidance in the terms of the trust. See Restatement
(Second) of § 183 cmt. a (1959).,,24
16. Duty with respect to co-trustees.
a. A trustee must confer with and obtain the permission of any
co-trustee before a discretionary distribution is approved.
17. Duty with respect to person holding power of control.

23

24

Uniform Trust Code (2005) §803.
Uniform Trust Code (2005) §803, comment.
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a. A trustee must confer with and obtain the permission of any
advisor or other party who, by terms of the trust, must
approve a discretionary distribution.
VII. The Practical - How to Deal with a Discretionary Distribution Request
A. Before A Request Is Received
1. Communication and Education - Ideally, when a trustee first
accepts its appointment, a meeting should take place with all
beneficiaries to discuss the trust's terms in some detail. Those
individuals who will be dealing with the beneficiaries should be
present. In the case of a bank trust company, this should include
the investment and administrative officers. Topics such as the
reasons why the trust was set up, the advantages it offers, the
trust's assets and their management, and the processes involved in
exercising its benefits should be among the items discussed. If the
grantor is available, he or she should also attend so that they can
explain the thinking behind the trust's provisions. Such a meeting
will often bring out issues or confusion in a forum where they can
be dealt with unencumbered by an actual discretionary distribution
request and the emotion that can accompany it. The meeting is
also an opportunity for the trustee or its representatives who will
be working with those in attendance to establish some rapport and
set the tone for how the trust will be administered. Written
materials should be distributed to each participant including a copy
of the trust and a summary of how the trust operates such as
statement cycles, the timing of income distributions and the
documentary requirements for a discretionary distribution request.
A written summary of the meeting and its main points should also
be sent to each participant after the meeting.
a. Beneficiaries who are not happy with their treatment under
a trust document are seeking advice and resorting to legal
action. Their discontent has spawned such organizations as
Heirs, Inc., which describes itself as " ...the first group of
"unhappy" beneficiaries in the country dedicated to
reforming the administration of trusts/estates." 25 There are
also advocates for trust beneficiaries such as Robert
Rikoon, CEO ofRikoon-Carret Investment Advisors and
author of "Managing Family Trusts: Taking Control of
Inherited Wealth". 26
Heirs, Inc. (2005). Heirs.net. Retrieved June 19, 2005, from http://www.heirs.net/index.html.
See Cotter, Marianne. The Business of Trust Busting. Worth. January 1, 2004. Retrieved June 18, 2005
from http://www.worth.com/Wealth/Trusts-EstatesNisions-Revisions-The-Business-of-Trust-Busting.asp.

25

26
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b. It is too easy to tenn these organizations and advocates as
crackpots and rabble-rousers. A review of some of their
materials shows that there is clearly an underlying lack of
beneficiary communication and education by grantors and
trustees. There are also a number of clear issues created by
trustees and their administration of trusts that could have
been avoided.
B. Upon Receipt of a Request
1. Get the Request in Writing - Most often, a request for a
discretionary distribution will come in the fonn of a telephone call
from a beneficiary. If you are lucky, the request will be one that is
not an emergency and can be dealt with in an expeditious and
businesslike manner. Unfortunately, many requests arrive as
"emergencies" that the caller expects will receive immediate
attention. Regardless as to how these requests are received, the
trustee's representative must insist-that the request be submitted in
writing by the requestor. In today's world of e-mail, (which is an
acceptable fonn for the written request), this is a less onerous
requirement than it once was. Written requests are an absolute
necessity for the trustee, especially in the case of bank trustees who
are subject to reviews by compliance authorities of every stripe
who insist on having a written request in file.
2. Review the Trust Document - The trustee has a fiduciary duty to
administer a trust by its tenns. It is important to read the trust
document in order to detennine the circumstances under which a
discretionary distribution can be made and the standards that are
applicable. While this is a very basic step, it may be one that
during a busy period is easily set aside because "I know that
document". A review of the applicable state law should also occur
in conjunction with a reading of the trust. 27
3. Obtain and Review Supporting Documentation
a. Document the Expense - While each request for a
discretionary distribution is different, most will involve the
payment of some type of expense that can be documented
by way of an invoice or bill. As with the need for a written
request, the trustee needs this item for reasons of
documentation and, in the case of bank trustees,
compliance.
See Hahn, C., Stalions, S. & Staser, J., (2002) "Considerations in Reviewing Requests for Discretionary
Trust Distributions." Hoosier Banker.

27
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b. Other Resources - A trustee should also give consideration
to the other resources available to the requestor that could
be put to use in addressing the issue that has triggered his
or her distribution request. The trust itselfwill often have
terms that specifically require the trustee to investigate
other assets or ignore their existence. Where this issue is
specifically addressed one way or the other, the trustee has
clear cut direction as to how it should proceed.
1.

The Restatement Trusts third edition gives the
following guidance:
A trustee may have discretion, and
perhaps a duty, to take account of
the principal of the beneficiary's
personal estate, depending on the
terms and purposes of the
discretionary power and other
purposes of the trust. The settlor's
relationships and objectives with
respect to both the beneficiary in
question and the trust's other
current and remainder beneficiaries
are of particular relevance. Also
important are any income, estate,
and other tax purposes the trust
may serve (see Comment g) as
well as the liquidity (including
marketability
and
income-tax
basis)
of the
discretionary
beneficiary's assets. 28

11.

Where the document is silent on the issue of other
resources, the trustee has a quandary. Statutory and
case law is non-existent on this issue in Kentucky as
it is in mostjurisdictions. 29 From a practical
standpoint, if the trustee finds the trust is silent on
this issue it should, from the outset, attempt to make
it standard practice that a discretionary distribution
request be accompanied by copies of income tax
returns, financials statements, budgets or some other

Restatement (Third) of Trusts §50, emt. E(2).
See Rounds, Charles E, Jr. (2005). Loring: A Trustee's Handbook. § 3.5.3.2(a). New York, NY: Aspen
Publishers.
28

29
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documentation which shows the requestor's
financial status.
4. Other Beneficiaries - If there are a number of other beneficiaries
who could potentially request distributions from the trust, the
trustee must determine the impact of the current request on their
ability to have their own future requests granted. A trustee may be
aware of their current or potential needs and should weigh how
those needs might be impacted. As noted above, a fiduciary's duty
of impartiality requires the trustee to treat all of the beneficiaries
fairly given the trust's stated terms and purposes. 30
5. Prior History of Distributions - A trustee should review the trust's
prior history of distributions as part of the discretionary
distribution process. Does the beneficiary have a history of
requests that are abusive in nature? Is there a pattern emerging that
the trustee can address by some other means? Is there a pattern of
distributions to other beneficiaries that could be disrupted by the
granting of the current request?
6. Review of the Trust Assets and Cash Position - This is normally a
rather basic step in the process of considering a discretionary
distribution request. However, where the request is large and the
trust assets small, it could be a very important consideration. In
addition, the number of other beneficiaries who could potentially
request distributions could make an otherwise routine request one
that must be given a great deal of consideration.
7. Consult with Co-Trustees, Advisors or other Co-Fiduciaries - The
trustee receiving a discretionary distribution request must be sure
to share the request with any co-fiduciary whose authorization
must also be obtained before it is granted or denied. It is also
necessary to keep investment advisors or others who have
authority over investment decisions apprised of discretionary
distributions that may require investment action.

30

See Uniform Trust Code (2005) §813 (a).
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I.

Absolute Discretion v. Standards for Distribution

In establishing any discretionary trust, that is, a trust in which payments of either income
or principal or both are not specifically dictated by the terms of the trust instrument, one of the
first decisions that a grantor must make--after naming the trustee, of course--is \vhether such
distributions are to made at the discretion of the trustee or in accordance with certain standards
that the trustee must follow.

A.

Absolute Discretion

In trusts which grant the trustee absolute discretion over distributions of incolue and
principal, the trust beneficiary is only entitled to the anl0unt that the trustee in the proper
exercise of its discretion decides is appropriate for the beneficiaryl. A beneficiary who disagrees
with a trustee's decision cannot request the court to compel the trustee to make a distribution to
the beneficiary unless the trustee has abused its discretionary power. 2
7.2
Trustee will distribute from the net income and
principal of the trust such amounts as Trustee in its sole and
absolute discretion deems advisable to my child and my child's
descendants. Undistributed income will be added to principal.
Unequal distributions will not be taken into account in the final
distribution of assets. Trustee's decision will be controlling and
will not be subject to judicial review.

B.

Standards for Distribution

In trusts which establish standards for the distributions of income and principal, the trust
beneficiary is only entitled to the amount that the trustee in the proper exercise of its discretion
decides is appropriate for the beneficiary to satisfy those standards J . A beneficiary who
disagrees with a trustee's decision may request the court to compel the trustee to make a
distribution to the beneficiary but the court will not compel the trustee to do SQ unless its
4
decision was not reasonable.
The most common standards are for health, education., maintenance and support.
7.2
Trustee will distribute from the net income and
principal of the trust such amounts as Trustee deems advisable to
provide for the health, education (including education beyond the

l Scott on Trusts, § 128.3.
2

Id .

3

Scott on Trusts., § 128.4.

-l

[d.

undergraduate level), maintenance, and support of my child and
my child's descendants. Undistributed income will be added to
principaL Unequal distributions will not be taken into account in
the final distribution of assets.

These standards are often further limited by requlnng the trustee to take into account a
beneficiary's accustomed standard of living or by taking into account income and other assets
available to the beneficiary from other sources.
Observation: The preference among corporate trustees in the northeastern United States
tends to be absolute discretion trusts. The preference among corporate trustees in the South and
Mid-West tends to be trusts with standards for support. The jury is still out on the West Coast.

C.

Ascertainable Standards and I.R.C. § 2041

The most common standards for distributions found in discretionary trusts are those of
health, education, maintenance and support. These are often referred to as "ascertainable
standards" because of their interplay with section 2041 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended (the "Code").
Treasury Regulation § 20.2041-1 provides that an individual will be deemed to have a
power of appointment over the assets of a trust, thereby causing such assets to be included in his
or her estate for federal estate tax purposes, if the individual has the power to consume or
appropriate the principal of the trust.) This can occur if the beneficiary is serving as the trustee
and has absolute discretion over the distribution of the trust assets or if the beneficiary has the
power to remove the trustee and appoint himself as the trustee. 6
However, if the beneficiary is serving as the trustee and the trustee's ability to encroach
on trust principal is limited to "ascertainable standards", the trust assets will not be included in
the beneficiary's estate. According to the Treasury Department, "ascertainable standards'" are
limited to health, education, maintenance and support.

(2) Powers limited by an ascertainable standard. A power to
consume., invade., or appropriate income or corpus., or both, for the
benefit of the decedent which is limited by an ascertainable
standard relating to the health., educatio.n., support, or maintenance
of the decedent is., by reason of section 2041 (b)( 1)(A), not a
general power of appointInent. A power is limited by such a
standard if the extent of the holder's duty to exercise and not to
exercise the power is reasonably rncasurable in temlS of his needs

'l'reas. Reg. § 20.2041-1 (b)( 1)~
6

1d .
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for health, education, or support (or any combination of them). As
used in this subparagraph, the words "support'" and "maintenance"
are synonymous and their meaning is not limited to the bare
necessities of life. A power to use property for the comfort.,
welfare, or happiness of the holder of the power is not limited by
the requisite standard. Examples of powers which are limited by
the requisite standard are powers exercisable for the holder's
"support," "support in reasonable comfort," "maintenance in health
and reasonable comfort,"" "support in his accustomed manner of
living,'" "education, including college and professional education,"
"health,'" and "medical, dental., hospital and nursing expenses and
expenses of invalidism." In determining whether a power is limited
by an ascertainable standard, it is immaterial whether the
beneficiary is required to exhaust his other income before the
power can be exercised.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1(c)(2).
Note that section 2041 does not prevent the grantor from establishing a purely
discretionary trust However, in order that the trust assets are not included in the beneficiary's
estate, the trustee at all times must be an independent trustee, i.e., a corporate trustee, or an
individual whose interests are adverse to those of the beneficiary.

D.

Medicaid Trusts

In certain situations, establishing a trust with ascertainable standards may not he
an option. Typically this arises in the context of asset protection trusts and trusts which ~re
designed so that the beneficiary will. qualify for public assistance. In the latter, although the
Trustee must he given sole and absolute discretion regarding distributions for the beneficiary"s
needs, it is still important that the grantor specify his or her intent regarding distributions for
extraordinary needs that are not covered by Medicaid and Social Security.
7.2
My child suffers
from disabilities which
substantially impair my child's ability to provide for my child's
own care and custody and which constitute a substantial handicap.
It is my intent in establishing this trust that it facilitate iny child's
financial eligibility for Suppleluental Security [nCOlne (SSI) and
Medicaid under the provisions of Section 13611 of tIle Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (42 U.S.C. s. 1396p(d)(4 )(a»
and Section 205 of the Foster Care Independence Act of 1999 (42
U.S.C. s. 1382(b», and other applicable provisions of state and
tedcral la\v. It is inlportant that IIl)/ child continue to have.. or to be
able to apply tor., these prograrns in orcler to I1laintain a level of
hUlllan dignity and hUltlLulC care. If this trust \vere to he invaclccl
by creditors., subjected to any liens or (;[lCUIllhrances., or cause
public hcnctits to be tCfnlinatccL it is likely' that the trust principal
\vould be clcpleted prior to Illy chilcrs death., especially considering
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the substantial expense of providing care and services for a
disabled person. In this event, there would be no supplemental
fund for emergencies, necessary programs, and my child's care.
The following trust provisions should be interpreted in light of
these concerns and the stated intent.
A.
Trustee may pay to or apply for my child's
benefit such amounts from the income or principal, up to the whole
thereof, as Trustee may, in Trustee's sole discretion, from time to
time, deem necessary or advisable for the satisfaction of my child's
special needs. The following are examples of what Trustee might
consider to be my child's special needs: dental expenses, special
equipment, programs of training, education and treatment,
occupational and physical therapy not provided by Medicaid or
any other program of public benefits, assisted mobility equipment,
assisted communications equipment, transportation, acquisition of
a wheelchair-accessible van, attendant care, modifications to the
family home for my child's care, and necessary recreation and
entertainment.
B.
Except as otherwise expressly provided
herein, no interest in the income or principal of this trust may be
anticipated, assigned or encumbered, or be subject to any creditor's
claim or to legal process, prior to its actual receipt by my child.
Furthennore, because this trust is to be conserved and maintained
for my child's special needs, no part of the principal or income will
be construed as part of my child's "estate" or be subject to the
claims of voluntary or involuntary creditors for the provision of
care and services, including residential care, by any city, county, or
state government, or by the federal government or any other public
or private agency.

c.
Trustee is not responsible for seeking
support and maintenance for my child from available public
resources. However., in making distributions to or for my child's
special needs as herein defined, Trustee will take into
consideration the applicable resource and income limitations of the
means-tested public benefit progranls for which my child is
eligible, including SSI and Medicaid.
D.
The assets of this trust \vill be adtninistered
(I ) in a manner that supplenlcnts Il1cans-tested public benefits, and
(2) if feasible, trust distributions should not be Blade that cause the
loss or reduction of such benefits. f-{owever~ the ultinlate goal ()f
this trust is to ensure lIlY child's gc)od health., safety and \velfare.
Consequently., Trustee \vill suffer nc) liability of any kind if rrrustee
tllakcs a distribution that causes the loss or rccluction of benefits if
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Trustee determines, in Trustee's absolute discretion, that such
distribution is in my child's best interests. It is recommended that
neither means-tested public benefits nor my child's earnings be
added to the trust estate unless Trustee detennines that it is in Iny
child's best interests to do so; provided, however, that if such
assets are so added, they will not be commingled with other trust
assets but will be separately held by Trustee in order to preserve
applicable creditor protections.

II.

Who is the Primary Beneficiary?

When creating trusts that currently benefit multiple generations, it is in everyone's best
interest,s that the grantor indicate whether the trustee is to give any priority or preference to
certain individuals or a class of individuals or if all beneficiaries are on equal footing. This is of
particular concern for trustees in administering a "family trust" or "credit shelter trust" in light of
the increasing applicable exemption amount. This is further complicated in second and third
marriages when the grantor's spouse is not the parent of the grantor's descendants.
ARTICLE 58
Administration of Fund B for the Benefit of
My Spouse and Descendants
[Choose one of the following statements regarding preference
among beneficiaries]
Trustee will consider a beneficiary's income and assets, and tax
consequences (direct and indirect), when making distributions. I
have made my descendants beneficiaries of Fund B to provide for
reasonable flexibility, but my Spouse is the primary beneficiary.
Trustee will consider a beneficiary's income and assets, and tax
consequences (direct and indirect), when making distributions.
Although [ intend for my Spouse to continue to live in the style to
which my Spouse is accustomed, and generally want my Spouse
treated generously, I also intend for amounts to be available for my
descendants during and after my Spouse's life.
l'rustee \vill consider a beneficiary's inCOlne and assets, and tax
consequences (direct and indirect)~ when making distributions. I
intend t()r tny descendants to be the primary beneficiaries of Fund
(3 tu the extent consistent \vith nlaintaining a reserve to satisfy nlY
SPOLlSC"S basic needs if tl1y Spouse's other assets are substantially
exhausted and Illy Spouse"s income is insufficient.
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Likewise, in trusts for the benefit of the grantor's descendants, the grantor should indicate
whether preference should be given to children over grandchildren to avoid conflicts in the
future.
6.3
In the trusts that follow, when Trustee is given the
discretion to make distributions atnong my beneficiaries, primary
consideration will be given to those beneficiaries in the oldest
generation, but their taxable estates will be considered when
making such distributions.

III.

Power of Withdrawal and Advancements

It is not unusual for disagreements or disputes to arise among beneficiaries in even the
most harmonious of families when it comes to encroachments on principaL One sibling may be
more prosperous than another, one sibling may be more frugal than another, one sibling may
have more children than another, and more often than not, everyone has different investment
objectives. Also, if mom or dad is also a beneficiary of the trust, he 'or she may not want to
justify to the children why the trustee should make a distribution for a new roof for the house, a
new car, or even a well deserved vacation.
One way to resolve this issue is by giVIng the trust beneficiaries, or certain trust
beneficiaries, a power of withdrawaL The beneficiary is entitled to withdraw a certain amount
from the trust each year and to spend that amount as he or she chooses, no questions asked.
58.2 My Spouse may, each year my Spouse is living on
31, by written notice to Trustee, withdraw specific
assets from the principal of Fund B, the value of which does not
exceed 5% of the market value of the principal of Fund 8 on
December 31 of the year of withdrawal. This right to withdraw is
noncumulative. Trustee may make reasonable advancements to
my Spouse in anticipation that my Spouse will be living' on
December 31, provided such advancements are repayable to
Trustee if my Spouse dies before December 31. Regardless of
other provisions to the contrary my Spouse, or an agent acting on
behalf of my Spouse, may relinquish this right at any time by
written notice to Trustee.
Dece~ber

Another possible solution is through the use of advancements. The trustee may make
clistributions of principal for extraordinary expenditures that will ultimately be charged against
that hcneticiary's share when the trust is later divided.
7.3
After my child becomes 21 years old, Trustee, at
Trustee's discretion, may advance an· atnount from a trust having
the child as a then cun·ent beneficiary to enable such child to enter
into a trade, business or profession, or to purchase a principal
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residence and (regardless of other provisions to the contrary) such
amount will be charged as an advancement without interest to such
child in the final distribution of assets. Trustee, however, will not
be liable if, for any reason, such advancement exceeds the child's
final distributable share of the trust property.
No such
advancement may be made if to do such would impair a
beneficiary's withdrawal rights.

IV.

Flexibility Through Powers of Appointment

More and more today, grantors are creating trusts that last for the lifetime of their
descendants instead of terminating at certain ages. There are both tax and non-tax reasons for
doing so. The most common tax advantage of lifetime trusts is postponing the time in which the
assets will be subject to the federal estate and/or generation-skipping transfer taxes again. The
non-tax advantages of lifetime trusts include creditor protection including protection from inlaws and other predators.
The disadvantage of trusts of such long duration is that circumstances may change and
provisions that once worked flawlessly may become rigid and archaic. To prevent this and to
provide flexibility for the future, it is often recommended that the grantor give special powers of
appointment to the trust beneficiaries to be able to change or terminate the trust after their deaths.
For those individuals who want the trust assets to remain in the family at all costs, they
7
may choose to grant a special power of appointment that is limited to their descendants.
7.3
My child may appoint, by specific reference to this
power in my child's Will, part or aIr of the assets of this trust
among my descendants; or if none, to any person or entity (but in
all instances excluding such child, such child's estate, such child's
creditors., and the creditors of such child's estate) in such
proportions and in such manner, outright or in trust or otherwise,
as my child detennines. Regardless of other provisions to the
contrary, my child may relinquish this power in whole or in part at
any time by written notice to Trustee. Assets not disposed of by a
power of appointment will be known as the remaining trust assets.
On the other hand, many individuals choose may not want to limit the power to just their
descendants because: (l) they actually like their sons- and daughters-in-law; (2) they have
children who do not have children of their o\vn; (3) they would like for their children to be able
special po\ver of appointlllcnt will not cause the trust assets to be included in the
bencficiary's estate under section 2041 oftlle Code. Section 2041 only applies to general po\vers
of appointrnent \vhich include the ability to appoint to one"s self: one's estate, one's creditor., and
the creditors ofone's estate. Trcas. Reg. § 20.2041-1(c).
7

/\
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to leave money to charity; or (4) they were going to give their assets outright to their descendants
until their estate planning attorney or trust officer talked them into creating a trust. For these
individuals, granting a broad special power of appointment is more appropriate.
7.3
My child may appoint, by specific reference to this
power in my child's Will, part or all of the assets of this trust
among any person or entity (but in all instances excluding such
child, such child's estate, such child's creditors, and the creditors
of such child's estate) in such proportions and in such manner,
outright or in trust or otherwise, as my child detennines.
Regardless of other provisions to the contrary, my child may
relinquish this power in whole or in part, at any time by written
notice to Trustee.
Assets not disposed of by a power of
appointment will be known as the remaining trust assets.
However, even in first marriages, more often than not, the grantor will not want to give
his or her surviving spouse a broad special power of appointment Although the grantor may
want his or her surviving spouse to be able to appoint the assets freely among the grantor's
descendants, generally, the grantor does not want the surviving spouse to be able to appoint those
assets away from the grantor's descendants, usually to the survivor's widow(er). In second or
third marriages, the grantor may not want to give his or her spouse any power of appointment.

v.

Use of an Advisory Committee for Unique or Difficult to Manage Assets

Often a grantor will own assets that are unique or somewhat difficult to manage and
which may require special expertise that is beyond the trustee's experience. Such assets include
real estate, closely held business interests, artwork and intellectual property. In such instances it
is may be advantageous to the beneficiaries of the trust that the grantor create an advisory
committee to direct the trustee regarding the investment of these assets so that their income
potential and value are properly exploited. It is also in the trustee's interest that the grantor
creates an advisory committee because KRS 287.275 limits a corporate trustee's liability for
certain investment decisions when following the direction of an advisory committee.
ARTICLE 11
Advisory Committee

11.1
During any time I am incapacitated or after my
death, TOM, DICK, and HARRY are appointed as the initial
Advisory Committee ("Advisor") to Trustee. No Advisor will be
deemed to have accepted such position until the Advisor gives
\vritten notice of acceptance to the then acting Trustee.
Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary" 1~rustee \vill be
subject to the powers and autllority of Advisor as hereinatter set
forth.
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A.

Powers.. Advisor has the following powers

and authority:
(A.l) To advise Trustee, to approve or
disapprove any investment recommendation made by Trustee, to
direct Trustee with respect to general investment policy, to initiate
action, and to direct Trustee concerning important matters
pertaining to all closely held business investments of any trust
established hereunder, including, but not limited to, the borrowing
of money, the lease, sale, investment, and reinvestment of any trust
assets, the making of tax elections applicable to a trust, and the
voting of stock.
The grantor may also want to give the advisory committee the power to direct the trustee
regarding discretionary distributions of income and principal, especially if there are minor
beneficiaries, in second and third marriage situations, or if there are other circumstances in which
conflicts are likely to arise in the family.
(A.. 2) To approve, disapprove., or direct
discretionary payments or accumulations of income or
encroachments upon the principal of any trust established
hereunder, subject to the standards herein set forth.

VI.

Distributions to Minors or Incapacitated Beneficiaries

It is not uncommon when there are minor or incapacitated beneficiaries that the
beneficiary's guardian and the trustee are different people. As a result, the trustee may have
reservations of making distributions to a beneficiary if such distributions could potentially
benefit the beneficiary"s guardian. This concern can be addressed easily in the trust instrument.
12.1 After my death, Trustee may make distributions to
or on behalf of a beneficiary even though such distributions benefit
a guardian or the person having custody of the beneficiary if such
benefit is reasonable under the circumstances.
However, the grantor may want to take additional steps to ensure that his or her intentions
with respect to his or her minor children are understood clearly by the trustee. One 111ethod of
accomplishing this is through a letter from the grantor to the trustee setting out the grantor's
specific intentions.
July 21,2005

Ms. Trust Officer
Senior \/icc President
Worthy National E3ank of Kentucky
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100 West Main Street, Suite 200
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
Dear Trustee:
You are the Trustee of my Revocable Trust Agreement
dated July 21,2005. Paragraph 12.1 of this trust provides that you
may make distributions to or on behalf of my child even though
such distributions may benefit a guardian or the person having
custody of my child. It is my intention and desire that this
paragraph be interpreted liberally, such that distributions be made
which will enhance the quality of my child's life.

If a guardian is ever required, I want the guardian to be able
to nurture his or her relationship with my child so that the
relationship resembles a parent-child relationship as closely as
possible. For example, I wish for the guardian and my child to
take family vacations together and I would like the guardian to
visit my child while he or she is away at school, just as I would do
if I were able. To this end, I am not concerned that distributions
made to enable the guardian to do these and similar activities will
benefit the guardian.
Cordially,
Kelly S. Henry

VII.

Incentive Trusts to Influence Behavior

The goal of many affluent individuals today when creating trusts for their families is to
try to impart their values and work ethic on future generations. As a result, for many individuals
incentive trusts are an attractive option.
Incentive trusts may be used to encourage certain behaviors and to discourage others.
Among the behaviors that most clients want to encourage are education, industry, public service
and philanthropy. The behaviors that most want to discourage include reckless consu111ption,
sloth and self-destructive behavior such as drug and alcohol abuse. 8
Provisions that award a beneficiary upon the c0I11pletion of a certain goal set by the
grantor, such as graduating fronl college, are fairly simple to draft and to administer.

Ho\vard M. McCue, [II, ';';Planning to Influence Behavior,!"" 2()OO University of t\;1ianli
Heckerling lnstitute on Estate Planning" 6-1'16-7 to 6-10 (2000).

8
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7.3
Trustee will distribute $25,000 to my child if my
child receives a bachelor's degree from an accredited college or
uni versity.
Provisions designed to discourage behaviors such as drug and alcohol abuse are more
complicated. For example, the following language is designed to prevent drug and alcohol abuse
by beneficiaries. This language is not perfect and typically, would only be included in the trust
instrument if the grantor was' aware of an existing problem with one of the beneficiaries at the
time the trust was created.
ARTICLE 10

Periodic Testing
It is my belief that the purposes of wealth are to
enable people to better themselves, their families, and the
communities in which they live. I also believe that wealth should
not be used to encourage or enable one to be a wastrel or a
profligate which could lead to self destruction, the deterioration of
one's family, and a blot on one's community. For these reasons, I
authorize Trustee to establish a program which will result in the
income beneficiaries, age 18 and over, of the trusts administered
by Articles 4 and 5 to be subjected to random testing for alcohol
and other drug abuse.
10.1

10.2
Income and principal distributions (1) to those who
test positive, (2) to those who refuse to cooperate in the testing
process, or (3) to those who have incurred morbidity due to drug or
alcohol abuse, will not be made pursuant to the standards set forth
in paragraphs 4.2 and 5.2, but will be made in the sole discretion of
Trustee.

If, and when, subsequent testing (given within one
year after an event described in paragraph 10.2) reveals a negative
result, the beneficiary who once tested positive, or \vho refused to
cooperate in an earlier testing process, will again be eligible to
receive income and principal distributions as set forth in
paragraphs 4.2 and 5.2, as the case may be.
10.3

The costs incurred in tests conducted by the
provisions (}fthis Article \vill be paid from the principal of the trust
for which the person being testccl is a beneficiary.
10.4

10.5
[ realize that 111()st drugs arc \vater soluble and pass
through the body in a short titlle -- cCl1ainly prior to the tinlC the
beneficiary is given reasonable notice for a test date. Thus. [ ant
a\vare that the provisions ()f this /\rticle arc tla\ved: perhaps never
detecting alcohol abuse.

B(b) - 11

10.6 I give Trustee powers, exercisable in Trustee's sole
discretion, to direct the trust beneficiary to be subjected to
additional testing, by a medical doctor, or doctors, selected by
Trustee. The failure of a beneficiary to be tested or the finding that
the beneficiary has incurred morbidity due to alcohol or drug
abuse, constitutes authority to Trustee to pay income and principal
to the beneficiary at the sale discretion of Trustee.
10.7 Trustee's decisions in impl~menting (or not
implementing) the provisions of this Article will be final and \vill
not be subject to judicial review. Trustee will incur no liability for
its decisions made hereunder. Any expense incurred by Trustee in
carrying out the provisions of this Article, including the defense of
any law suits brought against Trustee, will be paid from the
principal of the trust involved.
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UNI-TRUST CONVERSION PROCEDURE UNDER
KENTUCKY'S PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT
Wayne F. Wilson
Goldberg & Simpson, P.S.C.
3000 National City Tower
Louisville, KY 40202
502-589-4440
wwilson@gsatty.com
I.

Identifying the Candidates
A.

Income Only Trusts - These are trusts which provide the Trustee with no
discretion to distribute principal to the current beneficiary. If the Trustee
has been investing in traditional securities, it is likely that the income yield
generated by the trust has declined but the principal value of the trust is
stagnant or has increased.

B.

Blended Families - Not necessarily limited to blended families, this is the
situation where the Trustee may have discretion to distribute principal but
the remainder beneficiaries challenge every discretionary distribution
because it may decrease their remainder share.

C.

Tax Sensitive Beneficiaries - One of the reasons dividend yield declined
in the past is that, prior to recent tax acts, dividends were taxed at a higher
rate than capital gains. Interest income is still taxed at a higher rate than
capital gains in most cases. The beneficiaries may have a desire to
generate distributions but prefer to recognize those distributions as a
capital gain rather than ordinary income.

D.

Investment Mix Disagreement - This is the traditional conflict between
current and remainder beneficiaries where the current beneficiaries wish to
invest for current yield and remainder beneficiaries wish to invest for
capital appreciation which, in an income only trust, decreases the current
distributions.

E.

Trusts Holding a Single Security - Occasionally, a trust will hold a large
block of a single security which, due to basis issues or the direction of the
Settlor, can't be sold. If the single security generates very little yield it
may be possible to convert to a uni-trust to increase the yield to the
beneficiary.
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II.

Make Sure None of the Statutory Prohibitions Apply (KRS 386.454(4) &(7)). A
Trustee may not make an adjustment:
A.

That diminishes the income interest in a trust that requires all of the
income to be paid at least annually to a spouse and for which an estate tax
or gift tax marital deduction would be allowed, in whole or in part, if the
fiduciary did not have the power to make the adjustment;
I.e.

A QTIP Trust yielding 6% but desire to convert to a 4%
uni-trust

B.

That reduces the actuarial value of the income interest in a trust to which a
person transfers property with the intent to qualify for a gift tax exclusion;

C.

That changes the amount payable to a beneficiary as a fixed annuity or a
fixed fraction of the value of the trust assets;
i.e.

D.

A currently existing uni-trust

From any amount that is permanently set aside for charitable purposes
under a will or the terms of a trust unless both income and principal are so
set aside;
I.e.

Charitable remainder trusts

E.

If possessing or exercising the power to make an adjustment causes an
individual to be treated as the owner of all or part of the trust or estate for
income tax purposes, and the individual would not be treated as the owner
if the fiduciary did not possess the power to make an adjustment;

F.

If possessing or exercising the power to make an adjustment causes all or
part of the trust or estate assets to be included for estate tax purposes in the
estate of an individual who has the power to remove a fiduciary, appoint a
fiduciary, or both, and the assets would not be included in the estate of the
individual if the fiduciary did not possess the power to make an
adjustment;

G.

If the fiduciary is a beneficiary of the trust or estate (includes both income
and remainder beneficiaries); or

H.

If the fiduciary is not a beneficiary, but the adjustment would benefit the
fiduciary directly or indirectly; except that any effect on the fiduciary's
compensation shall not preclude an adjustment so long as the fiduciary's
fees are reasonable and otherwise comply with the applicable law.
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I.
III.

If it is clear from the terms of the trust that the terms are intended to deny
the fiduciary the power of adjustment.

Laying the Groundwork
A.

If any of the prohibitions above apply to some, but not all of the CoTrustees, KRS 385.454(5) allows for the unaffected Co-Trustee to make
the adjustment.

B.

If the trust is not a Trust Under Will, it will be necessary to register the
trust with the district Court.
1.

C.

If appointing a Co-Trustee to solve one of the above prohibitions it
will likely be necessary to file an AOC Petition for Appointment,
Certificate of Qualification and Fiduciary Bond

Gather consensus ofbeneficiaries (KRS 386.450(3))
1.

Consent of current beneficiaries

2.

Consent of remainder beneficiaries in the oldest class
a.

D.

IV.

If any remainder beneficiaries in the oldest class are
minors, it will be necessary to appoint a Guardian
Ad Litem

Arrive at a distribution method
1.

Statute states that adjustment may not be less than three percent
(3%) or more than five percent (5%)

2.

Rolling Averages to smooth out any sharp market shifts are
popular

Contents of the Petition and Order
A.

An Individual Trustee must elect to be governed by the Prudent Investor

Rule (KRS 287.277)
B.

Identify the trust language at issue

C.

State that it is impossible for the Trustee to administer the trust impartially
as required by KRS 386.452(2)
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v.

D.

I always include a statement that either (i) none of the prohibitions ofKRS
386.454(4) apply or that (ii) a prohibition would have applied but for the
included solution

E.

Waivers from the current and remainder beneficiaries will need to be
attached and Judge may also require attendance at Motion. If GAL is
appointed, report will need to be entered.

F.

Draft the Order in a manner that can be easily interpreted and
implemented by the Trustee.

G.

The Order should also be as flexible as possible such as giving the Trustee
the discretion to allocate principal to income annually without the
necessity of further motions to the Court.

Follow Up Work
A.

If the trust was not a Trust Under Will, a motion to release the registration
of the trust should follow entry of the Order granting the adjustment.

B.

Confirm that the Accountant and Trustee are all in agreement as to how
the adjustment Order should be interpreted and the adjustment calculations
conducted.
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287.277 Standards for bank or trust company acting as fiduciary.
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, a bank empowered to act as a
fiduciary or trust company, when investing, reinvesting, purchasing, acquiring,
exchanging, selling, and managing property held in a fiduciary capacity, shall act as
a prudent investor would, in light of the purposes, terms, distribution requirements,
and other circumstances of the fiduciary account.
The standard described in subsection (1) of this section requires the exercise of
reasonable care, skill, and caution, and is to be applied to investments not in
isolation but in the context of the account portfolio and as part of an overall
investment strategy, which should incorporate risk and return objectives reasonably
suitable to the account.
In making and implementing investment decisions, the bank or trust company has a
duty to diversify the investments of the account unless, under the circumstances, it
is prudent not to do so.
In addition, the bank or trust company shall:
(a) Conform to fundamental fiduciary duties of loyalty and impartiality;
(b) Act with prudence in deciding whether and how to delegate authority and in
the selection and supervision of agents; and
(c) Incur only costs that are reasonable in amount and appropriate to the
investment responsibilities of the account.
The duties of the bank or trust company under this section are subject to the rule
that in investing the funds of the account, the bank or trust company:
(a) Has a duty to the beneficiaries of the account to conform. to any applicable
statutory provisions governing investment by fiduciaries; and
(b) Has the power expressly or impliedly granted by the tenns of the account or
applicable instrument and has a duty to the beneficiaries of the account to
conform to the tenns of the account directing or restricting investments by the
bank or trust company.
Effective: July 15, 1996

History: Created 1996 Ky. Acts ch. 338, sec. 6, effective July 15, 1996.
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386.450 Definitions for Kentucky Principal and Income Act, KRS 386.450 to
386.504.
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)
(5)

(6)
(7)

(8)
(9)

(10)
(11)

(12)

(13)

"Accounting period" means a calendar year unless another twelve (12) month period
is selected by a fiduciary. The term includes a portion of a calendar year or other
twelve (12) month period that begins when an income interest begins or ends when
an income interest ends;
"Beneficiary" includes, in the case of a decedent's estate, an heir, legatee, and
devisee and, in the case .of a trust, an income beneficiary and a remainder
beneficiary;
"District Court approval" means the consent of:
(a) All current beneficiaries;
(b) All remainder beneficiaries in the oldest generation; and
(c) The court;
"Fiduciary" means a personal representative or a tnlstee. The term includes an
executor, administrator,' successor personal representative, and public administrator;
"Income" means money or property that a fiduciary receives as current return from a
principal asset. The term includes a portion of receipts from a sale, exchange, or
liquidation of a principal asset, to the extent provided in Articles 4 and 5 of the
Kentucky Principal and Income Act;
"Income beneficiary" means a person to whom net income of a trust is or may be
payable;
"Income interest" means the right of an income beneficiary to receive all or part of
net income, whether the tenns of the trust require it to be distributed or authorize it
to be distributed in the trustee's discretion;
"Mandatory income.interest" means the right of an income beneficiary to receive net
income that the terms of the trust require the fiduciary to distribute;
"Net income" means· the total receipts allocated to income during an accounting
period minus the disbursements made from income during the period, plus o~ minus
transfers under KRS 386.450 to 386.504 to or from income during the period;
"Principal" means property held in trust for distribution to a remainder beneficiary
when the trust tenninates;
"Remainder beneficiary" means a person entitled to receive principal when an
income interest ends;
"Terms of a trust" means the manifestation of the intent of a settlor or decedent with
respect to the trust, expressed in a manner that admits of its proof in a judicial
proceeding,whetber by written or spoken words or by conduct; and
"Trustee" includes an original, additional, or successor trustee, whether or not
appointed or confirmed by a court.
Effective: January 1, 2005
History: Created 2004 K.y. Acts ch. 158, sec. 1, effective January It 2005.
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386.452 Fiduciary duties.
(1)

In allocating receipts and disbursements to or between principal and income, and
with respect to any matter within the scope of Articles 2 and 3 of the Kentucky
Principal and Income Act, a fiduciary:
(a) Shall administer a trust or estate in accordance with the terms of the trust or
the will, even if there is a different provision in KRS 386.450 to 386.504;
(b) May administer a trust or estate by the exercise of a discretionary power of
administration given to the fiduciary by the terms of the trust or the will, even
if the exercise of the power produces a result different from a result required
or permitted by KRS 386.450 to 386.504;
.
Shall administer a trust or estate in accordance with KRS 386.450 to 386.504
if the terms of the trust or the will do not contain a different provision or do
not give the fiduciary a discretionary power of administration; and
(d) Shall add a receipt or charge a disbursement to principal to the extent that
neither the terms of the trust nor KRS 386.450 to 386.504 provide a role for
allocating the receipt or disbursement to or between principal and income.
In exercising the power to adjust under KRS 386.454(2) or (3) or a discretionary
power of administration regarding a matter within the scope of KRS 386.450 to
386.504, whether granted by the terms of a trust, a will, or KRS 386.450 to 386.504,
a fiduciary shall administer a trust or estate impartially, based on what is fair and
reasonable to all of the beneficiaries, except to the extent that the terms of the trust
or the will clearly manifest a contrary intention. Except as provided· in this
subsection, determination in accordance with KRS 386.450 to 386.504 shall be
presumed to be fair and reasonable to all of the beneficiaries.
(c)

(2)

Effective: January I, 2005
History: Created 2004 Ky. Acts ch. 158, "sec. 2, effective January 1,2005.
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386.454 Trustee's power to adjust -- Personal representative's power to adjust Circumstances prohibiting adjustment.
(1)

Notwithstanding any provision of Kentucky law to the contrary, the trustee ofa trust
to which by law KRS 287.277 does not apply may elect to have such provisions
apply to the administration of the trust with approval of the District Court.

(2)

A trustee may adjust between principal and income to the extent the trustee
considers necessary if KRS 287.277 applies by law or by election· made and
approved under subsection (1) of this section, the terms of the trost describe the
amount that mayor shall be distributed to a beneficiary by referring to the trust's
income, the trustee determines, after applying the roles in KRS 386.452(1), that the
trustee is unable to comply with KRS 386.452(2) and the adjustment, including an
adjustment method such as an annual percentage distribution if the percentage is not
less than three percent (3%) nor more than five percent (5%) of the fair market
value of the trust assets determined annually, is approved by the District Court.
A personal representative may adjust between principal and income in the same
manner as a trustee if.KRS 287.277 applies to the personal representative by law or
if the personal representative elects to have KRS 287.277 apply to the
administration of the estate, upon approval of the District Court, which approval
may be an adjustment method such as an annual percentage distribution if the
percentage is not less than three percent (3%) nor more than five percent (5%) of
the fair market value of the trust assets determined annually, and:
(a) The amount distributable to a beneficiary of the estate is detennined by
reference to the income of the estate; and
(b) The personal representative detennines, and after applying the rules of KRS
386.452(1), that the personal representative is unable to comply with KRS
386.452(2).
A fiduciary shall not make an adjustment:
(a) That diminishes the income interest in a trust that requires all of the income to
be paid at least annually to a spouse and for which an estate tax or gift tax
marital deduction would be allowed, in whole or in part, if the fiduciary did
not have the power to make the adjustment;
(b) That reduces the actuarial value of the income interest in a trust to which a
person transfers property with the intent to qualify for a gift tax exclusion;
(c) That changes the amount payable to a beneficiary as a fixed·annuity or a fixed
fraction of the value of the trust assets;
(d) From any amount that is permanently set aside for charitable purposes under a
will or the terms ofa trust unless both income-and principal are so set aside;
(e) If possessing or exercising the power to make an adjustment causes an
individual to be treated as the owner of all or part of the trust or estate for
income tax purposes, and the individual would not be treated as the owner if
the fiduciary did not possess the power to make an adjustment;
(f) If possessing or exercising the power to make an adjustment causes all or part
of the trust or estate assets to be included for estate tax purposes in the estate

(3)

(4)
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of an individual who has the power to remove a fiduciary, appoint a fiduciary,
or both, and the assets would not be included in the estate of the individual if
the fiduciary did not possess the power to make an adjustment;
(g)

Ifthe fiduciary is a beneficiary of the trost or estate; or

(h)

(5)

If the fiduciary is not a beneficiary, but the adjustment would benefit the
fiduciary directly or indirectly; except that any effect on the fiduciary's
compensation shall not preclude an adjustment so long as the fiduciary's fees
are reasonable and otherwise comply with the applicable law.
Ifparagraph (e), (f),.(g), or (h) of subsection (4) of this section applies to a fiduciary
and there is more than one (1) fiduciary,. a cofiduciary to whom the provision shall
not apply .may make the. adjustment unless the exercise of the power by the
remaining fiduciary or fiduciaries is not permitted by the terms of the trust.

(6)

A fiduciary may release the entire power conferred by subsection (2) or (3) of this
section or may release only the power to adjust from income to principal or the
power to adjust from principal to income if the fiduciary is uncertain about whether
possessing or exercising the power will cause a result described in paragraphs (a) to
(f) of subsection (4) of this section or paragraph (h) of subsection (4) of this section,
or if the fiduciary detennines that possessing or exercising the power will or may
deprive the trust. of a tax benefit or impose a tax burden not described in subsection
(4) of this section. The release may be permanent or for a specified period,
including a period measured by the life of an individual. Such release shall require
approval of the District Court. Further, with approval of the District Court, a
fiduciary may divide a trust into one (1) or more fractional shares if the division
does not change the beneficial interests.

(7)

Terms of a trust or will that limit the power of a fiduciary. to make an adjustment
between principal and income do not affect the application of this section unless it
is clear from the tenns of the trust or will that the terms are intended to deny the
fiduciary the power of adjustment conferred by subsection (2) or (3) of this section.
Effective: January 1, 2005
History:

Created 2004 Ky. Acts chI 158, sec. 3, effective January 1, 200S.

Legislative Research Commission Note (1/112005). In 2004 Ky. Acts chI 158, sec. 3,
subsec, (2), a reference is made to "subsection (1) of this Act," Because it is clear
from the subject matter of chI 158, sec. 3, subsec. (1), that the reference was intended
to be to "subsection (1) of this· sectionII instead, this manifest clerical or
typographical error has been corrected during codification by the Reviser of Statutes
under KRS 7.136(1).
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Recent Trends In Legal Malpractice Cases
•
•
•

•

In 1985, 6.97 % of all legal malpractice claims were found in the area of
estate, trust and probate.
In 1995, the percentage rose to 7.59%.
Given changes in privity, fiduciary duty. conflicts of interest, statute of
limitations, the percentage will likely rise in 2005.
50% of all claims can be attributed to five types of alleged errors:
-

Failure to know or property apply the law;

-

Planning or procedural errors;
Inadequate discovery or investigation;
Failure to obtain client consent; and,
Procrastination in Performance

Helpful Hints
•
•

"Heirs always sue."
"Clients sue too because they expect work that the attomey has not agreed to do,"

•

"Always, always, always write very specific retainer letters outlining EXACTLY the
services the attomey will perform, listing each client. and listing non-clients who
would typically be beneficiaries."

•
•

"Beware of conflicts, or relationships that can be perceived as conflicts later on."
"Don't undo for one family member what you've done for another,"

•
•

"Document yourfile."
"Explain alternatives to common problems, and discuss the risks associated with the
problems and the possible solutions, Document those discussions."
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PRIVITY? WHAT'S THAT?

o

o

o

The Strict Privity Rule: Only the testator or the testator's estate may sue for
malpractice.
The Third Pary Beneficiary Rule: Third party beneficiaries to a will or an
estate plan may sue the attorney for malpractice. Some states require the
person to simply be named in the estate planning documents, while others
require the beneficiary to prove that the purpose of the estate plan was to
benefit him.
HYbrid Approach: Some states balance various factors, including the extent
to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the
foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff
suffered the injury, the closeness of connection between the defendant's
conduct and the injury, and public policy considerations.

O'Bryan
o
o

o

o

V

Cave

In July of 1997, Mr. and Mrs. Cave met with O'Bryan to-discuss estate plan.
O'Bryan talked about the right of Mrs. Cave to renounce against Mr. Cave's ultimate
estate plan.
O'Bryan discussed a joint tenacy with right of survivorship to their home, and told Mr.
Cave the property would go to his wife upon his death without probate.
In August of 1997. Mr. Cave returned
-

deeded home to wife, joint tenancy with right of survivorship

-

willed the residue to his sisters and nephews.

In 1999, Mr. Cave died. O'Bryan. who never advised Mrs. Cave of her renunciation
rights and did not represent her, prepared a renunciation of the will.
Mr. Cave's nephew sued, claiming O'Bryan failed to advise his uncle of his right to
renounce and the effect of the deed, and he was deprived of his inheritance

o

o

o

o
<

o

o

o

O'Bryan moved for summary judgment before the trial court, arguing there was no
evidence of a failure on his part to advise Mr. Cave of his wife's renunciation rights
and there was no expert testimony that he violated the standard of care.
The plaintiff found an expert witness. and also argued that res ipsa loquitur applied
because O'Bryan wrote a will that did not work as Mr. Cave intended.
The trial court grented summary judgment. While the plaintiff found an expert
witness, the court found that no evidence existed to refute O'Bryan's testimony that
he told Mr. Cave about his wife's renunciation rights.
The trial court also found that the plaintiff had no standing since O'Bryan never
represented him.
The Court of Appeals, in an April 2004 Opinion to be published, reversed and
remanded.
On standing. the court concluded -an attorney owes a duty of care to the direct,
intended, and specifically identifiable beneficiaries of the estate planning client,
notwithstanding a lack of privity." The court did not address whether persons not
named in estate planning documents could sue.
On the other issue, since the plaintiff identified an expert who would opine that
O'Bryan violated the standard of care. and since the only evidence in the record was
O'Bryan's. and it was -self-serving", and since the plaintiff -Was never given the
opportunity to depose" Mrs. Cave, issues of material fact existed.
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•

On April 13, 2005 the Supreme Court granted discretionary review.

•

O'Bryan argues a number of points to the Supreme Court.

•

Mr. Cave's nephew has not filed his brief.

Limits to the Expansion of Standing Are Developing, In
All Places, In California
•

Moore v Anderson Zeigler Disharoon Gallagher & Gray, 109 Cal.App.4th 1287
(Ca.Ct.App. 2003) - an attomey preparing a will for a testator owes no duty to the
beneficiaries of the new will, or previous wills, to ascertain and document the client's
testamentary capacity.

•

Boranian v Clark, 20 Cal.Rptr. 405 (Ca.Ct. App. 2004) - a lawyer's primary duty is
owed to his client, and when there is a question about whether a third-party
beneficiary was the intended beneficiary, and the beneficiary claims the lawyer failed
to adequately ascertain the testator's intent or capacity, the lawyer will not be held
accountable to the beneficiary.

•

Featherson v Farwell, 20 Cal.Rptr. 412 (Ca.Ct.Ap. 2004) - where there are questions
about the dient's intent to fawr one adult child over another, the lawyer will not be
held accountable to either child.

Don't Forget The Attorney/Client Privilege
•

In Gould Larson Bennet Wells and McDonnell v. Panico, 869 A.2d 653
(Conn.Sup.Ct. 2005), the court held that an attomey who met with her dient and
discussed the client's estate plans, but did not prepare a will for the dient, could not
be compelled to disclose the confidential communications between them in a will
contest action.

•

MThe importance of a testator's ability to discuss his testamentary intentions candidly
and the concomitant professional advice needed from an attomey in regard to
drafting the will to effectuate those intentions is paramount: kl at 657.

•

Distinguished between situations when an attomey who prepares a will can be
required to disclose all she knows about the testator's state of mind.
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Conflicts of Interest

•
•
•
•

Marriedcouples
Second marriages
Substantial assets
Desire to leave to persons other than spouse

•

ABA Formal Opinion 05-434
-

There ordinarily is no conflict of interest when a lawyer is engaged by a testator
to disinherit a beneficiary whom the lawyer represents on unrelated matters,
unless doing so would violate a legal obligation of the testator to the beneficiary
or unless there is a significant risk that the lawyer's representation of the testator
will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to the beneficiary.

Fiduciary Duty Cases
•

Nesvig v Nesvig, 676 NW.2d 73 (N.D.Sup.Ct. 2004) - an attorney who undertakes to
manage or inwst a client's money assumes broader responsibilities than merely
establishing an agreement with the client and acting in good faith regarding return of
the money. When a client entrusts the net proceeds of his recowry to his attorney to
properly inwst, safeguard and manage, the attorney has a fiduciary duty to properly
advise his client abow and beyond the requirements of the rules of professional
conduct.

•

Reynolds v Schrock 107 P.3d 52 (Or.Ct.App. 2005) - an attorney who drafts an
agreement between a client and a third party, knowing that the client and third party
are in a fiduciary relationship, might draft an agreement imposing duties on the client
falling short of what one fiduciary owes another. In that situation, if the attomey
knows the fiduciary relationship imposes a higher standard of conduct than the
agreement, then the attorney who advises the client that he may do an act that the
contract permits but the that is incompatible with the fiduciary relationship may be
liable for the breach of the fiduciary duty.

•

Traub v Washington, 591 S.E.2d 382 (Ga.Ct.App. 2003)

The Baker Botts Case
•
•

Kathleen and Floyd Cailloux - married 55 years
They had two children, Kenneth Csilloux and Paula Heilman, and one grandchild,
Stephen.

•
•

Baker Botts - law large firm
Neil Griffin - majority owner to the First National Bank of Kerrville, now Wells Fargo

•

William Goertz - an officer at Wells Fargo

•
•

Stacy Eastland - a Baker Botts lawyer
Stephen Dyer - a Baker Botts lawyer
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Decision making is a constant process in probate. In making these decisions,
the attorney is constantly seeking to avoid pitfalls. This paper addresses selected
common pitfalls which arise from waiver and elections in probate.
I.

THE INITIAL PITFALL: WHO IS YOUR CLIENT?
The probate bar is indebted to the Kentucky Bar Association for Ethics Opinion
E-401, which is appended to this paper as Exhibit B. Released in 1997, E-401
stands for the proposition that the individual, who is the personal representative,
is the client of the attorney. While E-401 is a rather lengthy opinion, the general
rule is that the attorney represents the individual who is the personal
representative. The attorney does not represent "the estate" or "the trust" or "the
beneficiaries."
This assumes, however, that the attorney avoids the initial pitfall. The attorney
who elects to advise the family that he or she represents "the estate" or someone
other than the personal representative mounts the horns of a dilemma.

II.

ELECTING WHO WILL PROVE THE WILL.
A Kentucky statute provides that any taker under a Will, and his or her spouse,
will lose the bequest, if he or she proves the Will and "the will cannot otherwise
be proved", subject to a potential savings clause:
Unless such witness would be entitled to a share of the estate of
the testator if the will were not established, in which case he shall
receive so much of his share as does not exceed the value of that
devised or bequeathed. KRS 394.210; Floore v. Green, 83 S.W.
133 (Ky. 1904).

III.

WAIVER OF RIGHT TO SERVE AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE.
For a variety of reasons, your client may decide not to serve as personal
representative, in spite of being named in a valid Will. One obvious fact pattern
calling for waiver of the right to serve as personal representative is where the
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nominee intends to file a Will contest proceeding. One who undertakes to qualify
as personal representative of an estate makes an irrevocable election to abide by
the Last Will and Testament, when he or she "has knowledge of all the facts at
the time." It also appears that this election may not be cured by a subsequent
resignation by the personal representative. Frank's Adm'r v. Bates, 97 S.W.2d
549 (Ky. App. 1936).
IV.

THE ELECTION TO TAKE AGAINST THE WILL.
When a husband or wife dies testate, the surviving spouse may, though under
full age, release what is given unto him or her by the Will, if any, and receive his
or her share under KRS 392.020 as if no Will had been made. In such case,
however, the share in any real estate which the surviving spouse takes shall be
only one-third (1/3) of such real estate.
Such renunciation shall be made within six months after probate and
acknowledged before and left for record with the county clerk or his authorized
deputy in the country where probate was made, or acknowledged before a
subscribing witness and proved before and left with the county clerk or his
authorized deputy. KRS 392.080. If within those six months an action contesting
the Will is brought, the surviving spouse need not make such relinquishment until
within six months succeeding the time when the action is disposed of. KRS
392.080(1 ).
However, the period for renunciation may be extended not
exceeding six additional months by order entered by the district court upon
application of the surviving spouse for such extension within six months after the
date of probate. KRS 392.080.
Renunciation of the Will necessarily disrupts the scheme of the deceased as to
the distribution of his or her estate. Aspects of the effect are treated in the U.K.
CLE publication Kentucky Estate Administration, Third Edition (2000) at Sections
1.23; 1.24 and 8.14.
Of particular interest, where the decedent had established a Revocable Trust, is
whether the spouse who would benefit from the provisions of the Revocable
Trust is required to renounce those benefits to be received from that Trust, if the
spouse is renouncing the Will. This curious circumstance has also not been
addressed by the Kentucky General Assembly, although "corrective legislation"
has been lifted up. At first blush, it might appear that the surviving spouse, who
renounces a Will under KRS Chapter 392, is apparently not adversely impacted
upon receiving the benefits of the Revocable Trust created by the deceased
spouse during his or her lifetime, unless there is contrary language in the trust
document. Harper v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. No. 32 (1989). See Carnahan v.
Stallman, 29 Ohio App.3rd 293,504 N.E.2d 1218 (1986).
Massachusetts was one of the first states to consider whether a surviving
spouse, who is not mentioned in a Revocable Trust, may reach its assets if it was
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funded during the marriage. The Massachusetts rule for many decades was that
the surviving spouse could not reach the assets in the Revocable Trust, upon
renouncing the Will. As subsequent states addressed the issue, the consensus
was to adopt "the Massachusetts rule." However, in the leading case of Sullivan
v. Burkin, 390 Mass. 864, 460 N.E.2d 572 (1984), the highest appellate court of
Massachusetts abolished "the Massachusetts rule" and allowed surviving
spouses to receive revocable trust assets "as to any inter vivos trust created or
amended after the date of this Opinion."
V.

WAIVER OF RIGHT TO ELECT AGAINST WILL.
Apparently, the most common way to fail to elect against the Will is to fail to
follow the statutory procedure. The execution of a renunciation instrument, the
filing of the instrument with the district court and even the service of the
instrument upon the personal representative are not adequate to renounce the
Will. The correct procedure involves the county clerk, and strict compliance may
be required.

VI.

WAIVER BY ACCEPTANCE OF BENEFITS UNDER THE WILL.
It is clearly established that where the surviving spouse accepts the provisions
for her in her husband's Will, she cannot thereafter claim a right to share in
undevised property. Rhodus v. Proctor, 433 S.W.2d 625 (Ky. 1968).
Thus, the execution of a receipt for the personal property bequeathed to the
surviving spouse may be adequate to waive the right of the surviving spouse to
renounce the Will. Sanders v. Pierce, 979 S.W.2d 457 (Ky.App. 1998).
It has also been held that if the widow fails to renounce the Will of her husband,
then she must take the estate given her by the Will subject to all claims against it
and she must comply with a direct request or direction attached to the devise.
Huhlien v. Huhlien, 8 S.W. 260 (Ky. 1888).

VII.

WITHDRAWAL OF RENUNCIATION.
An accomplished renunciation under this section is not revocable at the pleasure
of the widow. But recall of the election may be granted under the equitable
powers of the court. Craven v. Craven, 181 Ky. 428, 205 S.W. 406 (1918).

VIII.

WAIVER OF RIGHT TO ELECT AGAINST WILL BY WRITTEN AGREEMENT.
It is clear that persons about to wed can waive the right to elect against the Will
by the execution of a prenuptial agreement. In a Will contract case, however, it
was held that the Will contract did not bar renunciation of the Will, where no such
provision was included within the contract. Bauer v. Piercy, 912 S.W.2d 457
(Ky.App. 1995).
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At the UKICLE 2004 Annual Estate Planning Institute, a panel discussed the
issue of separate counsel for a couple about to wed regarding prenuptial
agreements. A question was also raised regarding whether the spouses should
have separate counsel for such a waiver relating to a post-nuptial agreement.
Years ago, the writer requested the Kentucky Bar Association to render a formal
opinion, including whether one attorney could represent both parties to a
prenuptial agreement. The Opinion is appended to this paper. KBA Ethics
Opinion E-290 (Exhibit C) concluded that it is usually not proper for the attorney
representing one spouse in a prenuptial agreement negotiation to "answer
questions" of the other spouse. The Opinion notes, in part:
Assuming that the agreement contemplated by the parties does not
offend public policy, joint representation may threaten the exercise
of counsel's independent professional judgment if one or the other
of the parties is unwilling to be completely forthcoming ....
. .. If counsel is possessed of confidences or secrets of a party
that the other needs to know and that party is not willing to disclose
such information, it is obvious that counsel would, at the very least,
violate DR 5-150 by purporting to represent both.

IX.

WAIVER OF CLAIMS.
Kentucky's claims statutes were taken in great measure from parallel provisions
of the Uniform Probate Act. Generally all claims against a decedent's estate,
which rose before the death of the decedent, are barred, if not barred earlier by
other statute of limitations, against the estate, the personal representative and
heirs and devisees of the decedent unless presented within six months after the
appointment of the personal representative. If no personal representative has
been appointed, they are barred if no claim has been filed within two years of the
decedent's death.
This section does not impact any proceeding to enforce a mortgage, pledge, lien
or other security interest securing an obligation of the decedent or upon property
of the estate. The section also does not affect the limits of the insurance
protection only in any proceeding to establish the liability of the decedent or the
personal representative for which he is protected by liability insurance.
Also excluded are claims of the United States, the state of Kentucky and any
subdivision thereof.
Kentucky practitioners have generally relied upon this self-effectuating statute of
limitations for claims against personal representatives. However, the Tulsa
Collections decision by the United States Supreme Court in 19871 raised

1

Tulsa Professional Collection Services v. Pope, 485 US 478 (1987).
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questions regarding the enforceability of self-executing statutes of limitation.
There is an excellent treatment of this topical by James E. Hargrove, Esq. and
Walter R. Morris, Jr., Esq. in the Chapter entitled, Claims Against the Estate in
Kentucky Estate Administration, Third Edition, published by UKICLE.

x.

WAIVER OF DEFENSES TO CLAIMS FILED AGAINST AN ESTATE.
Prior to the amendment to the claims statute to somewhat conform with the
Uniform Probate Code, which amendment was effective July 15, 1988, a
personal representative had no time limitation to respond to a claim against the
estate beyond the normal course of the administration of the estate. KRS
396.055 now requires analysis and action by the personal representative.
Failure of the personal representative to mail notice to a claimant of
action on his claim for sixty (60) days after the time for original
presentation of the claim has expired has the effect of a notice of
allowance, except that upon petition of the personal representative
and upon notice to the claimant, the court at any time before
payment of such claim may for cause shown permit the personal
representative to disallow such a claim. From KRS 396.055(1).
This statute was construed by the Court of Appeals in Kentucky in Patterson v.
Estate of Boone, 150 S.W.3d 58 (Ky. App. 2003), where the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky stated:
Our legislature, in contrast, has specifically placed a limitation on
the discretion of a personal representative to disallow a claim
previously allowed by reason of inaction. We agree with the estate
that the only time-limitation on the discretion to disallow the claim is
that it must be done before payment. However, the legislature later
provided that when the claim has been allowed by the personal
representative's inaction, in order to later disallow the claim the
representative is required to petition the court and to "show cause."
Obviously, the legislature rejected the absolute right to disallow a
claim previously allowed by the representative's inaction.
The term "cause" is not defined in KRS 396.055. Nor does the
statute explicitly state whether the showing of cause relates to the
reason that the representative did not act on the claim before the
expiration of sixty days, or to the merits of the claim itself. We find
that when read in the context of the entire statute, the "cause"
referred to in KRS 396.055(1) refers to a reasonable cause for not
responding to the claim within the sixty-day period and not to the
merits of the claim.
Although in Patterson, the district court conducted a hearing and refused to allow
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the personal representative to disallow the claim, on appeal the circuit court
reversed. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky allowed the personal representative
to disallow the claim.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the personal
representative, at the contested hearing, had overcome the presumption of
allowance because of a need to accumulate a number of documents to make an
informed decision about the claim.
In the recent decision of DeMoisey v. River Downs Investment Company, 159
S.W.3d 820 (Ky.App. 2005), the Court of Appeals of Kentucky held that the
executor's failure to disallow a claim within the time limit prescribed by the statute
converted a void debt into one required to be paid.
XI.

WAIVER OF CLAIMS ASSERTED BY OR AGAINST DECEDENT.
As held in Snyder v. Snyder, 769 S.W.2d 70 (Ky.App. 1989):
A personal representative does not automatically succeed to his
decedent's rights and status as a litigant and thus is not a party to
any suit against the decedent unless the action is revived. Daniel
v. Fourth and Market, Inc., 445 S.W.2d 699 (Ky. 1968).
CR 25.01 (1) provides that if the proper substitution of parties is not
made "within the period allowed by law . . . the action may be
dismissed as to the deceased party." This rule does not arrogate to
the courts a discretionary authority but allows for instances in which
the right to have the action dismissed has been lost as by waiver,
estoppel or consent.
KRS 395.278 permits reviver of an action in the name of the personal
representative. In Snyder, this was held to be a statute of limitations and a
mandatory time limit.
"Thus, an action which is not revived within the one-year statutory
period of this provision must be dismissed." Snyder, page 72.

XII.

WAIVER BY ELECTION AGAINST COMPETING GRANTS.
The surviving spouse may be placed in a difficult position of electing to either
accept the benefits under the Will or the benefit of being a joint tenant under one
or more deeds. A surviving spouse who is also a surviving joint tenant has been
held to be put to an election by a Will which purports to devise to the surviving
spouse a life estate in the joint tenancy property, with the remainder being given
to others. In such case, the surviving spouse must elect between keeping her
own property and renouncing the gift under the Will on the one hand, or taking
the gift under the Will and surrendering the joint tenancy interest. Kentucky Trust
Company v. Kessel, 464 S.W.2d 275 (Ky. 1971) (Exhibit D); 5 Page on Wills §
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47.13, at 618-619 (3rd rev.ed. 1962).
The 1980 Kentucky General Assembly apparently sought to abolish the doctrine
of testamentary election by KRS 381.050(2):
Where a conveyance or devise expressly creates a mutual right to
the entirety by survivorship in real estate between a husband and
wife, no provision of the Will of the husband or wife shall be
construed to defeat such right to the entirety by survivorship of the
surviving spouse.
The doctrine may still survive, however, since the waiver is created by the
election, not by a "provision of the Will" of the deceased.
The doctrine of testamentary election is not limited to this fact pattern.
XIII.

WAIVER BY FAILURE TO PROPERLY BIFURCATE A DIVORCE.
The death of a person still involved in a dissolution proceeding raises the
question whether a bifurcated decree was properly drafted.
Kentucky law permits dissolution of marriage by an interlocutory decree,
commonly known as "bifurcation" of the divorce proceedings under the authority
of Putnam v. Fanning, 495 S.W.2d 175 (Ky. 1973). However, as noted in that
decision, a bifurcated decree of dissolution of the marriage can have very little
practical significance unless and until it is made final under Kentucky Civil Rule of
Procedure 54.02. This rule requires that a judgment recite a determination that
(a) there is no just reason for delay, and (b) that the order is final, where more
than one claim for relief is presented. The potenti~1 horrendous results without
such finality language can be seen in other jurisdictions in Cook v. Lobianco, 8
Ark.App. 60, 648 S.W.2d 808 (1983); and Pittman v. Pittman, 375 So.2d 415
(Miss. 1979).

XIV.

WAIVER OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY RIGHTS.
Community property, which has been acquired in a community property state,
does not lose its community property status by the owner moving to a common
law state. To address these issues, Kentucky has enacted the Uniform
Disposition of Community Property Rights at Death Act, found at KRS 391.210.260. The Act applies to that portion of property traceable to a community
source. A statutory presumption is created that all property acquired in a
community property jurisdiction is community property. A rebuttable presumption
is created that property taken in a form which creates rights of survivorship is not
subject to the Act. KRS 391.215(2). Under KRS 391.220:
Upon death of a married person, one-half of the [community]
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property . . . is the property of the surviving spouse and is not
subject to testamentary disposition by the decedent or distribution
under the laws of succession of this Commonwealth. One-half
(1/2) of that property is the property of the decedent and is subject
to testamentary disposition or distribution under the laws of
succession of this Commonwealth. With respect to [community]
property ... the one-half (1/2) of the property which is the property
of decedent is not subject to the surviving spouse's right to elect
against the will.
Limited protection is given by the statute to the personal representative:
... Neither the personal representative nor the court in which the
decedent's estate is being administered has a duty to discover or
attempt to discover whether property held by the decedent is
[community] property ... unless a written demand is made by the
surviving spouse or the spouse's successor in interest. From KRS
391.225.
The Act also protects purchasers for value and lendors. KRS 391.235.

xv.

WAIVER BY INTESTACY.

Can a parent favor one child over another child by giving the preferred child a
parcel of real estate during the lifetime of the parent? The answer is "Qualified
Yes." One should be assured that this parent has a valid Will in place and
understand the severe consequences under present Kentucky statutes if the
parent dies without a Will.
This serious problem can best be illustrated by the case of Frank (Exhibit E), who
owned a farm of 110 acres. Frank had two children by his first marriage and
three by his second marriage. Frank's second wife died when he was 63 years
old. Six years later, he went to see his attorney. He had received considerable
attention from the three children of his second marriage, and less attention by the
two children of his first marriage. He asked his lawyer to draw a deed for "love
and affection" to the three children by his second wife for 50 acres of the 110
acres. This was done. The record does not reflect whether the attorney
suggested that Frank needed a Will, as well.
The next year, Frank died intestate. One of the children of his second marriage,
Roy, was appointed administrator of the estate. Roy reduced the personal
property to cash, paid the indebtedness of the estate and made distribution of the
balance of the money among the five children of his father.
The two children by Frank's first marriage filed suit. They claimed that the
conveyance of 50 acres to the three children of the second marriage was an
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"advancement" under KRS 391.140.
The three children of the second marriage countered that Frank and his lawyer
had considered this possibility. The deed signed by Frank expressly provided, in
part:
It is expressly understood and agreed by the parties hereto that the
conveyance of this land to the second parties by the first party is
not in the nature of an advancement from the first party to the
second parties, but is an absolute gift to them.
Relying upon the express language of KRS 391.140, the former Court of Appeals
of Kentucky held that the conveyance of the 50 acres must be treated as an
advancement if the consideration was "love and affection":
The intention of the grantor in such cases, or the donor, does not
govern. As has been held by this court, the purpose of the statute
is to effect equality in distribution. If a parent gives a child, or
certain of his children, a part only of his estate, and dies intestate
as to the remainder, the law will take hold of the undisposed part
and apply a sufficient amount of it to equalize the others with the
favored ones, or to equalize them as far as may be done with the
undisposed part of the estate.
[Ecton v. Flynn, 229 Ky. 476,17 S.W.2d 407, 410 (1929).]
It is too bad Frank did not have a Will, because this rule only arises in cases of
intestacy.
Professor Carolyn Bratt of the University of Kentucky College of Law has
criticized this rule. Kentucky apparently holds the distinction of being a minority
of the only jurisdiction in the United States with this rule of law. Legislation
seeking to change the ruling, however, has been rejected by the General
Assembly of Kentucky.
No transaction between a husband and wife can be considered an advancement
or be subject to the laws governing advancements. KRS 391.140(2); Talbott's
Ex'rv. Goetz, 286 Ky. 504,151 S.W.2d 369 (1941).
XVI.

FRAUD ON THE DOWER.

Historically, Kentucky has not permitted a spouse to make a voluntary transfer of
a significant portion of either his real or personal property with the intent to
prevent his spouse from sharing in such property at his death. Martin v. Martin,
282 Ky. 411, 138 S.W.2d 509 (1940). If he does so, upon his death the spouse
may assert her marital rights in such property in the hands of the donee.
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Anderson v. Anderson, 583 S.W.2d 504 (Ky.App. 1979). Placing assets into joint
bank accounts with others may constitute fraud on the dower. Harris v. Rock,
799 S.W.2d 10 (Ky. 1990). (Exhibit F)
The motive to defeat the statutory share of the spouse may be inferred from the
circumstances of the case, and Kentucky courts have had little difficulty
determining such intention where the gift is not reasonable in proportion to his
estate. Benge v. Barnett, 309 Ky. 354, 217 S.W.2d 782 (1949). But a gift of
$8,000 from an estate of $21,000 (38%) was held reasonable and not in fraud of
the dower, when the gift was meant to provide for the children of the deceased
husband. Goff v. Goff's Ex'rs, 175 Ky. 75, 193 S.W. 1009 (1917). A gift to
siblings of as little as 45% of personalty may raise a presumption of fraud on the
dower. Benge, supra.
XVII. WAIVER BY ADULTERY.
If either spouse voluntarily leaves the other and lives in adultery, the offending
party forfeits by statute all right and interest in and to the property and estate of
the other, unless they afterward become reconciled and live together as husband
and wife. KRS 392.090(2); McQuinn v. McQuinn, 110 Ky. 321, 61 S.W. 358
(1901). The statute has been construed not to preclude recovery on a life
insurance policy where the wife who was designated as beneficiary abandoned
the husband and lived in adultery. Bradley v. Bradley's Adm'r, 178 Ky. 239, 198
S.W. 905 (1917). And the statute does not preclude allocation of employee
benefits covered by ERISA. Moore v. Phillip Morris Companies, 8 F.3d 335 (6th
Cir. 1993). The statute has also been construed as not precluding a wrongful
death recovery by a spouse who deserted the deceased and lived in adultery.
Napier's Adm'rv. Napier's Adm'r, 210 Ky. 163,275 S.W. 379 (1925).
XVIII. ESTOPPEL BY ORIGINAL TITLE.
Where property is inherited by children and they decide to partition the real
estate among themselves in division, the legal title to the partitioned real estate
resides in the child ("child"), regardless of the provisions of the partition deed. It
has been held that even where the partitioned deed adds the spouse of the child
as a joint tenant with right of survivorship, such a provision is ineffective to
change title from the child in fee simple to joint with right of survivorship with the
child's spouse. Reynolds v. McGuire, 253 S.W.2d 386 (Ky. 1952).
XIX.

MISCELLANEOUS.
There are so many waiver problems and election pitfalls in probate, it is
impossible to cover them within one paper. Complete CLE presentations are
made on many other elections and pitfalls, including, but not limited to:
1. DISCLAIMERS. These essential devices for current estate planning require
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strict compliance with many requirements, including filing. Generally, a
disclaimer which is given in exchange for a quid pro quo, for example, is
invalid. Acceptance of the property interest is also a waiver of the right to
disclaim. KRS 394.640.
2. QTIP ELECTIONS. A recurring problem is the failure to make a proper
election for life estate property on the United States estate tax return.
3. COLLECTION OF THE KENTUCKY INHERITANCE AND ESTATE TAX. In
the illustration for this paper, the bequest of the firearm collection could
generate a tax. Will the executor collect the tax, before delivering the gun
collection?

xx.

WAIVER BY HEIRS.

In 1992, legislation proposed by the Legislation Committee of the Probate and
Trust Law Section of the Kentucky Bar Association was adopted by the Kentucky
General Assembly. It permits any fiduciary, prior to filing a final settlement and
prior to distribution of assets, to file with the court a proposed written settlement.
The settlement is set for hearing and noticed, as with other settlements.
Beneficiaries of the estate are given notice by the fiduciary by certified mail of at
In addition to all assets and
least 20 days prior to the hearing date.
disbursements previously made, the proposed settlement shall indicate assets on
hand and "the manner in which the remaining and anticipated assets are
proposed to be distributed."
An aggrieved party may "institute an adversary proceeding in Circuit Court" no
later than thirty (30) days from the entry of the order upon the proposed
settlement by the district court. (KRS 395.617(2»
The statute expressly states:
Following the entry of an order of approval or of an order of
amendment, the fiduciary shall disburse the assets in accordance
therewith. KRS 395.617(1)
The statute purports to establish a waiver in the heirs of any objection to a
settlement.
Glen S. Bagby
June 7,2005
[Portions of this paper are from the author's chapter on "Spousal Rights" published by the University of
Kentucky College of Law in its Handbook, Kentucky Estate Administration.]
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HYPOTHETICAL FOR DISCUSSION
Ml
Wl

I

Adorable

Ml

M2
HERSHEL

WANDA

Hl

I
I

I

Barbara

Charlie

1.

Hershel and Wanda were each married twice. They had children by the prior
relationships indicated above.

2.

After working for years in Texas, the couple moved to Kentucky to be nearer to
their families.

3.

There was no issue of their marriage to one another.

4.

Upon their return to Lexington, the estate of Hershel's last surviving parent was
being settled. The parent had owned outright 1,200 acres in Central Kentucky.
There were three children, who agreed to partition the real estate into three 400
acre parcels. They hired a lawyer to draw the deeds of partition. The lawyer
asked Hershel how he wanted to take title of the 400 acres he was to receive.
Hershel told the lawyer to draft the deed to Hershel and Wanda, as joint tenants
with right of survivorship. That deed was properly recorded in 1998.

5.

Upon arrival in Kentucky, Hershel and Wanda paid cash for a new home on
Richmond Road in Lexington, which turned out to have construction defects.
They filed suit against the builder only months before Hershel's death.

6.

Hershel had a very large cash inheritance, too. He placed it in two Certificates of
Deposit with his two siblings, one-half in the name of each of his siblings, as joint
tenants with right of survivorship.

7.

For several years, Hershel needed assistance at home. His daughter was very
helpful for quite a while during a very trying period. As a reward, Hershel
deeded to Adorable 60 acres off the back of the 400 acres he received by the
partitioned deed. He went to the lawyer who drafted the deed and the deed
expressly provided:
EXHIBIT A

It is expressly understood and agreed by the parties hereto that the
conveyance of this land to the second party by the first party is not in
the nature of an advancement from the first party to the second
party, but is an absolute gift to her.
8.

Later Wanda became concerned about Hershel's will and found in his
papers a handwritten will leaving everything to Adorable. Wanda typed
out a Codicil, which changed the residue clause to herself.

9.

Also toward the end of his life, as his health worsened and his needs
increased, Wanda became fed up with Hershel's demands and Adorable's
presence. Wanda moved out. No divorce was filed, but by the time of
Hershel's death, Wanda was living with a lover, out of the home.

10.

When Hershel died, his holographic will dated January 1, 1998 read as
follows:
A.

I name Adorable as my Executrix.

B.

I leave my personal property, outright, unto my wife, Wanda,
if she survives me.

c.

I leave our residence on Richmond Road to Wanda for life,
with the remainder upon her death to my children, Adorable
and Barbara.

D.

All the rest, residue and remainder of my estate I leave
outright to Adorable, my daughter.

Also found was Hershel's typed codicil, which read:
I make this Codicil to my Last Will and Testament.

I change Item D of my Last Will and Testament to read, "I give

and bequeath the residue of my estate unto my wife, Wanda, if
she survives me."

·
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KENTUCKY BAR ASSOCIATION ETHICS OPINION
&-401
The Committee has been asked to address the applicability of the Kentucky
Conduct with respect to a lawyer's representation of the
fiduciary of a decedent's est~te or trust, and the lawyer'S responsibilities to the
beneficiaries of estates and ·trusts•. In order to provide the requested advice,
explain the Committee's position on these issues, and to give insight into the
applicable Rules of Professional Conduct, the following questions are presented
for .-esponse and discussion.
~ules of Professional

guestion 1: Does a lawyer's representation of a fiduciary of a decedent's estate
or trust expand. or limit the lawyer's obligation to the fiduciary under the Rules
of Professional Conduct?
.

Answer: No.

guestion 2: Does a lawyer's representation of a fiduciary of a decedent's trust or
e'state impose on the lawyer obligations to the beneficiaries of the decedent's
trust or estate that the lawyer would not have toward third parties?
Answer: No.
Question 3: Is the lawyer's obligation to preserve client confidences under Rule
1.6 altered by the fact that the client is a fiduciary?

Answer: No.
Question 4: May the lawyer for the fiduciary also represent the beneficiaries of
the decedent's trust or estate?

Answer: Qualified Yes.
References:
ABA Formal Ope 94-380 (1994); Privilege and Confidentiality Issues When a
Lawyer Represents a Fiduciary, 30 Real Property, Probate and Trust Journa1541
(1996): ACTEC Commentaries on the Model Rules of Profess,ional Conduct. 28
Real Property, Probate and Trust Journal 865 (1994): Developments Regarding
the Professional Responsibility of the Estate Administration Lawyer: The Effect
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 26 Real Property, Probate and Trust
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Journal 1 (1991); When Loyalties Collide: Courts Resolve Confficting Duties, 135
Trusts & Estates 22 (1996); Professional Responsibility Issues Keep Practitioners
on Their Toes. 135 Trusts & Estates 22 (1996): and The Fiduciary. His Counsel
And The Attorney - Client Privilege. 136 Trusts & Estates 29 (1997): &sect;73,
Duty to Certain Non-Clients, Restatement, The Law Governing Lawyers.

OPINION
From tiDle to time Kentucky lawyers have requested advice from· the Committee
regarding a lawyer··s %eSponsibffities in the conten of the administration of
trusts and estates. The primary problem in answering such questions arises from
the fundamental question: Whom does the lawyer represent? Does the lawyer
represent the beneficiaries of the estate 'or trust: does the lawyer represent the
estate or trust entity or does the lawyer represent the fiduciary? The complexity
of this problem is acknowledged in Comment 12 to Rule 1.7, which states:
Con.O.lct questions may also arise in estate planning and estate
administration. A lawyer may be called upon to prepare wills for
several famlly members. such as husband and wife. and. depending
upon the circumstances. a confllct of interest may arise. In estate
administration the identity of the client may be unclear under the
Jaw of a particular jurisdiction. Under one view. the client Is the
fiduciary; under another view the client is the estate or trust.
including its beneficiaries. The lawyer should make clear the
relationship to the parties Involved.

By issuing this Opinion it is the Committee's intent to clarify a Kentucky
lawyer's obligations under the Rules of Professional Conduct. The examination
of these issues must focus on Rule 1.7. Conffict of Interest: General Rule. and
the problems generated by a lawyer' 5 multiple representation of clients. The
American College of T~t and Estate Counsel. hereafter referred to as "ACTEC.
adopted Commentaries to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in October
1993, and their Commentaries and the Reporter's Notes on the ACTEC
Commentaries are helpful to this analysis. The Reporter·s Notes contained the
following statements:

1f

Lawyer for Fiduciary.
Under the majority view. a lawyer who represents a fiduciary ••• stands in
a lawyer-cUent relationship with the fiduciary and not with respect to
the fiduciary estate or the beneficiaries.
DutIes to Beneficiaries.
The lawyer who represents a fiduciary generally Is not usually considered
also to represent the beneficiaries. However•.most courts have concluded that
tile lawyer owes some duties to them. Some courts subject the lawyer to
the duties because the beneficiaries are characterized as the lawyer's
':Jolnt,tt "derivative" or "secondaryft clients. Other courts do so because
the lawyer stands in a fiduciary relationship with respect to the fiduciary,
who. In turn, owes fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries. The duties. commonly
called "fiduciary duties," arise largely because of the nature of the representation
and the relative positions of the lawyer. fiduciary, and beneficiaries. However,
note that the existence and nature of the duties may be affected by the nature

and extent of the representation that a lawyer provides to a fiduciary. Thus,
. a lawyer who represents a fiduciary individually regarding a fiduciary estate
may owe few. if any, duties to the beneficiaries apart from the duties that the
lawyer owes to other noncllents.

t~ the Reporter's Notes, this Committee finds the following
comments from the ACTEe Commentaries on Model Rule 1.7 instructive for
purposes of clarifying the lawyer·s obligations to the fiduciary. to the
beneficiaries of an estate or trus~ and the problems of multiple representation.

In addition

General Nonadversary Character of Estates and Trusts Practice: Representation
of Multiple Clients. It is often appropriate for a lawyer to
represent more than one member of the same famny in connection
with their estate plans, more than one beneficiary with common
interests in an estate or·trust administration matter•..•
In some Instances the clients may actually be better served by such a
representation. which can result In more economIcal -and better .
coordinated estate plans prepared by counsel who has a better overall
understanding of all of the relevant famDy and property considerations•
•.• Multiple representation is also generally appropriate because the
Interests of the cllents In cooperation. inclUding obtaining cost effective
representation' and achieving common objectives. often clearly
predominate over their limited inconsistent interests••••
Disclosures to Multiple Clients.
Before, or within a reasonable time after. commencing the represeJ;ltatlon.
a lawyer who is consulted by multiple parties with related Interests should
discuss with them the implications of a joint representation (or a separate
representation if the lawyer believes that mode of representation to be
more appropriate and separate representation is permissible under the
appUcable local rules). In particular. the prospective cUents and the lawyer
should discuss the extent to which materla1lnformation imparted by either
client would be shared with the other and the possibility that the lawyer
would be required to withdraw If a conflict in their interests developed to
the degree that the lawyer could not effectively represent both of them.
The Information may be best understood by the clients if it is discussed
with them in person and also provided to them In written form. as in an
engagement letter or brochure.

This Committee adopts the ACTEe Commentaries because the Commentaries
properly set forth a lawyer's ethical obUgations. Further, this Committee agrees
with ABA Formal Opinion 94-380, and adopts the majority view: that is, that a
lawyer Who represents a fiduciary does not also represent the beneficiaries. We
reject the view that a lawyer who represents a fiduciary also owes fiduciary
obligations to the beneficiaries that in some circumstances will override
obligations otherwise owed by the lawyer to the fiduciary. such as the obligation
of confidentiality. We also reject the view that when a lawyer represents a
fiduciary in a trust or estate matter. the client is Dot the fiduciary, but is the
trust estate. We adopt the following comments made in the ABA's Formal
Opinion:

When the fiduciary is the lawyer's client all of the Model Rules prescribing
a lawyer's duties to a cIlent apply. The scope of the lawyer's representation
Is defined by and limited by Model Rule 1.2. The lawyer must diligently
represent the fiduciary. see Model Rule 1.3, preserve in confidence
communications between the lawyer and th:e fiduciary. see Model Rule 4.1(a).
The f~ct that the fiduciary client has obligations toward the beneficiaries
does not impose parallel obligations on the lawyer, or otherwise expand or
supersede the lawyer's responsibllltles under the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. A lawyer's duty of confidentlal1ty to a client is
not lessened by the fact that the client is a fiduciary. Although the Model
Rules prohibit the lawyer from actively participating in criminal or
fraudulent activity or active concealment of a client's wrongdoing, they
do not authorize the lawyer to breach confidences to prevent such wrongdoing.

The ABA·s Opinion. in Footnote 6. included the following -important caveats:
6. The Model Rules impose a number of limitations on a lawyer representing
a fiduciary. For ezample, a lawyer may not participate in a breach of
fiduciary duty by the fiduciary that .involves fraud or criminal activity
because the lawyer·s conduct is limited by Model Rule 1.2(d). which provides
that a lawyer may not actively participate In a client's criminal or fraudulent
activity. ·ThIs rule applies to all lawyers, not just those representing
fiduciaries. Lawyers are also prohibited from actively concealing client
breaches of fiduciary duty, or actively assisting in such concealment, by
Model Rules 4.1(a) (a lawyer shall Dot lie to third parties) and 3.3(a)(I) and (2)
(a lawyer shall Dot Ile to or conceal information from a tribunal).
If a lawyer knows that a breach of fiduciary duty has occurred, and that
an accounting Is misleading in that it hides wrongdoing committed by the
fiduciary. the lawyer is expressly prohibited by Model Rule 3.3(a) from
presenting the accounting to the court. Further, the lawyer is prohibited by
Model Rule 4.1(a) from representing to the beneficiaries that a false
accounting Is accurate. These rules apply to a lawyer with a fiduciary client
to the same extent as, but no farther than, they apply In any other
lawyer/tribunal/third party scenario.

Continuing in the text of the Opinion, the ABA Ethics Committee then made the
following comments:
Although a lawyer may not disclose confidences of the fiduciary. If the
fiduciary insists on continuing a cOlUSe of fraudulent or criminal conduct.
the lawyer may be required to terminate the representation because the
lawyer's services will be Involved In that conduct, s~ as to invoke Rule 1.16(a)(I).
or may have the option ·of a voluntary withdrawal under Rule 1.16(b)(1).
If either of these provisions of Rule 1.16 applies, this will be not because the
client Is a fiduciary. but because the client Is acting In the manner described
by the Rule. The cUent-s ·status is irrelevant.

Based upon the instructive comments of the ACTEC Commentaries and the ABA
Formal Opinion, this Committee concludes with the following advice for
Kentucky lawyers.
1. In -representing a fiduciary the lawyer's client relationship is with the
fiduciary and not with the trust or estate, nor with the beneficiaries of It
tru.st or estate.

2. The fact that a fiducIary has obligations to the beneficiaries of the tnIst
or estate does Dot in itself either expand or limit the lawyer's obligations
to -the fiduciary under the Rules of Professional Conduct, nor impose on
the lawyer obligations toward the beneficiaries that the lawyer would not
have toward other third parties.
3. The lawyer's obligation to preserve client's confidences under Rule 1.6
is not altered by the circumstance that the client is a fiduciary.
4. A lawyer has a duty to advise multiple parties who are involved with a
decedent's estate or trust regarding the identity of the lawyer'S client, and
the lawyer'S obligations to that client. A lawyer should not imply that the
lawyer represents the estate or trust or the beneficiaries of the estate or
trust because of the probability of confusion. Further, in order to avoid
such confusion, a lawyer should D.ot use the term "lawyer for the estate" or
the term "lawyer for the trust" on documents or correspondence or in
other dealings with the ~duciary or the beneficiaries.
5. A lawyer may represent the- fiduciary of a decedent's estate or a trust
and the beneficiaries of an estate or trust if the lawyer obtains the consent
of the multiple clients, and explains the Umitations on the lawyer'S
actions in the' event a conflict arises, and the consequences to the clients
if a conflict occurs. Further, a lawyer may obtain the consent of multiple
clients only after appropriate consultation with the multiple clients at the
time of the commencement of the representation.
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You have requested an Opinion relating to the propriety of joint
representation in the contexts of "no-fault" divorce and the preparation
of antenuptial agreements.
Question 1: Mayan attorney ever represent both sides in a "no-fault"
divorce?
Answer:

Except in rare cases, No.

Question 2: If not, is it proper for the attorney representing one spouse
to "talk with" the other spouse and "answer questions."
Answer:

Qualified No.

Question 3: Mayan attorney represent both parties to an antenuptial
agreement?
Answer:

Qualified Yes.

Question 4: If not, is it proper for the attorney representing one spouse
to "talk with" the other spouse and "answer questions."
Answer:

Qualified No.
.Qginion

The questions presented address the conduct of counsel in his or
her traditional roles as advocate and advisor. In responding to these
questions we do not address the propriety of mediation or arbitration
in which the lawyer does not "represent" either party. Compare EC 5-20
and ABA Model Rule 2.2.
As you note in your request, the practice of both husband and wife
going to see a single attorney to secure a dissolution of their marriage
pursuant to the "no-fault" divorce act is not uncommon. You note that
"where the parties have spoken with one another and desire an
amicable divorce, it is also not uncommon for both parties to want one
EXHIBITC

attorney to assist them in securing their desired divorce and in
preparing what they believe to be their agreement."
In suc~
circumstances the potential clients may believe that having more than
one lawyer is a wasteful luxury, and might even serve to exacerbate
problems rather than solve them.. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of
Professionaf do not affect the right to negotiate with the unrepresented
party. They merely preclude the attorney from giving advice to the
unrepresented party"); Connecticut Ope 27 (1976) [Maru doc. 10700]
(n... if the other spouse has an independent opportunity to examine
and approve the agreement before it is entered."); Florida Ops. 1-2
(1972) [Maru doc. 8126]; L.A.Co.Op. 334 (1973) [Maru doc. 7689].
The question you ask is deceptively sim~ -- may the attorney
representing one party "answer questions" posed by the unrepresented
spouse? Give the above authorities, and' the fact that much legal
"advice" is given in the form of answers to questions, the answer would
be no in many, if not in most, instances involving more than the
conveying of innocuous information or responses to simple questions,
If the interests of the spouses are sufficiently conflicting to require
separate counsel in the first instance, it follows that the door should no1
be opened that would allow the "answering of questions" concernin~
the effect of the proceeding on the rights or alternatives 01 .
unrepresented spouse. Counsel can be an "advocate for or an advisol
to only one of the contesting parties." New York Op. 478, supra.
Regarding antenuptial agreements, we note that separate ethica
problems may be presented if the particular agreement could bE
construed to violate public policy. In Jackson v. Jackson, 626 S.W.2c
630 (1981) the Supreme Court cited with approval the followin~
language from R. Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law § 13.8:
". . . Public policy embraces a vital interest in the
preservation of marriage. Any provision that looks
toward, provides for, facilitates, or tends to induce a
separation or divorce after marriage is contrary to public
policy and void. A provision for the payment of alimony
or a property settlement should a separation and divorce
occur after marriage is void and unenforceable ..
"
Kentucky Family Law, Husband and Wife, Sec. 13.8.

s'ee also, Sousley v. Sousley, 614 S.W.2d 942 (1981); Stratton v. Wilson,
185 S.W. 522 (1916). Compare New York City Op. 722 (148) (A lawy_er
may not insert in contracts provisions which have been held voia
against public policy by "a court of last resort ... as a matter of law.").
Assumi-ng that the agreement contemplated by the parties does not
offend public policy, joint representation may threaten the exercise of
counsel's independent professional judgment if one or the other of the
parties is unwilling to be completely forthcoming. Specifically, we note
another passage from Petrilli, at § 13.5:
During marriage, or after the death of one spouse an
antenuptial agreement may be avoided unless ... [both
parties have] knowledge ... of their' legal rights, and
knQwledge of the effect the antenuptial agreement will
have upon their legal rights.
Elsewhere in the same section the author observes that "full frank
disclosure to each other of the property held by each of them" is
required, and that "it is good practice to make a recital in the
antenuptial agreement of the parties holdings of property." Compare
Lipski v. Lipski, 510 S.W.2d 6 (1974) (upholding antenuptial agreement
prepared by an attorney representing both parties). If counsel is
possessed of confidences or secrets of a· party that the other needs to
know and that party is not willing to disclose such information, it is
obvious that counsel would, at the very least, violate DR 5-105 by
purporting to represent both.

Accordingly, joint representation should be undertaken only if each
party consents to the representation after full disclosure of the potential
problems inherent in such representation. Prudent counsel would
obtain such consent in writing. DR 5-105(C).
Finally, we believe that our comments in response to Question 2
are pertinent to Question 4.
Richard H. Underwood
Chairman, Ethics Committee

KENTUCKY TRUST COMPANY V. KESSELL
Ky. 464 S.W.2d 275 (1991)
[THE DOCTRINE OF TESTAMENTARY ELECTION]
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ECTON V. FLYNN
229 KY 476, 17 S.W.2D 407 (1929)
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1.

Apparently, Amos had $160,000 from first marriage.

2.

Amos creates $20,000 CD's with second wife (Rosa) and seven
children by first marriage.

3.

Amos dies.

Harris v. Rock, Ky., 799 S.W.2d 10 (1990)
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I.

Framing the Issue (WFW's Disclaimer)
A.

To the client, a trust comes with burdens, both real and merely perceived.
Many people who establish trusts see them as a necessary evil; something
their lawyer made them do to avoid taxes, take care of minor children,
take care of a .spendthrift, or protect an inheritance for children from a
prior marriage.

B.

This outline is intended to address the issue of deconstructing trusts from
the Settlor's point of view, not the beneficiary. Where there is a trust,
there is a beneficiary who would like to "break" it and those methods are
not addressed here.

C.

This outline is not intended to serve as a scholarly work or academic
commentary. Furthermore, this outline does not address the myriad of tax
issues presented by unwinding funded trusts. This outline is a collection
of some of the practical, if imperfect, methods that have been employed to
unwind funded trusts.

D.

Ultimately, your ability to take apart a trust will tum on the provisions of
the trust instrument. I have found that by studying the instrument
carefully, there is almost always a way.

E.

This entire outline is based on the premise that the contemplated technique
to be employed has the full support of all interested parties. This is the
first and most important step in the process. Without full support of all
involved, there is little point in proceeding.

E.

A LAWYER WHO ASSISTS WITH THE TERMINATION OF A
TRUST ALWAYS RUNS A RISK OF HIS WORK BEING SECOND
GUESSED BY TRUSTEES, BENEFICIARIES AND POSSIBLY THE
COURT. CHOSE YOUR CLIENTS CAREFULLY
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II.

III.

Funded Revocable Living Trusts
A.

This is the easiest type of Trust to unwind because its terms allow for its
revocation. However, I often counsel clients against revoking their funded
revocable trusts even if the reasons for the trust have gone away. This is
because the administrative cost of "un-funding" a living trust can
outweigh its benefit. It may be much more cost effective to revoke most
of the provisions of a living trust and substitute language that directs an
outright distribution at the Settlor's death.

B.

My biggest fear with unwinding a funded living trust is that I will deliver
what I think are all the assets out of the trust and then revoke it, only to
discover another asset once the Trustee has lost all authority, or worse.
The bottom line is that you can't always trust your client to advise you of
all the assets that have been placed in the trust; especially if you aren't the
lawyer who initially drafted and funded the trust. Revocable trusts don't
file tax returns so it can be hard to back into the assets. There could also
be real property held in the trust you aren't aware of.

Terminating Trusts by Statute or by the Terms of the Instrument
A.

KRS 386.185 allows a trustee administering an amount of $25,000 or less
to distribute the trust assets to the beneficiary. The Court MUST enter the
Order distributing the funds and releasing the Trustee. The statute goes on
to state that the recipient of the trust proceeds "shall be under a duty to use
the funds for the purpose of the trust." .

B.

Although not technically a termination, KRS 395.326 states that a
testamentary trustee serving under a Will which does not nominate a
successor trustee,may designate his own successor trustee. The statute
requires a hearing with notice to the beneficiaries. If the desire is to "free
up" the trust assets, the proper successor trustee will likely be the current
beneficiary.

C.

Sometimes a trust instrument will contain language that states that a
trustee, usually a corporate trustee, can terminate a trust when:

D.

1.

The trustee determines the trust can no longer be economically
administered; or

2.

The trust assets are no longer sufficient to generate the trustee's
minimum fee.

If a trust instrument contains language which allows the trustee to
terminate it, it usually directs the trustee to distribute the assets to
individuals who are currently eligible for income distributions.
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IV.

Merger of Estates (not to be confused with a qualified disclaimer)
A.

The Internal Revenue Code and the KRS both provide for qualified
disclaimers which will avoid the imposition of transfer tax from one
beneficiary to the next. Luckily, this outline is not about taxes.

B.

The principal behind "qualified" disclaimers is fundamental; a would-be
beneficiary doesn't have to accept an interest in trust. Even if the interest
is accepted, it can be relinquished and transferred.

C.

Generally, a beneficial interest in trust may be transferred. Where the
current beneficiary transfers his interest to the remainder beneficiary, it is
said that a "merger of estates" has occurred and the trust may be
terminated. Where a current beneficiary's interest has been accelerated,
the interest will become the sole estate of the remainder beneficiaries.
1.

D.

While the doctrine of Merger of Estates is covered at length by the
usual treatises and the Restatement of Trusts, there is little
Kentucky law on the subject, but see, In reKlayer, 20 B.,R. 270.

There are a number of issues which may arise when trying to terminate a
trust under the doctrine of Merger of Estates:
1.

Does the instrument prevent the beneficiary from alienating his
interest? If so, all may not be lost since a spendthrift clause should
not be· interpreted against the remainder beneficiary of trust and
since the transfer is voluntary.

2.

There is some authority that for a trust Merger of Estates to occur
the current beneficiary, remainder beneficiary AND TRUSTEE
must all be one and the same. Therefore, a third party trustee must
be willing to participate.

3.

There is some authority that once a trust 'is funded, a merger of
estates does not terminate the trust but only makes it terminable by
the new, sole beneficiary. Thus, a shade of gray which could
necessitate a court action depending on the willingness of the
trustee to participate.

4.

If any of the above issues are present, a decision will'have to be
made as to whether the trust estates should be merged without the
approval of the court.

F-g

V.

Merger of Instruments
A.

Though not technically a termination, merging o~e instrument with the
other can accomplish a kind of deconstruction. Often, an attempt to
accommodate a client's wish to terminate a trust is to make the best of a
bad situation. In such a case, merging one offensive instrument for a less
offensive instrument may present the best, and most cost effective, option
for the parties.

B.

Many trust instruments provide that a Trustee has the authority to "merge
the assets of this trust with those of any other trust with similar provisions
so as to allow the Trustee to hold the assets of all of such trusts as one
single trust."
or
"The trustee may merge or consolidate any trust into any other trust that
has the same trustee and substantially the same dispositive provisions."

C.

As with every other technique covered here, merging two instruments is
an imperfect art and should not be undertaken without an examination of
all the issues which could affect the beneficiaries:
1.
2.
3.
4.

VI.

What does "substantially the same" really mean?
What if one trust contains a merger provision but the other does
not?
Which trust will be the survivor instrument?
Can two trusts which do not contain merger provisions still be
merged absent court approval?

Termination by Agreement
A.

It is well settled in Kentucky that even if a Trust is irrevocable, it can be
rescinded with the consent of the settlor and all the beneficiaries or upon a
showing that the trust is a product of fraud, duress, undue influence or
mistake. Cruise v. Leary, Ky.App., 727 S. W.2d 408 (1987). There are
several published cases which expand on this statement and some that
appear to limit it. The following represents a fair survey:
1.

A trust may be terminated by agreement of all parties in interest,
by consent of beneficiaries upon any judicial action, where
instrument creating it does not in express terms or by necessary
implication prohibit termination thereof, or by mere consent of
beneficiaries alone, if object of plan of trust is not defeated, or trust
res is not diverted from essential purpose of trust. First Nat. Bank
& Trust Co. ofLexington v. Purcell, Ky., 244 S. W.2d 458 (1952).
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B.

C.

2.

Chancellor's consent is unnecessary to terminate trust as to either
life tenants or remaindermen when all of them· are living and sui
juris. Keith v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co., Ky., 75 S. W.2d 747
(1934).

3.

A Court of equity may not tenninate a trust, even though interested
parties agree to terminate it, unless design and object of trust has
been acconJ.plished. Young v. Robinette, Ky., 239 S. W.2d 91
(1951).

4.

To terminate trust agreement in which no power of revocation is
reserved in absence of fraud or mistake, whole object trust must
have been accomplished, termination of trust must be
advantageous to beneficiaries, and all interested parties must
consent. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Williams, Ky., 105
S. W2d 814 (1937).

The first two cases cited above invite lawyers to terminate trusts by
Agreement. The second two appear to dare lawyers to terminate trusts by
Agreement. The common threads appear to be the participation of all
interested parties/beneficiaries and the accomplishment of the trust
purpose (or at least the lack of its defeat).
1.

It's a sure bet that the participation of all beneficiaries includes
both income and remainder beneficiaries. Since this is the case,
and if the remainder succession is contingent upon surviving the
life tenant, how can "all" beneficiaries participate in the trust's
termination by agreement when we don't yet know who the
remainder beneficiaries are?

2.

There is little published guidance on what it means to say that a
trust's purpose has been accomplished, or at least not defeated.
Generally, I tend to look for language in a trust that appears to
espouse a clear purpose such as, until my child attains the age of
35; this is a clear trust purpose that cannot be evaded.

Clearly, there is case law that supports the proposition that a trust can be
terminated by agreement among ·the parties. The question then becomes
whether the matter is "clean" enough to be resolved without a court saying
grace over it and whether the client can be protected without a court order.
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VII.

Judicial Termination
A.

There is both comfort and risk in attempting to dismantle a trust through
judicial termination. There is comfort in knowing that whatever the
outcome, it was upon the orders of the court and all was done within the
bounds of fiduciary prudence. Of course, the risk is that you won't get
what you want.

B.

The strict legal justification for terminating a trust has been summarized in
the preceding section. However, the case of Kelly v. Marr must also be
mentioned as it stands for the proposition that where there has been a
change of circumstances not known to or anticipated by settlor and such
circumstances would defeat or substantially impair accomplishment of
purposes of trust, the court may direct the trustee to do acts forbidden by
terms of the trust. Ky., 185 S. W.2d 945 (1945).

C.

1.

When asking a court to deviate from or terminate a trust, the most
common averment is that the trust was entered into by a mistake of
some kind or that circumstances have changed which could not
have been foreseen by the settlor.

2.

While the above case does not support trust termination, it does
support a judicial modification and, as mentioned earlier, when
making the best of a bad situation, sometimes a less offensive trust
instrument presents the best option for all the beneficiaries.

Jurisdiction and Venue
1.

Statutes
a.
b.
c.

2.

Cases
a.
b.

3.

KRS § 24A.120 - Jurisdiction of District Court
KRS § 386.675 - Initiation of Judicial Proceedings
KRS § 386.680 - Venue

Lee v. Porter, Ky. App., 598 S. W.2d 465 (1980)
Vega v. Kosair, Ky. App., 832 S. W.2d 395 (1992)

Necessity of GAL
a.

Whallen v. Kellner, Ky. App., 104 S. W. (1907)
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PART ONE:
A.

ELIGIBILITY RULES

OVERVIEW

1.

The Statutory regime

Medicaid fmancial eligibility requirements are codified generally within the maze of
regulations set out within Title 42 of the United States Code, and Title 20 in the Code of
Federal Regulations. The program is jointly administered by the Center for Medicare and
Medicaid Services ("eMS") and local state governments. CMS has published the so-called
State Medicaid Manual which provides guidance on the federal rules and policies pertaining
to the Regulations.
In Kentucky, the Regulations pertaining to financial eligibility are generally set out at
Chapter 907 of the Kentucky Administrative Regulations. The Kentucky Department for
Medicaid Services ("OMS") is the primary agency responsible for implementation of the
Medicaid program. OMS contracts with the Department for Community Based Services
("DCBS") which has generated a manual to provide guidance to caseworkers. This Manual,
known as the Field Services Operation Manual (the "manual") contains very specific
provisions as to how a particular set of facts should be interpreted in the context of Kentucky
Medicaid

eligibility.

The

manual

may

be

accessed

on

the

internet

at

http://manuals.chfs.ky.gov/dcbs_manuals/DFSjindex_dfs.asp.

2. Why is it important to know about Medicaid?
Medicaid is the only program of governmental financial assistance by which an individuals'
long term institutional care is paid. Medicare only pays in limited circumstances, and then
for a limited period of time. In that nursing home expenses in Louisville currently approach
an average of $5,000 per month, a basic understanding of these rules is an important
component of any practitioners' knowledge to provide effective estate planning advice to
elderly clients in anticipation of the need for long term care.
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(a)

3 criteria for eligibility
Medicaid does not generally pay for personal care. Thus, in addition to meeting
financial eligibility, the individual must ALSO meet the test for medically needy,
and the care provider must agree to accept Medicaid.

Given the very substantial potential financial costs to our clients should they require
institutional care, some basic appreciation for Medicaid eligibility is important whether for
advance planning purposes or damage control.
B.

THE ESSENTIAL RULES
1. Resource Limitations! Transfer considerations
(a)

Basic concept - Fitting within resource limitation
In that Medicaid, unlike Medicare, is a "means-tested" benefit, eligibility turns on
the financial ability to pay for care. Thus, one must reduce his or her assets known in Medicaid parlance as "resources" - to permissible limits. A fundamental
component of Medicaid eligibility requires the would-be applicant to be within
resource limits. For persons who require long term care - whether at home or in a
facility- the limits are $2,000 of counted resources for a single person, and for a
couple one-half (1/2) the counted resources, not more than $95,100 (and not less
than $20,000) in 2005, and as adjusted in later years per COLAs.
(2) Excluded versus counted resources.
Before advising clients, one would do well to become familiar with the
regulations concerning what is counted and what is excluded. Counted
resources may be retained. Generally most liquid resources are counted with
the notable exception of funds in a tax qualified retirement plan at least until
withdrawn. See 907 KAR 1:645(3)(21).
(i) Note: Current policy requires withdrawals to be taken at age 591/2.

Also, certain jointly owned resources may be excluded at least where
the co-owner refuses to release his or her portion of the property. This
is discussed in greater detail below.
Generally, most people who come to us for assistance will have resources in
excess of the limitations, and are eager for guidance as to how they may properly
fit within the limitations. As the material in Part Two, below, will illustrate a
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number of means by which an individual may re-structure resources, in the
overwhelming majority of cases one of the first steps is to look at whether an
outright transfer of resources so as to reduce funds to resource limitations is
advisable.
As is true in many other areas of the law (e.g., contemplation of death gifts in the
context of estate/inheritance tax) divestiture of assets as a means of re-writing
one's financial statement in anticipation of gaining advantages due to a postdivestiture net worth is subject to scrutiny. Stated differently, transfers made in
contemplation of gaining Medicaid eligibility will be subjected to a penalty.
(b)

The transferred resource rule - Funds transferred for less than fair market value
(gratuitous transfers) to the recipient will trigger a penalty which is expressed in
terms of an ineligibility period, or length of time from date of gratuitous transfer
until the transferor may become eligible for benefits.
(1) Transfers considered - There is a 36 month "look-back rule" which
establishes the time parameters during which transfers are considered.
The look-back period extends to 36 months for outright transfers
preceding the month an individual is institutionalized and an application
for Medicaid is made.

For most transfers to trust, the look-back is

increased to 60 months from the date all, or a portion of, the trust
becomes unavailable to the transferor.
(2) Transfer penalty calculation
Once a transfer is made for less than fair value during the look-back
period, a transfer penalty is assessed. Each transfer is assessed a penalty
in a process by which the transfer is divided by the so-called "transferred
resource factor" in the year of Medicaid application. In 2005, in Kentucky,
that is $2,685. The transfer factor changes from year to year based on cost
of living adjustments, but the factor used by DeBS in considering a case
is the factor in the year the application is made, NOT the year where the
transfer is made.

SPECIAL NOTE: For transfers made which will trigger a penalty which will
go into .the second or third year after transfer year, this may shorten the
waiting period a month or two. This is particularly so in years where the first
transfer is made late in the year - November or December - and the sum
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transferred is significantly close to 36 times the transfer factor of the current
year.

(c)

•

Thus, a transfer of $26,000 is divided by $2,685, resulting in 9.683.

•

Figures to right of decimal are disregarded.

•

The result is the number of months of Medicaid ineligibility starting
with and subsequent to the month of transfer, with the month of
transfer being regarded as the first month.

•

See Medicaid Manual Volume IVA, Section 2080(D) for illustrations,
and examples of multiple transfers.

•

Multiple transfers which do not trigger overlapping penalties
are treated separately.

•

Transfers made further back in time than the reach of the look-back
period are generally irrelevant. Thus, were Oprah Winfrey to transfer
billions to her children and retain nothing she could qualify for
Medicaid in 3 years.

Planning with ( i.e.,timing) transfers- As indicated above, timing is - if not
"everything" - certainly a significant factor. Thus, in planning gifts, transfers
timing should be approached from various vantage points, the first of which may
well be "what amount(s) and when" .
Transfers can take several different forms.
(1) Lump sum gifts - Typically, transfers of all resources are inadvisable
since the larger the transfer the larger the penalty, and funds will be
necessary to pay for the cost of care until the

pen~lty

expires and a

Medicaid bed is available. Thus, transfer planning must take into account
cost of care during the ineligible interval.
Example #1: Mother has $100,000. A transfer of all funds will mean
that she will not be able to apply to be eligible for benefits for 3 years.
Why? $100,000 divided by $2,685 = 37 months.

In the meantime

nursing home expenses will need to be paid.
(1) Rule of halves (with some adjustments). Instead of transferring $100,000,
consider a gift of half. $50,000 divided by $2,685 will result in a transfer
penalty of 18 months which will be paid from the $50,000 retained; that
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would mean that $2,685 per month would be available to pay the facility
from the retained funds until dissipated.
Since the $2,685 is a statewide average "Medicaid rate" and not a realistic
private pay rate, and further since private rates will tend to average more
along the lines of $5,000 per month, there will be an appreciable shortfall
each month. The income of the nursing home patient will help defray the
cost, but to what extent? This must be factored in to the equation.
Example #2. Same facts as in Example #1, but to complete the
picture, assume mother has $1,000 per month social security, and a $815
pension per month. Thus each month payment will be made on the following
basis •

Retained funds per transfer factor

•

Income

$ 2,685
1,815

TOTAL
Consideration of expenses and

$4,500
also

income

must

be factored

into

determining the amount required, and it is wise to adjust the gift
accordingly.
In the above example, this means that for 18 months - until the penalty
expires - there will be a monthly shortfall of $500 per month, or $9,000.
(2) Rolling transfers - May shorten ineligibility period.

For instance, a

transfer of $5,500 per month will - in a year when the transfer factor is
$2,800 - result in a 1.964, or 1 month, penalty. This is because penalties
are based on whole numbers (recall that figures to the right of decimal are
dropped).
Under current law, so long as the penalties do not overlap each transfer is
considered separately. Thus, the ineligibility period with respect to a
transfer of $22,000 may be shortened from the 7 months which would apply
in the case of a lump sum transfer ( $22,000 + $2,800

= 7.85 or 7) to 4

months where the transfers are made consecutively rather than all at once
($5,500 + $2,800

= 1.99, or a 0l\e (1) month penalty each month which

begins, and expires, within the same month.
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(3) Caveat - ALWAYS remember to inquire about gifts made during the lookback period. Transfer strategies which do not verify whether prior gifts
were or were not made may backfire.

c. PLANNING FOR COUPLES -

THE COMMUNITY SPOUSE ALLOWANCES

1. Background: Spousal Impoverishment
Until the passage of the Medicaid Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 (MCCA), in
situations where one spouse was institutionalized (the "institutionalized spouse") and
another spouse remained at home (or in the community, thus known as the ucommunity
spouse"), since the only financial resource exclusion was limited to $2,000 per spouse,
the cost of care for an institutionalized spouse frequently brought about the
impoverishment of not only the institutionalized spouse, but also the community spouse.
Stated differently, the community spouse was required to contribute of his or her
resources to support the institutionalized spouse until the resources of both spouses had
been reduced to the exclusion amount for each.
The MCCA, however, provided some relief to the community spouse. Basically, the rules
permitted the community spouse to retain a threshold level of assets - which since 1988
changes from year to year - in order to provide a financial cushion for that spouse. This
same rationale remains prevalent both directly and indirectly in 2005, and the underlying
philosophy permits the community spouse to request additional allowances and income
even above the automatic resource allowance where he or she can demonstrate financial
need.
2. Determination of Community Spouse RESOURCE Allowance
tt

Prior to June 1, 2003, the Community Spouse Resource Allowance ("CSRA in any given
)

case was a fIXed sum of money. In other words, the community spouse was permitted to
keep a set dollar amount. Whatever the amount in a particular year, all that was
necessary was to make sure that the counted resources were within limits, and once they
were - assuming any relevant gift penalties have expired - the Medicaid application would
be approved.
Sadly for the unprepared, those days of readily understandable guidelines are "gone with
the wind" - the 2003 legislative revisionist wind. In 2005, determinations of the CSRA
requires a more complex calculation which involves in all but very small estates
(resources less than $20,000) a two step procedure.

G· 6

(a) Resource assessment. The process of determining the CSRA is started with a socalled "resource assessment" which is a calculation done by the Medicaid
caseworker on form Medicaid form MA-22. This will require scheduling a date with
the Medicaid caseworker assigned to the particular facility, and submitting
required documentation about current assets.
(1) Aggregate countable resources.

All non-exempt resources of both spouses

must be counted together, regardless of their character, and regardless of
whose name appears on the title of the resources. Such non-exempt resources
are pooled, and the total value is calculated.
{b) Segregate community spouse's allowable share. At the resource assessment the
community spouse's CSRA is determined as follows:
(1) Effective June 1, 2003 in Kentucky the CSRA is a minimum of $20,000, or
one-half of the value of the pooled counted resources, whichever is greater,. up
to a maximum - in 2005 - of $95, 100.
(2) Both the base amount and the maximum is adjusted annually for federal cost
of living adjustments as evidenced by the Consumer Price Index.
(i)

NOTE: This does NOT mean that each year once
Medicaid eligibility is established the spouse gets an
increase. It simply

means

that

the

amount

which will be set aside for the spouse at the initial

detennination changes for each year. See, however,
paragraph (e) of this section, below, relating to posteligibility accumulations for the community spouse.
(3) The other one-half of the spousal resources, or, if greater, the amount of those
resources which exceed the CSRA maximum amount (in 2005 that is $95,100)
count as resources of the institutionalized spouse, which will disqualify that
spouse for Medicaid until either "spent down," that is, applied towards the cost
of that spouse's care in the institution, converted to excluded resources, given
away followed by the conclusion of the ineligibility period, or a combination of
any of the above.
(4) Note that only counted resources are factored in to determine CSRA. Thus, for
instance the residence, retirement plans and excluded vehicles of the spouses
are not considered in determining the CSRA.
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(c).

Inter-spousal Transfers

Since the transfer of resource rules are not applicable with respect to transfers to or
for the benefit of an individual's spouse, the institutionalized spouse (or his or her
attorney-in-fact with sufficient authority to transfer resources on his or her behalf)
may transfer resources to a community spouse without penalty in order to bring the
community spouse up to the maximum CSRA allowance.
It should be noted that since October 1995 in Kentucky all resources owned by both
spouses at the time the institutionalized spouse applies for Medicaid are counted even
if there is a valid pre-nuptial agreement which purports to maintain assets for the
exclusive use of the community spouse.
(d).

Preserving the CSRA maximum under new rules.

Timing is not necessarily "everything" when it comes to maximizing the CSRA... to
paraphrase Vince Lombardi, it is "the only thing", and since the practitioner on the
field of legal football will determine whether the spouse wins the maximum allowance,
it is incumbent upon us to know the rules.
(1)

Two-step process.
(i) As stated above, the CSRA is now limited to 1/2 of counted resources, up
to the maximum in the year the application is made Thus, if spouses own
$90,000

when application

is

made,

the

CSRA

is

$45,000.

The

institutionalized spouse may keep $2,000, and thus the couple exceeds
limits by $43,000.
In all cases where the couple has more than $20,000, there will be a
potential eligibility problem unless a resource assessment precedes the
Medicaid application to establish the amount of resources, set the CSRA,
and determine excess resources which must be spent, transferred or
converted by the time the application is made.
(ii) Thus, there are two steps to administrative process:

a)

First, it is necessary to establish the CSRA. This is done at the time of

the resource assessment. Once locked in to the amount of the CSRA, the
next task involves reducing the spouse to be within the limits so that at a
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later date, when the second administrative procedure - the application for
Medicaid eligibility - is undertaken, the institutionalized spouse qualifies.
b) That second step is when the actual application for benefits is made.
Example: Husband, in LTC facility and his wife who lives at
home have $200,000 in counted resources. Resource assessment is done in August 2005 and $95,100 set aside as the
CSRA for the Wife. Spend down plan/ gifting/conversion of
counted resources into excluded resources or income takes
place. When the community spouse's assets are within the
CSRA, and the institutionalized spouse is within $2,000 limit,
the application should be approved.
(2)

Planning in light of the procedures (ix) Maximize resources at time of assessment .In that the amount of the

CSRA will depend on the assessment, and in view of the fact that the
assessment is done on the basis of counted resources, consider
legitimate means of maximizing counted resources at time of assessment.
a) Have assessment done when resources are at high point; e.g before
gifting; spending.
b) Where funds will be available, or MAY be available, have assessment
done when they are in hand.
c) Query: can you borrow to increase resources when otherwise would
have less than the maximum times two?
Example: Where counted resources are less than two times maximum
($95,100, in 2005) an assessment will produce less than the
maximum. If spouses have $150,000, the maximum CSRA would be
$75,000. Can spouses borrow another $40,200 so that when
assessment is done their resources stand at $190,200? This would
yield a CSRA of $95, 100. Once the CSRA is set, the loan could be
repaid.
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d).What about withdrawing principal from IRA more rapidly to increase
counted resources?
(e) Post eligibility excesses.
It should be noted that under present policy with the month starting after the
month in which Medicaid eligibility is established as to the institutionalized spouse,
the resources of the community spouse are no longer considered. Thus, once the
institutionalized spouse is Medicaid eligible, should the community spouse acquire
additional resources, the community spouse will not be required to contribute such
excess resources towards the cost of care of the institutionalized spouse unless the
institutionalized spouse goes off Medicaid and a new application is made.
3. Income rules between spouses - The Community Spouse INCOME Allowance
Since the MCCA was enacted, the community spouse has been permitted to retain
not only more substantial assets, but also a much higher level of income. Basically,
the income of the community spouse is no longer required to be used to help pay for
the cost of care of the institutionalized spouse. Unlike the rule with respect to assets,
the income of each spouse is considered owned by the spouse in whose name it is
paid.

Income paid in both names is considered to be owned by each spouse as to

one-half of the amount of such income.
(a)

Community spouse's income stays with him or her. The community
spouse may keep all his or her income regardless of amount.

(b)

Automatic allowance from institutionalized spouse to community spouse.
The community spouse may draw against the institutionalized spouse1s
income (which may include the institutionalized spouse's Social Security) to
the extent necessary in order to bring the community spouse's income up to
the annual allowance, which starting in July 2005 is $1,604.

(c)

Additional automatic allowance - excess shelter expenses.
In situations where the community spouse has regular and significant
monthly "shelter expenses", the CSIA may be increased by the Medicaid
caseworker on the basis of clear documentation of same. The tlshelter
expenses" are expenses necessary to maintain the "roof over the spouse's
head" and do NOT include personal living expenses such as groceries, spousal
medical expenses, and similar items. Basically what is involved here are such
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monthly expense items as rent, mortgage, homeowner's insurance, utility
expenses, and a limited amount - $30 - for telephone.
(1) Note: Only the EXCESS shelter expenses are allowable - that portion of
such items in excess of a shelter standard of, in year 2005, $482 per month.
Example: Assume that shelter expenses come to $782 per month. The extra
$300 is added to the $1,604 allowance. Thus, the community spouse will be
permitted to draw on the institutionalized spouse's income to bring her
income up to $1,904 per month.
(2) Clear documentation such as bills, receipts, should be presented the
Medicaid caseworker to substitute the amounts.
(d)

Court ordered/fair hearing additional allowances
The federal and Kentucky regulations recognize situations where the
community spouse may need additional income allowances, and provides for
same through either an appeals hearing or court order. Such allowances
require either administrative award beyond the caseworker level, or judicial
process.

D. THE HOMESTEAD (PERSONAL RESIDENCE) IN THE WAKE OF 9-1-03 RULES

1.0verview
(a) Fonner law. Under law in effect prior to September 1, 2003, the homestead was
not counted as a resource. This was true regardless of whether the Medicaid recipient
could ever be expected to return home, and in fact whether he or she ever even set
foot in the home. Under pre-September 1 rules, excess resources could be used to
improve or buy a bjgger residence, and thus converted into an excluded resource.
2. Post-August 31,2003 Rules
(al Homestead may need to be sold Under new rules, unless the property is resided in
by a spouse or dependent family member the homestead will in most cases no longer
be regarded as a "homestead", and thus be treated as a counted resource after
"permanent institutionalization." See 907 KAR 1:645 §3(1)(b).
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(1) Administrative allowances - in addition to the above exceptions to
this rule, policy permits the recipient a time allowance to sell the
property during which it may be excluded from consideration.

In

essence, an individual who is in the process of marketing the property
for sale may become eligible for Medicaid during the period while the
property is on the market, and a "reasonable effort" is made to sell the
property. See907 KAR 1:645§3(3)(b)(2).
(bl Exceptions to sale requirement.
(1) Jointly owned property. In cases where residential property was jointly
owned prior to the effective date of the new law, so long as co-owners refuse to
relinquish their portion and thus facilitate a sale, the property may continue to be
excluded at least for cases where the recipient's eligibility was prior to 9/1/2003.
(i) This may be a "Pyrrhic victory" however. Eligibility may be
maintained, but the recipients' interest in the property may be subject
to estate recovery.
(ii) The addition of another person's name to residential property
constitutes a transfer of resource.
(2) Special situations. The homestead may be excluded in the following cases (a) Where the property continues to be resided in by a spouse or
dependent family member;
(ii) For the first six (6) months of the recipient's institutionalization;
(iii) For up to the 1st recertification (possibly even longer depending on
the facts and circumstances) where the recipient has signed a
statement to the effect that he or she intends to return home within a
specified time.
(iv) The home has been owned by, or transferred to, a specified class of
individuals under 907 KAR 1:650 Section 2a.

the recipient's spouse;

b. the recipient's child under age 21
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c.

a caretaker child who has resided with the recipient for two
years prior to institutionalization and who provided care to the
recipient to prevent institutionalization;

d. a disabled child of the recipient.
e.

A sibling of the individual who has an equity interest in the

home and who has lived with the institutionalized individual
for one year prior to institutionalization.
(c) What to do ?
(1) Transfer house as an advance plan well before need for long-term care.
(2) In situations where there is not sufficient time, it may be advisable to sell
all, or a portion of, the house to children for assessed value which may be less
than market value.
(i)It may also be advisable to sell for less than assessed value - this
would trigger a gift penalty, however, which will need to be considered.
(3) Retain life estate; transfer remainder.
(a) This technique will permit a reduction in value of what has been
sold. The manual has tables at Section 2056 which establish the
value of a life estate and remainder interest. ConsiderExample # 1: An 80 year old woman has a house which is tax
assessed at $100,000. She retains a life estate and sells the
remainder to her children. Her life interest under the tables is
worth

43.66°~

of the property, or $43,660. The children

then purchase the remainder interest for $56,340. Through a
combination of gifts and private pay spend down, assume she
consumes $6,000 per month. In 10 months she is eligible
because the funds are gone
Example #2. Same example, but children purchase the
remainder

for

half,

or

$28,000.

There

has

been

an

uncompensated transfer (gift) of $28,000. Assume the transfer
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factor was $2,800 in the year of application. Transfer penalty
will be 10 months.
(ii) Assume the children pay nothing. Penalty will be 20 months.
Query: how will 20 months cost of care be paid? May need to

retransfer property and start over. See CMS Regulation 3258.10 for
"curing" prohibited transfer penalties.
(d) Income tax considerations.
(1) Where property must be sold, consider sale of property in recipients' name for
capital gains tax exclusion where recipient has lived at property for at least one (1) of
previous five years. The normal 2 of 5 years is relaxed where a person has been in a
nursing home. In such cases it may be possible to exclude up to $250,000 captial
gain for a single person ($500,000 for a couple) as "personal residence" under
Internal Revenue Code Section 121(d)(7).
(I) If property is transferred to children who then sell, children will pick up

recipient's adjusted basis, which often is quite low relative to current market, thus
creating current tax liability to children.
(i) Property may be transferred to individuals who plan to live there
without tax concerns if the intent is for it to become their residence.
(3) Query as to whether property which is subject to retained life estate will enable
heirs to receive stepped up basis under Code Section 1015 based on inclusion in
estate under Code Section 2036.

E. ESTATE RECOVERY
1. Expansion of estate recovery. Under post-August 31,2003 rules, estate recovery is no
longer limited to the recipient's "estate" as defined for purposes of state probate law, but
purports to embrace any and all interests in property which the recipient owned at death.
Thus, even survivorship property, property in trusts, and - interestingly - life interests are
to be made subject to new estate recovery rules.
2. Planning to minimize damage. In the wake of the new rules, recovery may be more
expensive than appears.
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Example# 1: Recipient owns property in joint survivorship with children in a
pre-September 1,2003 deed for a pre 9/1/2003 approved case. Assume the
property is worth $200,000. Mother dies. Property may be subject to
estate recovery claim for $100,000.
(a) Transfers prior to eligibility. As always, advance transfers prior to recovery ought
to be considered where time permits. Thus, even where a transfer may extend an
eligibility period, the advantage to removing a property interest from estate recovery
claims should be weighed in the decision making process.
(blTransfers after eligibility has been established. In this situation what is assumed
is that one of the exceptions to requiring sale of the property ( which has been
discussed earlier) applies. Now that the individual is on Medicaid, the focus shifts to a
consideration of what can be done to protect the property from recovery.
(1) Cost of recovery exposure versus cost of discontinuance of Medicaid must
be taken into account. Following cessation of Medicaid, gifts can be made, or
purchase for PVA value and recipient can go back on Medicaid after spenddown.
(2) Example#2: Same facts as example # 1. Son purchases remainder interest
of mother's half of the property for $56,340, mother goes off Medicaid for 9
months. If half property subjected to estate recovery at death, son could lose
$100,000 to estate recovery claims instead.

3. Resistance to recovery claims.
Just because the government believes it has a claim doesn't mean that our clients have to
acquiesce.
(a) Survivors not subject to deceased co-owners debts.There are a number of
decisions and principles that a surviving co-owner of survivorship real estate is not
subject to the debts of the deceased owner, at least where the creditor has not
brought an action against the deceased co-owner prior to the deceased owner's death.
See CJS Joint Tenancy §§2 and 37.
(b) Life estate recovery at death? It is difficult to see what transfer occurs at the
death of a life tenant. The retention of a life tenancy is an excluded resource under
Manual Section 2055, with the result that the remainder interest is regarded as
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having been transferred. At the deceased recipient's death, the life estate simply
terminates and there is no "transfer". Thus, what remains to be subject to claims?
(1) Even if Medicaid can recover, the question becomes : against what?
If property transferred when recipient was 81, and he dies at age 85, is the
interest re-valued at the time of death based on life tables then?

PART TWO: PLANNING TECHNIQUES
A. OVERVIEW
Planning generally involves the process of reducing counted resources to be within the
allowable limitations as discussed above in Part One. The most common planning takes
the form of a combination of gifts, spend down, and conversion of counted resources to noncounted resources or income.
Simple gift planning and techniques have already been discussed in Part One, and will not
be reviewed again here. This section addresses the form by which transferred resources are
held subsequent to transfer from the standpoint of whether or not such form may be of use
in a given situation.
In addition, in certain instances form is - if not exalted over substance - a condition to
securing special eligibility qualification, i.e. "qualifying income trusts" and "special needs
trusts".

B. PLANNING THROUGH THE USE OF TRUSTS
1. General rule. Because of the change in the law brought about by OBRA '93, any trust
established after August 10, 1993, will be considered under the new transfer of resource
rules applicable with respect to trusts. Self-settled trusts - Le., those trusts created by
an individual with his or her own assets for his or her own benefit, whether actual or
potential - generally will prove useful only in a very narrow set of circumstances.
(a) Extended look-back. Transfers into trust have two unfavorable and complicating
features. First, the look-back period is extended an additional 24 months - from the
36 months applicable with respect to outright transfers to a sixty (60) month lookback period. What is more, the first month commences with the date at which no
distributions of all, or only a specified portion, of the trust can be made to the
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trust settlor. This is the case even if such distributions are made only in the
discretion of an independent trustee. It would seem that it would be a rare
circumstance where a self-settled trust would be a desirable planning technique,
since such a trust entails a longer waiting period than an outright transfer, and
affords the trust grantor/beneficiary/prospective Medicaid applicant minimized
beneficial enjoyment of the trust property other than over a segment or a potential
income interest only.
(1) Of course, even a gift made in trust is penalized based on the transfer of
resource factor, which in 2005 is $2,685. Thus, the trust rule only extends the

look-back period from 36 to 60 months. Whether the transfer will result in an
extended penalty depends on the amount of transferred funds.
Example: Mother has $100,000 which she places in an "income only" trust in
January 2006 to pay her income for life. She specifically relinquishes any
access to principal whatsoever. Thus, there has been a transfer of principal
which starts in January 2006. $100,000 divided by a projected transfer factor
of $3,020 (using 2005 as a base year and assuming 3% COLAs each
subsequent year) would mean that were an application made in January
2009 the penalty would have expired in October 2008. ($100,000 divided by
$3,020 = 33 months from January, 2006)Therefore, a penalty on a
$100,OOOTransfer into trust would not trigger any additional ineligibility
period.
(2) Contrast this with the situationwhere $200,000 is transferred. A transfer into
trust would expose the transferor to 2 additional years of ineligibility.
(b) Certain trusts receive favorable treatment.
(1) Special Needs Trusts - for disabled individuals under age 65 are a means to
qualify immediately for Medicaid.
(2) Third party trusts - that is trusts created by someone other than the Medicaid
recipient, a court, or legal guardian, or a spouse (other than a testamentary
trust created by a spouse) - are considered according to availability to the
individual seeking Medicaid. See 907 KAR 1:650.
(3) (iii) QITs - discussed below are not so much as a planning technique as an
eligibility requirement.
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c. SELF-SETTLED TRUSTS
Three general types are most typical: (i) A self-settled income only trust; (ii) a selfsettled special needs trust; and (iii) a qualifying income trust.
(1) THE INCOME ONLY TRUST

(a) Usefulness
The Income Only Trust is usually compared against a direct gift of assets to
children or other heirs.

Generally speaking, where an individual has been

financially independent, and is healthy, he or she may like to retain some but
not all, rights to his or her assets and independence. With an outright gift,
the funds are gone. If the individual wants money, he or she has to ask the
donees. Also, when an outright gift has been. made, the gifted funds would
generate income to the donees which would be reported on the donees income
tax return.
(b) Tax Features
With an Income Only Trust, the income from the assets would be paid from
the trust to the trust creator ("the Grantor"), and is not taxed to the donees.
(c) Limitations
With an Income Only Trust, by definition the Grantor's rights would be limited
to income, and he or she would not have an interest in the trust principal. If
the document permits, the Trustee could have the power to distribute
principal to persons other than the Grantor, which could then, if the
distributees desire, be gifted back to him or her, or used to pay his or her
bills.
(1) This may- although it should not - create problems as to issue of
availability of principal funds as to the grantor.
(d) Security to Grantor
Before leaving the subject, consider the potential dangers of gifts made directly
to children. For example, should a child run into creditor problems, the gifted
assets might be subject to the claims of a child's creditors.

Additionally,

should the child predecease the trust Grantor, then the funds that have been
given to the child might be subject to claims of a surviving spouse of the child,
or would generally be available to the creditors or other claimants of a child
through the child's probate estate.
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In this regard, if the Grantor wishes to

restrict access to principal, the Income Only Trust offers him or herthe
additional security that his or her money still remains available to provide for
him or her, and no one else.
(e) Medicaid Effect
The creation of an Income Only Trust starts the Medicaid waiting period from
the time assets are transferred into the trust. Upon the expiration of no more
than (and possibly less than) five years from the date of the establishment of
the trust, the trust principal should no longer be considered available to the
Grantor. See section (B)(l)(a), above to the effect that the penalty is based on
the amount of the transfer. If he or she requires long-term care, the trust
assets should not thereafter prevent him or her from being eligible for Medicaid
benefits.

In other words, through the creation of the income only trust, the

Grantor would be starting the time period which, upon expiration of five years
at the longest, would mean that he or she would be "resource eligible" for
Medicaid benefits should he or she require long-term institutional or home
health care for which Medicaid benefits are normally payable. Properly drafted
the trust should not be counted after five years. As stated earlier, the
ineligibility period will depend on amount of transfer.
(1) Given the current low yield interest rate environment, such trusts
may not be popular. If rates were to rise there may be a renewed
interest.
(f)

Tax Implications
(1) Estate and Gift Tax
The establishment of the trust mayor may not be a completed gift for
gift tax purposes, depending on what is decided.

If the Grantor's

estate is less than $1.5 Million, (in 2005) and there is some built in
capital gain it may be advisable that he or she retain a general
testamentary power of appointment over the trust assets which may
be exercised in his or her Will.

Basically, that just means that the

Grantor retains the power to say who gets what at death.

The

advantage to the transfer to the trust's not being considered a
completed gift is with the fact that where the gift becomes complete
upon death, -then the trust assets will receive a stepped up basis equal
to date-of-death value. This would enable the trustee to liquidate the
trust assets at that time without realizing capital gains tax.
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(2) Stepped-up basis - income tax advantage
The trade off for deferring the completion of the gift to the time of
death is that the assets would be includable in the taxable estate. As
mentioned, the federal estate tax will only apply to estates which
exceed (in 2005) $1.5 million dollars.

In other words, if there is no

estate taxation in any event, it may be advisable to structure the trust
so as to get the step up in basis.
(i) Generally, where it is believed that a taxable estate not will be
an issue, it is advisable to complete the gift at death which
would afford the heirs with the ability to eliminate capital gains
tax up to date of death.

If it is believed that the estate will

exceed the projected estate tax exemption in the year of death,
then it may be advisable to complete the gift now. The federal
gift tax exemption is $1 million.

If the transfer to trust is a

completed gift at the time of transfer, then that would lock in
the heirs to the Grantor's basis in the property which may
trigger the potential for significant capital gains when the
assets are sold.
(ii) Caution may be advisable in drafting to avoid exposure to
estate recovery.
(iii) Note: An incomplete gift for tax purposes can be a completed
transfer for Medicaid purposes
(3) Income Taxation
From an income tax point of view, as stated earlier the trust should be
taxed to the Grantor under the grantor trust sections of the Internal
Revenue Code, IRe §§ 671-679.

Where the Grantor retains a right to

income for life, he or she will be taxed on the income generated by the
trust assets.
This is an advantage in that a trust is normally taxable at more highly
compressed brackets than is an individual.

Of course, the trustee can

control· the extent of income generated, and the Trustee will not normally
(in a well-drafted trust agreement) be limited by any requirement to make
the trust assets productive of income. Thus, should the trustee design an
investment portfolio which contains primarily growth securities which do
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not pay dividends and there are few income paying securities, income flow
can be minimized or maximized as needs require.
(i) The trust could be established to generate higher income first which
could later be minimized at such time as the Grantor applies for
Medicaid benefits. Reason: Where the grantor goes on Medicaid, his or
her income from the trust must be paid to the facility unless there is a
possible community spouse income allowance.
(2) DISABLED

PER~ON'S ("SELF-SETTLED")

TRUSTS

(a) Overview
In August 1993, OBRA'93 specifically sanctioned the use of a special needs
trust established for the benefit of a disabled individual who is under 65 years
of age even if that individual's own assets are used to create the trust. The
grantor must be the disabled person's parents, grandparents, legal guardian,
or a court.

In certain instances, a non-profit organization can establish a

trust pooling arrangement.
A

so-called

"disabled

person's

trust"

is

authorized

under

42

USC

1396p(d)(4)(A) and 1396p(d)(4)(C), and is a means of qualifying for public
assistance benefits a disabled individual who otherwise has excess resources
and is thus not eligible Such trusts are exempt from transfer of resource
penalty.
(b) Special applications
The trust beneficiary qualifies for available Medicaid benefits as soon as the
funds are transferred into the trust and not used for the beneficiary's support.
Note: Unlike the issue regarding third party funds (discussed in Section *****
below) what is involved here is a trust created with the disabled beneficiary's
own funds which, once placed in the trust, are excluded from consideration.
Thus by establishing a qualifying trust and converging assets to it, he or she
can immediately receive governmental benefits. As to this type trust, there is
no Medicaid ineligibility period. The trust may thus be established either well
in advance of the time participation in a public assistance program is offered,
or the day before.
(c) Personal injury awards, inheritance protection

G - 21

(1) The Special Needs Trust technique can be used to shelter personal
injury awards from spend down requirements Thus, where the person
became injured and disabled in an act which was the source of a
settlement or damage award a Special Needs Trust can be a useful
device to protect the funds.
(2) Similarly, funds which a person receives by way of an inheritance
can be protected through use of the trust.
(3) In addition to qualifying a disabled individual for Medicaid, such a
trust can qualify a disabled beneficiary for Social Security SSI benefits
during a certain phase, (so long as principal is not available at the
beneficiary's

demand;

i.e.,

distributions

from

the

trust

are

discretionary with the trustee) while containing a "trigger" provision
that will qualify the disabled person for Medicaid benefits by shutting
down all basic support discretion at such time as a care facility, group
home, or other arrangement offers the beneficiary participation in a
Medicaid program.

For instance, a trust can contain a purely

discretionary provision authorizing certain payments on behalf of a
disabled beneficiary so as to render the beneficiary eligible for a
monthly Medicaid card to cover that beneficiary's hospitalization and
other health care benefits even though participation in a long term
care program might be deferred until a future date. Then, at the future
date when participation is available to the beneficiary, the trigger
provision can scale back the trust to provide more restrictive benefits
(i.e., supplement support only) to complete this important estate
conservation technique.

In particular, individuals who are awaiting

eligibility in the "Supports in Community Living" program (the "SCL
program") may find such a trust to be quite helpful on both a short
and long term basis.
(d) Qualification requirements
(1) Payback requirement
In order to qualify the individual for Medicaid, the self-settled Special
Needs Trust

must contain a

mandatory

state

reimbursement

provision. The provision must specifically state that at death of the
disabled person the trust property passes to the state to reimburse the
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state for medical assistance furnished the beneficiary during his or her
lifetime.

(i) Exception if the trust is administered as a pooled trust by a
non-profit organization, it may qualify for exemption.
(2) Substantive requirements
The other qualification requirements relate to the substantive or
dispositive provisions of the trust.
(i) Unavailability to beneficiary. The trust must not be accessible
by the beneficiary himself or herself,

and must be from

reimbursement to the state where the funds remain in trust for
other disabled individuals a pure discretionary trust in the
discretion of the Trustee. Further, the trust should contain a "no
support" clause that prohibits payment of essential support or
health care whenever such items are available, or potentially
available, to be paid by Medicaid.
(ti) For the sole benefit of the beneficiary. The self-settled trust can

not be made available to benefit anyone other than the beneficiary.
(iii) Age limit. Can not be created for, or added to after,
beneficiary's reaching age sixty-five.
(ivl Class of graritors. Under the authorizing statute, there isa
limited class of permissible grantors: the individual's parents,
grandparents, legal guardian, or a court.
(v) Qualifying Income Trust Compliance In an interesting recent
intepretation (some might say "misinterpretation")of the law, DMS
staff have sought to apply QIT rules (discussed in the next section)
to Special Needs Trusts. Thus, even though SNTs are specifically
authorized under 42 USC Section 1396(p)(D)(4) which sets out the
requirements, DMS has sought to engraft further requisites on the
Congressional statute passed in 1993, with the result being that
SNTs which do not comport with QIT rules may be rejected by
Frankfort.
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The author believes that DMS theory is simply wrong. QIT rules are
intended to provide a framework whereby individuals with income in
excess of the income standard (in 2005, $1,737 per month) must
place their excess income in a QIT. The federal regulations on such
matters, HCFA Transmittal 64, makes it clear that only income "of the
individual" is subject to QIT rules. As to SNTs, so long as the income
is that of the trust, and not the individual, QIT rule are inapposite.

NOTE: SPECIAL CONSIDERATION - As of this writing} the statutory language
authorizing a disabled person's trnst does not contain any guidance with regard
to what happens in the event the disabled individual recovers from his or her
disability and returns to independent living while assets remain in the trust.
There is a question as to whether the disabled person may receive unrestricted
principal benefits from the trnst at that time} or thereafter} which will cause a
substantial depletion or dissipation prior to such individual's deat~ thus cutting
down or eliminating a state's right of recovery.
(vi) Subrogation Counsel preparing disabled person's self-settled

trusts will often work with personal injury lawyers. In this regard,
it is important to determine whether there may be an outstanding
Medicaid subrogation claim against assets which are contemplated
for placement in the trust. The matter of subrogation rights is not
clear under Kentucky law, and it is possible under the so-called
"made whole" theory of tort law that even in the wake of a large
subrogation claim, the Plaintiffs lawyer may negotiate a reduced
payment. Nonetheless the practitioner is alerted to KRS 205.629.
Although Special Needs Trust legislation facilitates future benefit
eligibility subsequent to receipt of funds from a settlement or
judgment, there may well be an obligation to repay Medicaid for
benefits advanced prior to receipt of funds, even where the injured
party never receives funds that are conveyed into trust. Failure to
report funds may trigger harsh Medicaid penalties with respect to
future or ongoing benefits. This matter should be reviewed with
the client and personal injury attorney for guidance and risk
evaluation.
(3) QUALIFYING INCOME TRUSTS -
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In 2003 Kentucky joined the ranks of a handful of "income cap states". This means
that individuals with income above a certain ceiling are not eligible for Medicaid,
regardless of whether they are resource eligible.
(a) Definition - A "qualifying income trust" ("QIT") is a trust agreement which
is established to receive income of Medicaid applicants/recipients whose
income exceeds the income standard applicable under Kentucky's income
qualification rules which changed on September 1, 2003. QITs are not a
planning device as much as a compliance requisite. In effect, any individual
whose income exceeds the annual income standard (in 2005 it is $1,737 per
month) must place his or her income in excess of this amount in the QIT,
and by so doing the individual will no longer be income ineligible.
(1) Resource eligibility is still required. In other words, the trust does
not create eligibility. Resources are NOT placed in the trust. The
trust is a vehicle to

receive income.

(b) Requirements - Under 907 KAR 1:650 Section 3(5)(a)-(g), a QIT must
contain the following provisions (1) All income of the trust will be regarded as "patient liability" and
thus must be distributed currently toward the patient's cost of care
unless under the relevant facts use of funds for allowable deductions
such as dependency deductions (i.e. community spouse) is allowed
by the DeBS caseworker.
(2) The trust must be irrevocable.
(3) Only income above the annual income standard must be placed
in the trust.
(i) Thus, in cases where income is $2,037 per month, only
$300 must be placed in trust. The first $1,737 can keep
coming in to the same source as always.
(4) At the death of the recipient, any accumulated income which has
not been paid must be paid to the state.
(5) The trust must terminate only at the recipient's death.
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(i) Query as to what happens if the patient recovers? This is
not addressed

under

the

regulations.

Presumably the

recipient's income would then be directed away from the
trust.
(6) The trust must be notarized. This has been a strict requirement
of DMS policy makers.

D. THIRD PARTY TRUSTS 1. Overview. In this section, we will examine trusts created with funds not belonging
to the Medicaid recipient. In keeping with general principles, such trusts are generally
considered according to availability to the individual. See 907 KAR 1:650 for
guidance.
(a) Two general drafting principles. As an overall rule, in drafting for such
trusts, it is wise to keep in mind two fundamental principles:
(1) Make the trust a discretionary trust. In other words, do not give the
beneficiary unlimited access to the

tru~t.

Vest discretion exclusively in the

Trustee as to such amounts, if any, of income and/or principal that will be
paid to or for the benefit of the beneficiary.
(i) If creating a trust for the surviving spouse, even if it is intended
that spouse be Trustee for himself or herself and given latitude over
disbursements, such powers should be subject to cut back in the
event of spouse's incapacity or institutionalization.
(ii) Better option would be automatic removal of spouse from being
Trustee in the event of such events as described in (i), above.
a) Further if spouse is elderly or disabled, may wish to use
one other than spouse as Trustee.
(2) Incorporate Trust Protector provisions. Though such trusts are typically
irrevocable by beneficiary, it is wise to confer upon a non-beneficiary ( or notcurrent beneficiary) the power to amend the trust to comport with changes in
the law or the interpretation of the law subsequent to establishment of the
trust.
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(2.) THIRD-PARTY SPECIAL NEEDS TRUSTS (a) Overview - An important exception to the available resource rules applies in the
context of a trust created for the benefit of a potential Medicaid recipient other than the
individual who is the grantor, or his or her spouse. Where the funds utilized in the
establishment of a trust have originated with the Medicaid applicant, his or her transfer
is generally going to be either disregarded and the trust funds counted as available, or
the transfer will constitute a transfer of resources which will result in a period of
ineligibility, as determined by the look-back rule unless the special needs trust exception
applies. See 907 KAR 1: 645 for treatment of trusts and transfer of resource policy.
Trusts created for oneself that may receive special exclusionary treatment are not the
subject of this section, but are discussed more fully in Section 5, below.
(1) Created by non-recipient party
The third party trust referred to in this section contemplates a trust agreement which is
created by a third party (Le., one other than the prospective Medicaid recipient) with
assets which have originated at all times with the third

party~

In other words, this

section will focus on trusts established by a third party which, at the time a Medicaid
application is made, are not regarded as having been created by the Medicaid applicant,
and where the trust assets are not regarded being available resources to the Medicaid
applicant.
Example:

Father creates a trust for his daughter, a handicapped individual.

The

trust will be funded with the father's assets. The trust is, as to the daughter, a third
party trust.
(2) Typical Grantor(s)
In particular, at this point consideration will be with the need for responsible family
members to take into account how to best plan for those who may be dependent upon
funds which will be set aside either for dependent survivors at the death of the third
party; or be set aside for dependent individuals who are categorically eligible for
benefits, and resource eligible based on their own resources, but the third party
wishes to establish a source of supplemental support as to such individual in such a
manner as to not preclude public assistance benefits from being available to such
person, referred to herein as the "disabled person."
(3) Purposes
In all events, planning will emphasize the need for structuring the funds so set aside
in order that such funds constitute only a "supplemental source of income," of the
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disabled person with the result that any funds as to that individual will not be
regarded as available resources, subject to spend down limitation rules as a condition
to the disabled person's continuing eligibility for Medicaid benefits, or anticipated
eligibility for such benefits.

Thus, the primary issue relating to third party trusts

centers on whether the trust assets are "available" to the disabled person/Medicaid
applicant.
(b) "Supplemental Support" Trusts
The key to understanding the rules of third party trusts is that such trusts must be
written in such a way that at all relevant times, the assets and/ or income therefrom
will not be available to meet the disabled person's basic cost of care, including
institutional care, or generally the type of services which are normally covered by
public assistance programs.
A "special needs trust" or "supplemental support trust" can take two forms: (1) a
"pure" supplemental support trust; and (2) a so-called "trigger trust."
Included among the definition of items which go towards a disabled person's "special
needs" or "supplement support" are those items which are not necessary to provide for
the disabled person's basic needs, including room and board in an institution or other
facility, or under circumstances where governmental benefits are payable.

Special

needs would include such items as entertainment, vacations, travel, audio and visual
entertainment, non-essential clothing, and generally all other items which may
provide for a beneficiary's enjoyment of life but which are not among the beneficiary's
essential needs.
(1) "Pure" supplemental support trust - This is a trust which, by its terms, is at all times

limited to making disbursements which are strictly to provide for a beneficiary's
supplemental support or special needs. The trust does not authorize distributions for a
beneficiary's general health, maintenance, and support, even where such distributions
are discretionary with the trustee. Such a trust is normally confined to circumstances
where a beneficiary is already disabled and receiving public assistance.

Neither the

trust corpus nor income of such a trust would be considered available to the beneficiary
in the determination of his or her eligibility for benefits.
(2) Trigger Trust - This is a type of trust which provides that the trustee may, in the
trustee's sole and absolute discretion, apply so much of the trust income and/ or
principal as the trustee deems advisable to provide for the beneficiary's reasonable
health, maintenance, and support. However, upon a beneficiary's application for public
assistance benefits to be applied towards the cost of providing for the beneficiary's
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institutionalization or other care of a sort for which governmental benefits for the
beneficiary's health care become and remain, payable, then, at that time, the trustee
shall no longer have the authority to distribute to or for the trust beneficiary any
amounts from the trust income or principal which may supplant or displace public
assistance benefits.

Thus, when the Medicaid application is made the Medicaid

application(or eligibility, as the case may be) triggers the restrictive supplemental
support provisions of the trust, and no distributions may be made other than for the
purpose of providing for a beneficiary's special needs, or supplemental support.
(i) Under the current regulatory system, a third party special needs trigger trust
will generally not negatively affect a beneficiary's eligibility for public assistance,
provided that::
a)

the Trustee is never required to distribute income or corpus to be applied
toward the beneficiary's health, maintenance or support;

b) the Trustee's power to even make discretionary disbursements for health,
maintenance and support is shut down upon the application for public
assistance benefits. So long as benefits are paid, the Trustee has no power
to make disbursements which supplant or displace same. Some flexibility
may be inserted in the language of trust such that "insubstantial" public
assistance benefits, (usually small cash assistance payments such as SSI)
may be disregarded if the beneficiary has needs which are not being met
by those benefits, and the trust fund could meet those needs;
c)

The potential special needs beneficiary should not have a definable
interest in the trust;

d) Ideally (but often this is not practical) a person who has a support
obligation to the special needs beneficiary should not be trustee, especially
if someone else is available.
(ii) Comparison of Trusts
This author tends to favor third party trigger trusts over pure supplemental
support trusts, as the former are much more flexible to a given set of facts.
Such trusts require more intensive management, particularly as the Medicaid
beneficiary's situation changes, so as to not make a prohibited distribution
during a relevant time.
(3) Administrative Issues
Even should such a distribution be made, if spent before that month end, the Medicaid
rules of "administrative feasibility" may not necessarily result in a disqualification.

G - 29

(i) Trigger trusts can be adapted to a class of beneficiaries, including non-disabled
beneficiaries, thus facilitating broadly permissible support distributions to some
beneficiaries, while restricting distributions to others.
(ii) A trigger provision is commonly utilized where a beneficiary does not at present have
a life situation which requires the beneficiary's institutionalization or other long term
care, but in order to be responsive to circumstances which, by virtue of the passage of
time, and a change in life situation, the need for estate planning and trust
administration can become compellingly important.
(c)Special Needs Provision
(1) Override Provision
For the above reasons, an override provision in the trust document may be
advisable.
(2) Indirect distributions
Whether the trust is a pure, special needs or trigger trust, some other
technical aspects of the trust should be drafted for.

Included among the

special needs language, should be a proviso that any beneficiary who is
eligible for public assistance benefits will never receive payments directly from
the trust. Thus, distributions from a special needs trust should preferably be
paid to third parties on behalf of the beneficiary and limited to those
expenditures that cannot be considered to be, or converted to, food, shelter,
utilities, or essential clothing.
(3) Note that in-kind and indirectly paid support items will reduce SSI
payments generally up to a maximum reduction in SSI by 1/3.
(d) Trust agreement vs. testamentary trust
(1) OBRA '93 specifically sanctioned a third party testamentary trust for the
benefit of a spouse. This should not be relevant for a disabled non-spousal
beneficiary. Query as to whether an inter vivos trust agreement created by a
third party can provide supplemental support for a beneficiary and come
within the protection of the statute.

Does this mean that revocable trusts

should be collapsed at death and poured over to a testamentary trust? At this
point, the solution which is advocated is the grant of authority via specific
powers given to the executor to create a testamentary trust and receive such a
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distribution from an inter-vivos Trustee, even if that means re-opening the
estate, if necessary.
(i)

In cases where the trust beneficiary is not the spouse of the trust creator, the
trust should not present problems. Where the surviving spouse is beneficiary,
arguably the exception to transfer penalty under Manual Volume IV A Section
2010(8) (2) may not apply to a living trust versus a testamentary trust, since
that section appears to limit the exemption for trusts for a spouse to trusts
created "by will." This exemption should be construed to apply to trusts which
create benefits upon death of a spouse, as opposed to benefits while the nonapplicant spouse is living.

(ii) If the government is stingy and refuses to cover inter-vivos trusts which come

into effect after the death of the creator spouse, perhaps the most compelling
argument is with the fact that the trust was not created for the purpose of
gaining Medicaid eligibility. The transfer occurred upon and came into being
by reason of the spouse's death, which was not motivated by Medicaid
eligibility reasons.

See also Manual Volume IV A, Section 2105 for an

analogous situation.

E. CONVERTING ASSETS TO INCOME - ANNUITIES
1. Overview

(b) Caveat

Recently, although this author believes erroneously, the Kentucky Department
for Medicaid Services ("DMS") has challenged annuities acquired close in time
to Medicaid application date. The reader is advised to proceed with caution in

using this technique. Under policy adopted late in 2003, all annuities must be
reviewed by DMS staff in Frankfort which has begun to deny eligibility where
annuities were acquired on the eve of Medicaid application. The rationale of
DMS is that where a Medicaid purpose is clear, annuities are abusive means of
evading transfer penalties. This is in contrast with Federal Rules, under the
eMS Manual and Kentucky Administrative Regulations which provide that if

actuarially sound, non-transferrable and irrevocable, the transfer is not
counted and the funds are no longer considered a resource.
(c) May be only option. [n certain instances, if time is of the essence and there are no
other alternatives, an annuity may be advisable, depending on the client's risk
sensitivity.
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(d) The rationale by which the purchase of annuities is not a transfer of resources.
The reader will recall that the transfer of resource rule triggers a penalty period of
ineligibility in connection with a transfer made for less than full and adequate
consideration.

Although this rule operates generally to attach a penalty period to

most transfers, transfers for adequate consideration are thus not subject to a penalty.
Perhaps the most effective device to utilize the "adequate consideration" option is the
Private Annuity, which is nothing more than a transfer of assets in exchange for a
payment of income...a conversion of assets to income

Such a transfer, properly

structured, should enable the transferor to become eligible for Medicaid benefits
immediately, without any penalty period whatsoever, so long as the transfer results in
the transferor receiving annuity payments which are "actuarially sound" as deemed
by the Kentucky Medicaid regulations.

In effect, the technique should be viable in

that the property transferred in exchange for the annuity is transferred for
consideration (Le., the annuity payment) which is worth an amount precisely equal to
the value of the property transferred.
(e) Life expectancy tables have been set forth in the CMS regulations, and such tables

must be taken into account in determining the amount of the annuity payout. The
tables are set out at Manual Section 1890 and 1900.
Example: Mrs. Smith, age 72, is institutionalized and has been told
that

a Medicaid bed is available to her.

Under the CMS regulations,

she has a life expectancy of 13.99 years. Thus, payments under an
annuity cannot be established under a fIXed term of years which will
extend significantly beyond her life expectancy, or the arrangement
will be deemed to be not actuarially sound. If not actuarially sound,
adequacy of consideration will be questioned, and a possible gift
element will be involved.
2. Commercial annuities. Annuities purchase from a normal commercial annuity issuer
(typically a life insurance company) may satisfy the rules, however a VERY CAREFUL
examination must be made of each annuity.
(a) Qualification Considerations
(1)

Does the annuitant have access to principal? If so, -no matter what

limitations there may be, the annuity will likely be counted as a resource.
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(2)

What is the term? If it is not actuarially sound - i.e., a guaranteed

term of years - there will be a problem.
(3)

Is it irrevocable and non-transferrable? If not, it will count.

3. Private annuities. A private annuity is an annuity but the obligation to pay is not made by
an insurance company, but by an individual. Private annuities are quite complicated, and in
this author's experience should be undertaken only as a last resort option when there are
few other options. The reason : the transaction entails serious legal obligations over a
protracted period of time, which clients frequently don't have the stomach for. However, in
the right situation they have their merits.
(a) Mechanics - Those familiar with the estate planning utility of a Private
Annuity know that the arrangement is a means of converting assets into
income, whereby the individual transferring assets (known as the
"annuitant") transfers assets to another individual (the "obligor") in
exchange for the obligor's commitment to make payments back to the
annuitant, either for life, a term certain, or a term of years as determined
by reference to the annuitant's life expectancy, the last of which is known
as a "Private Annuity for Term of Years" or "PATY." Essentially, the Private
Annuity operates just like a commercial annuity purchased through an
insurance company, or other financial institutions offering annuities;
however, the difference is that the private annuity arrangement is between
individuals not normally engaged in the business of providing annuities,
typically family members.

Thus, the arrangement is referred to as a

"Private Annuity."
(b) The way it works is as follows.
(1) Transfer of assets - the annuitant irrevocably transfers assets to
the obligor. Upon transfer, the transferred assets then belong to
the obligor.

For reasons discussed below, clients should

earmark a specific account, or portfolio, where the transferred
assets can be segregated from other assets of the obligor.
(2) The annuity agreement sets forth .the obligation - A written
agreement should be prepared to recite and set forth the annuity
obligation, specifying the amount of the payout, the term of the
annuity, and the disposition in the event of the death of the
obligor. Some key points are as follows:
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(3) Investment element - For the transaction to hold water insofar as
Medicaid eligibility is concerned, not only is there a requirement
that the term of the annuity be actuarially sound, but the
payment must
reasonable.

reflect a

return

on investment which is

(4) Purpose - starting with the post-June 2003 rules, Kentucky
bureaucrats have been - this author believes without proper
authority - looking at the purpose of the annuity: was it to gain
Medicaid eligibility? If so, even a properly structured transaction
may, depending on circumstances, be disrespected, with the
result that resources so transferred may be considered subject to
transfer of resource penalty; or the funds may be considered to
be a "resource."
(i) This approach to denial of eligibility should, as a technical
matter, be baseless. Even eMS, speaking of "purpose" states
that it must be viewed in light of actuarial soundness. If DMS'
theory is correct - that a transfer is deemed as having
occurred, what is it that has been transferred when the
annuity is actuarially sound? Where is the failure of fair
market value? If the transfer is disregarded altogether, i.e. the
funds are considered a "resource", what of the fact that the
funds are not available?
(S) Disposition at death - Typically, at death the annuity obligor's
payment obligation

would

simply cease,

and

the

assets

transferred pursuant to the obligation would remain with the
obligor.

As an alternative, the annuitant may set forth a

beneficiary designation in the private annuity that directs the
disposition of any payment obligation which may survive him or
her.
(6) Power to amend - As of this writing, as is true with regard to
trust amendatory powers, it is prudent to authorize the obligor
(not the annuitant) to collapse the annuity and return funds to
the annuitant should either the

arrangement cause the

annuitant to lose eligibility for Medicaid benefits for any reason,
or if the funds transferred are regarded as available to the
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annuitant. A collapse should give the obligor power to commute
the remaining payment obligation to its present value. Note that
the annuitant must NOT have a power to access the principal.
(7) Why it should work - actuarial soundness" - In theory, the
t1

annuitant no longer has a resource to the extent of funds
transferred,

but

an

income

stream

that

will

result

in

consumption of the asset so transferred based on the individual's
life expectancy.
(c) Tax consequences - The tax consequences which flow from the
arrangement are as follows:
(1) Income tax aspects - The annuitant will receive taxable income
with respect to a fraction of the payments, since a portion
represents a return on investment, and a portion represents a
return of contributed capital.

The obligor will be taxed on

earnings from the funds transferred to him or her in exchange
for the annuity payments.

A discussion of the income tax

aspects of annuities is beyond the scope of this outline, however,
the practitioner is referred to Section 72 of the Internal Revenue
Code. Basically, the practitioner should determine the expected
payout over the life of the annuity, divide this by the amount
contributed, and determine a

return of contribution, and

anticipated return on investment.

This results in a fractional

share which should be multiplied by each annuity payment to
arrive at the amount which is taxable income for the year.
(i)It should be noted that regardless of whether the amount
transferred is invested by the obligor in a tax free obligation,
the annuitant nonetheless must report his or her return on
investment as determined in Section 72. Typically, in the
context of individuals interested in Medicaid eligibility
planning, this will be a fairly small amount, and generally
will be immaterial since the annuity payment will be applied
toward the cost of long term health care, and therefore tax
deductible at any rate.
(ii)Where assets other than bank deposits, certificates or
deposit, or cash equivalents are part of the arrangements, the
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obligor will

receive the annuitant's basis in the assets, with

some adjustment, as determined by applicable IRS basis rules
under Section 1014 and

1015 of the Internal Revenue

Code.
Caveat:: The annuity may be structured so that any unpaid amounts at the
annuitant's death will be paid by the obligor to named beneficiaries. Where
large amounts are involved, if the annuitant dies before receiving all
payments, if the obligor simply keeps the funds transferred and is relieved of
the annuity obligation, there may be taxable income to the obligor in the year
of the annuitant's death to the extent of the unpaid annuity amount.
Revenue Ruling 55-119.

See

Having the unpaid balance paid by way of a

beneficiary designation or general testamentary power of appointment
retained by the annuitant may, properly designed, cause the annuity to be
includable in the annuitant's estate and thus pass to heirs from the
annuitant, possibly avoiding income taxability to the obligor.
(2) Gift tax aspects - Structured properly, the transaction is a sale of
assets for valuable consideration, and not a taxable gift. Thus
the transfer of funds from the annuitant/ Medicaid recipient to
the obligor is without transfer tax consequences.
(3) Inheritance tax aspects - Depending on how it is structured, the
annuity may avoid estate taxation.

If the assets were acquired

during lifetime for consideration of the annuity promise, the
obligor should receive the assets at the death of the annuitant
free from Kentucky inheritance tax, or, where applicable, federal
estate tax. The latter will rarely, if ever, be involved, except in
those unusual instances where the annuitant has already used
up his or her unified credit, and enters into a private annuity
transaction and dies with a payment obligation outstanding.
Such an annuity should not be covered by Section 2039 of the
Internal Revenue Code, and in this authorfs view is not required
to be reported on IRS Form 706 under the IRS instructions.
(d)Uses and limitations
(1) Generally - An annuity in the context of estate conservation planning
is quite useful in two very important respects. The first is that the
arrangement is a means of taking a Medicaid bed when offered when
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transferred resources would preclude making a Medicaid application.
Secondly, the structure is a means of slowing down the dissipation of
resources.
(2) Limitations - The arrangement may not provide the family with the perfect
fmancial solution to the cost of care, since the annuity

i~come will,

with some

small allowances (notably personal monthly needs and the cost of health
insurance), be regarded as patient liability, and thus turned over to the
nursing home. Over a long period of time, the transferred funds will, in fact,
be dissipated. Yet, in situations where there is no time to plan, and assets
will be consumed in any event, the private annuity can give the family a
chance to receive an inheritance.

Even in smaller estates where a Rule of

Halves transfer will facilitate eligibility in a relatively short period of time,
there will still be a waiting period before eligibility can be established.
private annuity can eliminate the waiting period.

A

As a rule of thumb, this

technique will provide maximum benefits where the client is on the relatively
younger end of the elder client spectrum, especially where the annuitant's
actual life expectancy is not very long. A payout of fourteen years with good
investment performance can slow down the rate of consumption of $100,000
assets to $8,000 per year, versus $30,000.
(i) For elderly single persons, the annuity payments amy approach
monthly cost of care and be of little avail.
(ii) Typically works best for community spouse situations.
(e) Private versus commercial annuity?
For several reasons a private annuity offers advantages over a commercial
annuity.
(1) No sales load - typically, insurance companies charge a hidden fee which is
built into the return.
{2) Flexibility - since the transferred funds remain in the family, if the
annuitant ever needs more money, there is a pool of assets which can be used
for him or her. This may especially be critical if the annuitant is on Medicaid
for a while, but then goes off the program, returning to personal care or
independent living. With an irrevocable commercial annuity (remember, to be
effective the arrangement must be irrevocable) that flexibility is not there.
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(3) Opportunity for growth - if the family gets good investment performance, it
is possible that the yield on transferred assets will result in growth, rather
than consumption. In low interest times where the applicable federal rate is
low, funds may be able to generate the payout on earnings alone, thus
preserving the principal for the family.
(4) Can work for liquid assets - Assets can be transferred in kind rather than
sold and then have to pay taxes before writing a check to an insurance
company.
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TOP 10 MYTHS CONCERNING LONG TERM CAREl
MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY
by
Brian Borellis
Attorney at Law
802 Stone Creek Parkway, Suite 8
Louisville, KY 40223
(502) 425-5297

1.

If you make a gift, you must wait for 3 years before applying for
Medicaid.
This myth is the result of the confusion between the 3 year look back
rule with the ineligibility period. In its essence, the 3 year look back rule
is merely a point in time determined by reference to the date a Medicaid
application is made and how far back the government can go to assess
gifts made with a corresponding penalty. Basically, the ineligibility
period is determined on the theory of how long a person, transferring
funds, could have paid for long term care had he or she kept the funds.
The ineligibility period will depend on the amount of the gift.
The gift is divided by the transfer of resource factor established during
the year the Medicaid application is made. In 2005 in Kentucky, that
factor is $2,685.
Thus, a gift made 1 full year before the Medicaid application is made in
the amount of $26,850 will, assuming the application is made in 2005,
trigger a 10 month penalty, which would have expired at the time the
application has been made.

2.

Gifts in the amount of $10,000 per person per year are not

counted.
This myth confuses the gift tax annual exclusion (which, prior to 2002,
had been $10,000 per person per year, and is now $11,000 per year.
This is simply a gift tax matter), with the Medicaid transfer of resource
rule. There is no allowable minimum gift amount under Medicaid rules,
however, a gift made which is less than the transfer of resource factor
(see answer to question 1, above) will result in a zero (0) month penalty.

3.

It's always a good idea to transfer the house from parents to
children.
Prior to September 1,2003 there were very few cases, if any, where it
would make sense to transfer residential property. Residential property
had been excluded as a resource, and the transference of such property
out of the Medicaid recipient's name would result in the loss of the

exclusion, and would also trigger a penalty period. Simply stated,
transferred residential property is essentially the equivalent of a gift.
However, due to new rules effective September 1,2003, after an
individual is institutionalized for six months, the house is considered
non-homestead property which loses its exclusion in most cases. Thus,
the property will need to be put up for sale unless one of the following
exclusions applies. The exclusions are :
(a) the property is resided in by a spouse or a minor or disabled
child of the Medicaid recipient;
(b) the property has been transferred to a disabled child of the
recipient;
(c) the property has been transferred to a child of the Medicaid
recipient who has lived with the Medicaid recipient for two years
prior to institutionalization to provide care to the recipient to
prevent institutionalization.
(d) the property has been transferred to a sibling of the Medicaid
applicant who has an equity interest in the property and who
has resided with the applicant for a year or more.
Transferring the house to children can create significant income tax
problems to children upon the sale of the property subsequent to the
parents' death. For the disabled child exemptions it may be prudent to
sell the house in the Medicaid recipient parent's names if parent has
lived in house for 1 of previous 5 years to exclude gain from income tax
recognition.

4.

It is possible to shelter investments through a trust.
Although in certain instances it is possible that a trust can be a means
to shelter resources (Special Needs Trusts and income only trusts) any
assets - with the exception of excluded resources other than homestead
property- transferred into trust will either trigger a transfer of resource
penalty ( so long as the Grantor relinquishes rights to all or a portion of
the trust) or be of no consequence until withdrawn ( as in the case of a
typical revocable trust) . The only true exception is in certain limited
cases where property is transferred into a Special Needs Trust which can
avoid transfer penalties, subject to specific rules.
In certain instances, transfers into trust may actually extend the
Medicaid ineligibility period from 3 to 5 years since trusts trigger a 5 year
look back penalty. It depends on the amount of assets and what is
desired by the trust Grantor.
There are certain kinds of trusts - known as Income Only trusts - into
which funds can be transferred for individuals who wish to place
restrictions on the use of principal until after the Medicaid recipient's
death. Such trusts must be approached cautiously, and funds placed in

such trusts are subject to a 5 year, rather than a 3 year, look back
period.
Transfer of any assets into a trust in which the Medicaid applicant
retains a right to principal of the trust can result in a far extended
Medicaid ineligibility period.

s.

If one spouse is in the nursing home, the assets of the spouse living
at home can be protected.
While it is usually possible with some planning to protect the funds of
the non-institutionalized spouse (referred to as the "community spouse"),
there is a limit known as the "Community Spouse Resource Allowance"
or "CSRA" that can be protected for the community spouse. All nonexcluded resources in excess of the CSRA must be spent, transferred, or
otherwise converted into non-counted resources before they can be
protected for the community spouse.
Effective June 1, 2003, the CSRA is half the counted resources - up to a
maximum of$95,100 in 2005, with a minimum of $20,000. The
maximum changes annually based on COLAs per social security rules.
CAUTION: VERY IMPORTANT: The point at which the allowance is
determined is when the individual is institutionalized and has made
application for a "resource assessment" which can be a Medicaid
application. In other words, before the CSRA can be determined, the
individual will have to first have a "snapshot" of assets taken to the
Medicaid caseworker ( the government caseworker NOT the nursing
home social worker or staff employee).

Example: John and Jane Doe have combined assets of $100,000.
John is in a LTC facility, and Jane lives at home. Jane hears that
she can keep half the assets.
She thus pays for 2 pre-arranged funerals for $20,000 and spends
$30,000 on nursing home care. She goes to apply for Medicaid,
believing John is now eligible. After all, she read that she can keep
half the assets.
Problem is that when she first goes to caseworker she has
$50,000. She is told that she can keep Y2, or $25,000.
What she should have done was to have gone to the caseworker
and get a resource assessment when she had $100,000. She
would have been told she could keep $50,000, and then work from
there to get John eligible.

na.

6.

If one spouse goes into a nursing home, the other spouse living at
home must.helpto pay the nursing home costs for the
institutionalized spouse.
The non-institutionalized spouse may keep all of his or her income. In
addition, if the non-institutionalized spouse's income is less than a
particular year's "Community Spouse Income Allowance," then the
community spouse may receive however much is necessary of the
institutionalized spouse's income in order to bring him or her up to the
Community Spouse Income Allowance. Effective July 1,2005, the
Community Spouse Income Allowance is $1,604 with possible shelter
expense allowances.

7. Kentucky Medicaid eligibility determinations do not impose
INCOME eligibility requirements.
Previously, so long as the cost of care exceeded income, income was not
a bar to eligibility. Starting September 1,2003, however, Kentucky
Medicaid has imposed an additional requirement of income eligibility for
Medicaid recipients. Individuals with income in excess of $1,737 per
month must funnel the income in excess of this amount into a special
trust called a "Qualifying Income Trust". The trust must specifically
provide that the income, less possible allowable deductions for spousal
CSIA, health insurance premiums, and $40 monthly allowance, is to go
to the nursing home.

8.

Medicaid only counts half ofjointly owned property.
The rules on joint property are confusing, incomplete, and should not be
relied upon. Generally, joint property is considered available to the
Medicaid applicant if the Medicaid applicant may access the property.
Under Kentucky law, that is true with respect to most nearly every kind
of bank account imaginable. If the joint owner non-applicant's signature
must be given in order to transfer the joint property, then Medicaid may
count only half of such property. Joint bank accounts usually are
available at the signature of either of the owners. Joint property is not
something to rely upon where there is sufficient time to make other asset
transfers or conversions which are far more effective.
One exception may be with respect to jointly owned real estate.

9.

Medicaid does not count annuities as among the resources of the
applicant.
The problem with this general misunderstanding is that it is overbroad.
Only irrevocable annuities that are actuarially sound, non-assignable,

and contain a reasonable investment element may be excluded. Even
then, however, although the annuity may not be counted as a resource,
the annuity payments will be regarded as the patient's income and
reduce or defray Medicaid cost of care where the annuity is owned by the
Medicaid recipient.
This area is very volatile and planning through the use of annuities must
be approached with much caution. I would advise against using
annuities as planning devices unless there are no other viable
alternatives or in situations where health care costs are prohibitively
expensive.

10.

Basically, the best thing to do is to transfer all money and wait for
3 years before applying for Medicaid.
This mayor may not be the most advisable plan, depending on the
amount of funds. If the amount of funds exceed two times three years'
cost of care, then this is generally true. If a lesser amount is involved,
usually a transfer of less than all will result in a shorter Medicaid
ineligibility period. Also, through the judicious use of exclusions and
conversions, it is generally far more likely to be that exclusions,
conversions, and smaller transfers are a better way to go.
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